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ABSTRACT
We propose a methodology to analyze the risk 
of an adversary exploiting the maritime supply 
chain by smuggling a WMD in a container. 
We call this risk “WMD transfer risk”. We 
describe an extension of an existing modeling/
simulation tool wherein we show how to 
quantify the deterrence effects of optimal 
investments in WMD detection technology at 
U.S. ports; and measure subsequent reduction 
in WMD transfer risk. 
From a theoretical perspective, the implications 
of notional results from this model are 
different from implications of the results of 
traditional “game theoretical” models. From a 
practitioner perspective, our results emphasize 
the importance of tailoring foreign intelligence 
gathering efforts, hardening foreign ports 
against exploitation in addition to hardening 
U.S. ports, and comparing simulated optimal 
technology costs to real-world R&D and 
implementation costs. The audience for our 
proposal includes WMD detection technology 
engineers, law enforcement and security 
personnel, port operators, and agency 
executives.
INTRODUCTION
The security of the international maritime 
supply chain is vital to the economic well-being 
of the United States.  The National Strategy 
for Global Supply Chain Security,1 Maritime 
Commerce Security Plan,2 and other national 
strategies emphasize the importance of supply 
chain integrity to economic prosperity. Thus, 
we want to protect the supply chain from overt 
disruptions such as direct attacks on ports.
However, supply chain security is also 
important for a different reason: to prevent 
Measuring the Deterrence Value of Securing Maritime 
Supply Chains against WMD Transfer and Measuring 
Subsequent WMD Risk Reduction
Eric Taquechel, Ian Hollan, and Ted Lewis
its exploitation by way of smuggling illicit 
materials and people into the United States. 
Other strategies such as the National Strategy 
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,3 
and reports such as Maritime Transport and 
Destabilizing Commodity Flows,4 emphasize 
the attractiveness of supply chain exploitation 
to criminal and terrorist elements. This 
includes possible “transfer” of a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) into the United States, with 
the intent to detonate it in an inland city. While 
this is not the same problem as a direct supply 
chain disruption, the consequences of an inland 
WMD detonation are extremely important to 
address. 
To address this issue, technology analysis, 
and modeling and simulation coupled with 
risk analysis, can help us determine where 
supply chains are susceptible to exploitation 
by WMD transfer. This can help us think about 
where to place limited resources to mitigate 
this susceptibility. The Maritime Commerce 
Security Plan advocates:
Maritime security now involves risks that 
must be met with a layered approach that 
identifies and interdicts the threat as far as 
possible from the U.S. borders. A potential 
worst case scenario is the risk that a weapon of 
mass destruction is concealed in a container. 
Such a threat has severe consequences and 
must be detected as early as possible. A 
successful strategy will use risk management 
to align capabilities with threats to achieve the 
optimal response and protect the nation.5 
It can be debated whether a shipping 
container is the most likely mechanism for 
smuggling a WMD into the U.S. Nonetheless, 
analyzing the risk of WMD smuggled in shipping 
containers is one possible approach to reducing 
WMD transfer risk, since shipping containers 
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carry much of the goods shipped internationally 
via maritime conveyance. Before we propose 
an approach to do this, we review existing and 
emerging WMD detection technology, risk 
analysis, and modeling/simulation initiatives.
Existing and Emerging 
Technological Solutions
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO), a Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) component agency, has for the last 
several years managed the implementation 
of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 
(GNDA). The GNDA is a multilayered 
framework of radiological and nuclear weapon 
detection technologies and coordinating 
mechanisms, both within the United States and 
overseas.6 Example initiatives include:
• The Department of Energy (DOE) 
Megaports initiative leverages technology 
to identify and screen high risk cargo 
shipments overseas, before they depart 
enroute U.S. ports.7
• Customs and Border Protection (CBP’s) 
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) leverage 
technology to detect the presence of 
radioactive material in cargo shipments, 
primarily in U.S. ports.8
• U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) officers, equipped 
with radiation detection equipment, board 
vessels to ensure security and verify 
compliance with various regulations.9 
One emerging technology is the Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portal monitor (ASP) initiative. 
This initiative was intended to replace the 
existing RPMs, which only detect a radiological 
or nuclear signature. Then, secondary screening 
must be performed to identify the source of the 
signature. In contrast, the ASPs were intended 
to provide both a primary and a secondary 
screening function.10 However, this technology 
has had some challenges to implementation, 
as detailed in a National Academies report.11 
Going forward, the lessons learned from 
ASP development may benefit any efforts to 
develop the next generation of WMD detection 
technology.
There are many other initiatives not listed 
here. Together, these initiatives help reduce 
WMD transfer risk. Located both overseas 
and in the U.S., they constitute a layered 
defense. But, currently most of the focus 
is on the evaluation and testing of existing 
and emerging technologies. In addition 
to modeling technology effectiveness, we 
might also model how technology influences 
supply chain exploitation risk. Modeling and 
simulating supply chain exploitation risk 
requires quantitative representation of the 
layered defenses in the supply chain, and 
how technology effectiveness measurably 
contributes to those defenses. Furthermore, 
Taquechel and Lewis make the case for 
quantifying deterrence effectiveness of risk 
mitigation solutions,12 and applying that metric 
to determine unconditional risk.13 There is 
also work on optimal solutions to network risk 
problems, which could support a WMD layered 
defense strategy within budget constraints.14 
These concepts could be applied to a holistic 
framework for analyzing WMD transfer risk 
reduction, and could contribute to efforts to 
develop new WMD detection technology. 
Existing and Emerging 
Risk Analysis and Network 
Modeling
Existing risk models such as the Coast Guard’s 
Combating Maritime Terrorism Strategic Risk 
Model analyze risk of a WMD attack on U.S. 
port cities and grossly estimate risk reduction 
effectiveness of current USCG activities.15 
However, it is unclear whether this model 
explicitly measures deterrence effectiveness of 
these activities, or allows an analyst to simulate 
optimal activity levels or resource allocations 
to minimize WMD risk. It is also unclear 
whether this model incorporates estimates 
of WMD detection technology effectiveness 
into its algorithms, and whether it accounts 
for overseas exploitation. Also, the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model 
(MSRAM) is a risk analysis tool that might be 
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enhanced to analyze WMD risk, but it does not 
model network effects,16 so it is unclear whether 
MSRAM in its current state could support a 
layered defense strategy for reducing WMD 
risk. 
With respect to analyzing detection 
effectiveness in the context of supply chain 
network risk analysis, an attacker may exploit 
different supply chain network “nodes” such 
as foreign ports and U.S. ports to smuggle a 
WMD. Network science offers techniques to 
model the relationships between these nodes. 
Lewis explains network science and leverages 
its techniques in a modeling and simulation 
tool called the Model Based Risk Assessment 
(MBRA) model, in order to analyze network 
risk.17 MBRA can perform optimization or 
minimization of network risk given a limited 
budget, and can calculate return on investment. 
It treats risk as a probabilistic function of 
simulated investments. Other network analysis 
efforts to examine supply chain exploitation 
include a University of Southern California’s 
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of 
Terrorism Events (CREATE) initiative to 
develop a systems-based framework to analyze 
WMD transfer risk.18 Also, DNDO is expanding 
its Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Risk 
Analysis (RNTRA) model to explicitly model 
pathway exploitation.19 
These efforts are laudable. That said, there 
is an acknowledged need for an “integrated, 
holistic approach to the…security of maritime 
activities.”20 In this spirit, Taquechel extended 
Lewis’ MBRA model to show a “transfer threat 
network” model, including foreign ports where 
a shipping container would originate.21 This 
work also showed how attacker preferences 
can be used in place of traditional network 
science metrics. However, Taquechel’s MBRA 
extension does not simulate how WMD 
detection technology effectiveness influences 
network risk minimization, nor does it show 
how to measure potential deterrence effects of 
WMD technology investments. We now explain 
how our proposed modeling approach will 
complement and build upon these existing and 
emerging efforts.
Our First Contribution: 
Integrating Detection 
Effectiveness and Network 
Modeling
Our defense against WMD transfer might 
benefit from a comprehensive approach to 
(1) quantitatively model the risk reduction 
effectiveness of existing WMD detection 
technology investments at different layers of 
the supply chain, and (2) do this in the context 
of overall supply chain exploitation risk. Our 
existing efforts might also benefit from the 
analysis of optimal places in the supply chain 
for additional investment, where we could 
leverage emerging technology. Thus, one way to 
enhance existing efforts is to develop a modeling 
and simulation approach that captures WMD 
detection technology effectiveness estimates, 
and that performs supply chain network 
analysis, risk analysis, basic optimization 
techniques, and return on investment analysis 
to produce a comprehensive WMD transfer risk 
evaluation framework. We propose an approach 
to do precisely this, by expanding Taquechel’s 
original transfer threat model. 
Our Second Contribution: 
Quantifying Deterrence 
Effects of WMD Transfer 
Risk Mitigation Investments
This expansion will also leverage the 
quantification of deterrence, as introduced 
in Taquechel and Lewis. Cronin and Cronin 
propose that deterrence occurs when an actor 
discourages aggression toward another actor, 
with the intended outcome that the former 
never has to respond to aggressive action by 
the latter.22 Thus, we might attempt to deter 
an attacker from smuggling a WMD through 
the supply chain, rather than relying solely 
upon our detection equipment once a WMD 
has already entered the network. However, in 
this paper we focus instead on modeling how 
deterrence influences various attacker options, 
which we will call relative deterrence. That said, 
we want to quantify the relative deterrence 
effects of our technology investments, and 
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estimate how deterrence measurably reduces 
WMD transfer risk. The National Academies 
report on challenges with ASP implementation 
specifically identified that:
Deterrence…is an important factor in the 
likelihood that a malefactor will decide to try 
to smuggle a weapon or weapon materials, but 
there is not yet a widely accepted intellectual 
framework…to measure or evaluate this 
factor.23
Taquechel and Lewis show how risk can 
change based on changes in attacker intent. We 
can quantify the change in that intent based 
on the difference between (1) attacker intent 
to execute a specific attack before deterrence 
investments, and (2) attacker intent to execute 
that same attack after deterrence investments. 
That change in intent represents deterrence, 
and intent is a component of the legacy DHS 
risk equation Risk=f(Threat, Vulnerability, 
Consequence), where Threat is comprised of 
attacker Intent and Capability.24 The general 
deterrence quantification equation we will use 














Equation 1. Deterrence effectiveness
Taquechel and Lewis originally presented 
this concept in the context of deterring 
attacks on individual infrastructures, without 
explicitly accounting for network effects. Thus, 
we now extend deterrence quantification to 
the problem of reducing WMD transfer risk, 
a network analysis problem. The Maritime 
Commerce Security Plan advocates deterring 
attacks by inspecting cargo early in the supply 
chain, before it arrives in U.S. ports.25 This 
plan also claims inspecting cargo in a U.S. 
port is too late to deter an attack on that port; 
however, if the WMD target is an inland port, 
as it is in our approach, then investing in 
detection capabilities in U.S. ports could have 
deterrence value. We thus want to measure 
that value to use in quantitative WMD transfer 
risk analysis. Furthermore, RAND emphasizes 
the importance of deterrence in implementing 
technology for security improvements, as it 
would contribute to threat and vulnerability 
reduction, but they do not further address 
deterrence in their report.26
Given this context, there are various 
ongoing deterrence analysis initiatives in DHS, 
including a CREATE effort27 and a DHS Science 
and Technology directorate (S&T) review of 
multiple methodological approaches to model 
intelligent adversaries and deterrence.28 Also, 
DNDO’s RNTRA efforts emphasize deterrence 
of WMD attacks.29 These efforts are well-
intentioned and useful, but it is not clear 
whether they explicitly measure deterrence 
or explicitly examine the effects of deterrence 
upon WMD transfer risk. 
In an analysis of the ASP program, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
recommended that DNDO consider game-
theoretical analyses to determine whether the 
ASP technology might offer any deterrence 
effects.30 Our proposed model will quantify the 
WMD transfer risk reduction effects of detection 
technology, which could be existing technology 
such as the RPMs. But, our model will also 
quantify the prospective deterrence effects of 
emerging technology implementation, such as 
new solutions that might emerge as follow-on 
to the ASP initiative. We will use a modified 
game theoretical approach, from Taquechel and 
Lewis, to quantify these prospective deterrence 
effects in our model.31
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Putting It All Together: Our 
Proposed Methodological 
Approach
In sum, we will enhance Lewis’ MBRA model, 
specifically a logic tree model extension thereof, 
to model a supply chain as a network of nodes 
and links between the nodes, and we will include 
foreign ports, U.S. ports, and U.S. inland cities 
as nodes. The links will represent attacker 
transfer pathway options. We will also include 
a technique to incorporate WMD detection 
technology effectiveness estimates into our 
extension’s WMD transfer risk calculations. 
These estimates will reflect effectiveness of 
equipment that detects WMD hidden within 
shipping containers while in port, resulting in 
estimated exploitation susceptibility of each 
network node. Exploitation susceptibility 
will be modeled as an explicit function of the 
detection equipment investments at each 
node. We will calculate optimal investments in 
emerging detection technology at U.S. ports to 
minimize network risk, and we will quantify the 
deterrence effects of those optimal investments. 
Finally, our model will show how deterrence 
investments mitigate WMD transfer risk, and 
will show return on investment. 
This will create a holistic approach to 
assessing and reducing WMD transfer risk. 
Each of the previously discussed modeling 
efforts and technologies provides a critical 
piece of the puzzle, but we believe our approach 
integrates concepts from these efforts into a 
comprehensive systems analysis approach. 
Our approach may be valuable for those who 
need to analyze supply chain susceptibility to 
WMD smuggling, those who are developing 
solutions, and those who decide where/how 
to implement solutions:  the U.S. intelligence 
community, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs 
and Border Protection, DNDO, and other 
entities with maritime security and WMD 
detection responsibilities. Our approach 
may also be useful for agencies who evaluate 
the effectiveness of emerging technologies, 
such as DNDO. Furthermore, our approach 
may be useful for agency officials who report 
performance measures to oversight bodies.
We include the deterrence quantification 
effects in our WMD transfer risk analysis 
methodology based on the belief that 
incorporating deterrence effectiveness into risk 
calculations more accurately represents risk. 
The Coast Guard currently reports the general 
transfer risk reduction effectiveness of Coast 
Guard activities as measured in its Combating 
Maritime Terrorism Strategic Risk Model,32 
but our approach could provide additional 
methodological rigor.
Our Proposed Methodology: 
Summary of Steps
We will leverage the following methodological 
steps in our extension of Lewis’ MBRA model:
1. We re-introduce a general transfer network 
model from Taquechel [2010].33  This 
model will be that of a supply chain with 
three “layers” of nodes: foreign ports (FP), 
domestic U.S. ports of entry (DP), and U.S. 
inland cities (T, the targets of WMD attack), 
thus it models a “WMD transfer network.” 
We then explain possible transfer pathways 
to the target nodes that an attacker could 
exploit by smuggling a WMD within a 
container. A pathway reflects the attacker’s 
choice of exploiting specific ports in each 
supply chain layer. Each pathway poses a 
specific WMD transfer risk to U.S. inland 
cities. 
2. We explain probabilistic risk characteristics 
of each port node in our model. These 
probabilities reflect, for example, the 
notional detection effectiveness of WMD 
detection technology in each domestic port 
of entry. 
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3. We aggregate the node risk characteristics 
from step 2 to develop conditional transfer 
risk equations for different notional network 
configurations. See Figure 1 which shows an 
OR-OR configuration. These configurations 
reflect the different possible permutations 
of logic gates in our example, showing the 
relationships between nodes, but presented 
as a framework for attacker transfer pathway 
options. Even though the configurations 
do not specify individual pathways, their 
equations are necessary because later we 
will optimize deterrence investment with 
respect to the configurations, not with 
respect to individual pathways. This will be 
a way of “hedging” against possible pathway 
exploitation.34  In network science terms 
the relationships between nodes are known 
as “topology”.35  
4. We turn those conditional transfer risk 
equations into attacker expected utility 
function equations for our transfer 
pathways from step 1.  A utility function 
represents the value to the attacker, which 
we equate to the risk, or expected loss, to 
the defender (the United States) if the 
supply chain is exploited and a WMD is 
detonated in an inland U.S. city. These 
functions may change if we have invested to 
deter; hence we create both pre-deterrence 
expected utility functions, and post-
deterrence expected utility functions. We 
use these utility functions in our deterrence 
quantification approach. 
5. We simulate a notional “pre-deterrence 
game” that leverages the attacker pre-
deterrence expected utility functions from 
step 4.  We show how the values of these 
utility functions can be used to estimate 
attacker pre-deterrence intent to attack, and 
how that intent influences conditional 
defender risk to produce defender’s pre-
deterrence unconditional WMD transfer 
risk.
6. We simulate a notional deterrence game 
that leverages the attacker post-deterrence 
expected utility functions from step 4. We 
simulate deterrence investments based 
on different optimal allocations of WMD 
detection technology. We calculate these 
optimal allocations using MBRA, for each 
possible network configuration that the 
attacker could exploit from step 3. 
7. We leverage the results of the step 6 
deterrence game simulations to compare 
the attacker expected utility function values 
after hypothetical deterrence investments. 
We do this in order to determine post-
deterrence intent, and we compare it to pre-
deterrence intent to quantify the transfer 
deterrence effects of such investments with 
respect to the different attacker transfer 
pathways. 
8. We show how post-deterrence intent is 
used to calculate the defender’s post-
deterrence unconditional WMD transfer 
risk. Importantly, we average risk across 
multiple attacker options, or an “exploratory 
approach”, rather than focusing on 
traditional game theoretical results which 
identify an optimal or equilibrium solution, 
a “predictive” approach.
9. We determine ROI of these deterrence 
investments.
10. Finally, we summarize this data into 
deterrence “portfolios” to support decision 
making. This methodology is expanded 
and applied in a notional case study to 
yield notional results, all available from the 
authors. 
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EDIT FOREIGN PORT 1
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 25.0%,  E = $4321928.0
p = 12.5%,  A = $0.0





EDIT DOMESTIC PORT 1
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 42.0%,  E = $4321928.0
p = 98.4%,  A = $0.0








V = 100.0%,  E = $0
p = 16.39%,  A = $0.0
C = $1250000.0,  R = $204917.06
EDIT FOREIGN PORT 2
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 25.0%,  E = $4321928.0
p = 12.5%,  A = $0.0





V = 100.0%,  E = $0
p = 16.39%,  A = $0.0
C = $1250000.0,  R = $204917.06
EDIT DOMESTIC PORT 2
ROI ~ 0.0%/$
V = 31.0%,  E = $2160964.0
p = 7.26%,  A = $0.0
C = $0.0,  R = $0.0
OR EDIT
16.39%
Figure 1. Notional WMD transfer network from MBRA
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Summary of Practical 
Implications – From Case 
Study
This proposed methodology may offer 
opportunities for the spectrum of WMD risk 
management stakeholders: those who assess 
the problem, those who propose solutions to 
the problem, and those who make decisions on 
how those solutions will be implemented.
First, there are opportunities for the 
intelligence community. In our case study, 
we analyze the results of a deterrence game 
simulation and conclude that the possible 
network configurations we must analyze can 
be reduced by specificity of intelligence. For 
example, if we have no intelligence on attacker 
preferences for foreign port exploitation but 
intelligence can specify which domestic port 
(from among several in the simulation) an 
attacker is most likely to exploit based on existing 
detection investments and other information, 
then we may not want to optimize detection 
funding amongst domestic ports. Instead, we 
may want to put all available funding at the 
more likely domestic port and then evaluate 
foreign port exploitation susceptibility (e.g. 
whether the  attacker would be more likely to 
exploit multiple foreign ports, or only  one of 
several candidates). However, if intelligence is 
not that specific, but believes attacker will only 
exploit 1 of several candidate domestic ports, 
then we must analyze 2 configurations: OR-OR 
and AND-OR. And, if intelligence believes an 
attacker will exploit multiple domestic ports, 
then we must analyze AND-AND and OR-AND. 
Furthermore, if intelligence cannot specify 
whether an attacker will exploit multiple 
domestic ports or only one from among 
several candidates, then we should analyze 
all four configurations. The advantage of our 
exploratory approach with respect to attacker 
pathway options allows us to compare results 
from several possibilities, as an alternative to 
specific intelligence.
In our case study, if the intelligence 
community did have confidence that an 
attacker would want to exploit both domestic 
ports of entry, we found that the modeling 
results for optimal deterrence investment are 
indifferent to whether the attacker exploits a 
single foreign port, or multiple. With the caveat 
that this finding was the result of only one 
example, such information could help tailor 
intelligence collection efforts appropriately, 
helping the intelligence community prioritize 
RFIs (requests for information.) 
This segues into opportunities for a second 
stakeholder community: international and 
U.S. port security analysts. In our case study, 
results showed that the best attacker expected 
utility resulted from maximum flexibility, e.g. 
the ability to exploit a single foreign port.  This 
finding seems to reinforce the importance of 
efforts which focus on making foreign ports 
more unattractive to exploitation, such as the 
implementation of the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).36  These 
efforts may require an attacker to exploit 
multiple foreign ports to have a chance of 
moving WMD parts through, since ISPS 
initiatives help lower individual foreign ports’ 
exploitation susceptibility. Thus, attacker 
expected utility would be lowered, deterring 
exploitation. Since we are taking a network 
approach, overseas assessment efforts may 
benefit from coordination with domestic 
assessment efforts. 
Third, there are opportunities for technology 
engineers who develop/test WMD detection 
equipment, equipment operators, and 
management/budget personnel who fund 
operation. These stakeholders are where the 
rubber meets the road. After the intelligence 
community makes their assessment and the 
security analysts analyze vulnerability and risk, 
these stakeholders develop and implement 
solutions. Results of our case study deterrence 
analysis and subsequent risk reduction 
reflect optimal investments, but costs of 
implementing/operating detection equipment 
that would improve detection capability and 
thus deter WMD transfer may exceed those 
optimal costs. Thus, developers may need to 
find ways to increase equipment operational/
maintenance cost efficiencies or alternatively, 
suboptimal deterrence & risk reduction may be 
preferred if equipment cannot be implemented 
for less cost. This could be an iterative process 
of design, testing, running MBRA simulations, 
and refinement. With a limited budget for 
detection equipment, the MBRA tool can show 
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where to optimally invest for best possible risk 
reduction. But, a workaround to maximize 
risk reduction in the absence of more efficient 
equipment is to increase the available operating 
budget, or from a modeling perspective, to 
relax the constraint on the MBRA optimization 
simulation. 
Fourth, there are opportunities for decision 
makers: those who consider all of the above 
and decide how much to invest in detection 
equipment and where to put it, such as port 
authorities and terminal owners/operators. 
In our case study, we analyzed deterrence 
game simulation results and produced post-
deterrence unconditional transfer risk scores 
as part of the deterrence portfolios. We then 
showed that this transfer risk was less when the 
defender invested optimally hedging for AND-
OR network exploitation, or assuming minimal 
attacker flexibility for foreign port exploitation, 
than when the defender invested hedging 
for OR-OR exploitation. This supported the 
importance of overseas security improvement, 
but from a theoretical perspective  it is worth 
mentioning that this result is different from 
what classical game theoretic or optimization 
approaches would suggest: to invest to defend 
against the attacker’s best option, which would 
be exploiting OR-OR network configurations. 
From the perspective of data informing 
strategy, if we continue to implement overseas 
security measures and “drive” the attacker 
toward needing to exploit multiple ports, the 
mathematically optimal attacker solution based 
on traditional modeling might no longer be the 
outcome for which we plan. The attacker would 
desire maximum flexibility (OR-OR) but that 
could be very difficult to attain it if individual 
overseas ports were highly secure. That goal of 
improved security and less attacker flexibility 
in how they exploit foreign ports would be 
driven by data derived from an alternative to 
traditional attacker-defender modeling: our 
proposed approach. Importantly, improving 
security at domestic ports of entry might 
require decision makers to make tradeoffs on 
costs of implementing detection technology vs. 
desired risk reduction, as the best engineers 
may not be able to design equipment that meets 
desired exploitation susceptibility levels within 
budget constraints.
There are notable findings from the 
quantification of deterrence as well. One 
finding worth mentioning, as also discussed in 
Taquechel and Lewis (2012), is that deterrence 
quantification in and of itself is an interesting 
metric, and when used in isolation, may have 
practical implications for tactical responders. 
But, the overall goal of our methodology is 
to treat changes in intent (quantification of 
deterrence) as means to an end: informing 
unconditional risk values.
Directions for Future Work
Our approach applies concepts from Taquechel 
(2010) and Taquechel and Lewis (2012); 
thus many of the same directions for future 
work explained in that research apply here. 
We discuss these and additional possibilities 
below, in the context of individual steps to our 
proposed approach.
Step 1: 
We have presented a limited notional transfer 
network to illustrate our proposed MBRA 
extension and notional results. The model 
may need to analyze a large transfer network, 
based on decision-maker needs. Fortunately, 
our logic tree model’s iterative algorithm can 
approximate optimal WMD detection capability 
investment for many nodes. The number of 
possible WMD transfer pathways may expand 
nonlinearly as additional layers of supply 
chain nodes which an attacker must exploit are 
added to the model. Such layers could include 
an “offshore layer” of interdiction capabilities, 
augmenting existing shore-based capabilities 
such as container facility detection equipment. 
Step 2:
Initial node exploitation susceptibility and 
existing investment data input must be imported 
into the logic tree model. Thus, the usefulness 
of our proposed model’s recommendations 
depends in part upon the availability and 
reliability of this imported input. Port operators, 
risk analysts, and technology engineers would 
need to collect this data for real supply chain 
networks and WMD detection equipment. 
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Additionally, different node risk data should be 
used to determine results sensitivity; we only 
used one set of node data in our example.
Furthermore, future work could model 
encounter probabilities more explicitly. DNDO 
claims that 99% of all containers are screened 
for WMD.37  While in theory this is desirable, 
it may reflect an unconditional probability of 
encounter that does not take overseas or offshore 
screening efforts into consideration. The 
extent to which resources are being expended 
to maintain this high encounter probability 
and the resulting impacts on container traffic 
flow through ports might be examined. One 
possibility is to more explicitly focus on the 
probability a WMD could be smuggled within 
a container so as to reduce resources and time 
required to screen containers at U.S. ports 
of entry.  This is especially salient as ports 
increase their shipping container throughput. 
For example, the Port of Savannah plans to 
increase TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit 
standard measure for container capacity) 
throughput from 2.62 million to 6 million by 
2018.38   This presents opportunities for the 
intelligence community and international 
port security assessment community, in terms 
of focusing collection efforts on exploitation 
susceptibilities of various container vessels and 
overseas container terminals. 
Future work may also expand the modeled 
number of container facilities through which an 
attacker could conceivably transfer a container 
with a hidden WMD. The model’s equations 
would be modified. This could be done for both 
domestic U.S. ports of entry and foreign ports. 
Also, future work may expand our model to more 
explicitly show WMD encounter and detect 
probabilities in foreign ports.  The challenge 
may be getting appropriate quantifiable data 
on foreign port exploitation susceptibility. 
Evaluating optimal investment in foreign 
ports to deter and reduce WMD transfer 
risk, or evaluating a combination of optimal 
investments in both foreign and domestic 
U.S. ports of entry, may  provide quantitative 
support for the Maritime Commerce Security 
Plan’s guidance to “interdict the threat as far as 
possible from the U.S. borders.”39 
Step 3: 
We used conditional WMD transfer risk 
equations that reflected conditional risk of both 
U.S. inland targets, instead of specifying the 
attacker would prefer one over the other. This 
was a simplification for expository purposes, 
because the focus of this initial research was 
on optimizing deterrence investment in WMD 
technology at U.S. ports of entry. However, 
future work may create expected utility 
functions (derived from the conditional risk 
equations) for the deterrence game, which only 
reflect the consequences to one of the multiple 
U.S. inland targets. The transfer pathways 
would be expanded to include a specific U.S. 
inland target. This may change the notional 
results.
Step 4: 
We have made certain assumptions about 
availability of port risk information to would-
be attackers, and have made assumptions 
about the utility theories underpinning our 
expected utility functions. Essentially, we have 
assumed perfect attacker information meaning 
all information is available to prospective 
attackers, and have assumed subjective 
expected utility theory meaning attackers make 
decisions linearly. See Taquechel and Lewis 
for more discussion on these theories and how 
utility functions could be modified in future 
WMD deterrence modeling to accommodate 
alternate theories.40
Step 5: 
Depending on changes to conditional risk 
equations (e.g. discriminating between different 
U.S. inland city detonation consequences 
instead of aggregating them for all transfer 
pathways) and/or changes to expected utility 
functions, as proposed above in future research 
for steps 3 and 4, the information in the pre-
deterrence game may change.  With respect to 
perfect vs. imperfect information, an analyst 
could model the pre-deterrence game assuming 
either perfect information, or imperfect 
information, and then could examine how the 
deterrence effectiveness of additional WMD 
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technology investments changed based on pre-
deterrence game information availability.
Steps 6-8: 
Because we did not use a traditional game 
theoretical approach to our deterrence “games” 
in our methodology, we did not leverage 
defender expected utility functions. Future 
work might leverage more traditional game 
theoretical approaches to quantify deterrence. 
Also, we assumed a deterrence game of five 
defender courses of action (COAs) and six 
attacker COAs; future work might examine how 
deterrence can be quantified in a game with 
different numbers of attacker post-deterrence 
and defender deterrence options.
Furthermore, future work may 
simultaneously optimize investments at both 
foreign ports and domestic ports of entry, again 
emphasizing the potential role that those who 
help implement and evaluate ISPS could play, 
in addition to those who evaluate U.S. port 
security.
Beyond WMD and Port 
Exploitation:
Future research might apply this approach to 
problems beyond WMD transfer risk and U.S. 
port exploitation susceptibility analysis. For 
example, the transfer pathway logic could be 
applied to model adversarial decision making 
options in any sort of network, i.e. how an 
attacker might choose from among options to 
move any sort of illicit people/goods through 
a collection of nodes. These junctures could 
be just ports, a combination of ports and 
inland cities as described here, or solely 
inland targets, as a modeler or decision maker 
requires. It is possible an entire network could 
be modeled across the entire United States or 
internationally through land borders, modeling 
adversarial transfer pathway options in a much 
broader network than we have offered here. 
It may be possible that transfer pathway 
logic (AND and OR gates) used here could be 
combined with traditional network science 
metrics (degree, closeness, etc.)41 to create a 
more comprehensive network exploitation 
analysis. The AND-OR gate approach comes 
from fault tree analysis, used in reliability 
engineering. For example, suppose this analysis 
was expanded to include the physical links 
between U.S. ports and inland cities.42 This 
could influence the utility and risk calculations. 
We propose three notional options to examine 
this.
One option is that absent specific intelligence, 
node degree might reflect a greater propensity 
for an attacker to choose AND vs OR, for the 
transfer pathway. An attacker may prefer 
to exploit both U.S. ports (AND) if the port 
“degrees” were sufficiently low (e.g. if there 
were only one railway leading out of each port 
toward the ultimate target), but might prefer 
to exploit only 1 (OR) if that port’s degree were 
sufficiently high (e.g. if there were multiple 
railways leading from that U.S. port to exploit). 
Another option is that the links might have 
value in and of themselves (e.g. what is the 
likelihood various railroad companies could 
be exploited after a WMD has cleared initial 
U.S. port of entry?), which would increase the 
complexity of the model’s algorithm. A third 
option is that the links might be assumed to 
be of no intrinsic value, but their presence 
would increase each U.S. port’s exploitation 
susceptibility proportional to degree. Lewis’ 
MBRA tool offers ways to use both network 
analysis and fault tree analysis in tandem to 
thoroughly scrutinize a network.43 
Also, the modeling of failure susceptibilities 
as a function of investment could have broad 
applicability beyond maritime transfer of WMD; 
it might be applied to other system reliability 
analyses where budget is a concern. Models that 
simulate the allocation of resources to reduce 
some probability of an undesirable event (or 
increase the probability of a desirable event) 
could use our methodology. Furthermore, the 
deterrence quantification techniques used here 
are general enough to be applied to various 
adversarial or game theoretical analyses where 
deterrence quantification is desirable – be they 
analyses of crime, terrorism, WMD terrorism, 
counternarcotics, immigration interdiction, etc. 
The basic deterrence quantification technique 
was influenced by literature on deterring 
intentional acts other than terrorism.44 
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These techniques broaden risk analysis 
discourse by focusing on how phenomena from 
“earlier in the attack chain” may influence the 
actual attack options. By modeling deterrence, 
we show how changes in attacker intent, formed 
during the attacker’s early attack planning 
stages, may influence the attacker’s decision 
making. This approach also offers an alternative 
to traditional defender-attacker-defender 
or game-theoretical modeling in WMD risk 
analysis, by exploring possible outcomes rather 
than focusing on an “optimal” outcome. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We can only hypothesize how the attacker might 
exploit different pathways to transfer a WMD to 
an inland U.S. city and detonate it. Some models 
make predictions, but we prefer the exploratory 
approach. An attacker’s expected utilities from 
transferring a WMD within a shipping container 
through different supply chain pathways, 
and ultimately detonating in an inland U.S. 
city, can be calculated both before and after 
hypothetical transfer deterrence investments. 
Those expected utilities determine both pre 
and post-deterrence intent values for each 
COA, and those intent values help us quantify 
transfer deterrence effectiveness of the transfer 
deterrence investments.
We then apply those post-deterrence 
intent values to determine average defender 
post-deterrence unconditional risk. Then, 
we compare that average post-deterrence 
unconditional risk to the average pre-deterrence 
unconditional risk and optimal investment at 
each domestic port of entry, to calculate ROI of 
that optimal investment. Finally, we aggregate 
transfer deterrence effectiveness values, 
unconditional defender risk, and ROI of the 
transfer deterrence investments into concise 
portfolios to support decision-making.
The value of this approach is that we can 
calculate our risk, or expected loss from 
exploitation of the maritime supply chain and 
WMD detonation, while accounting for not only 
(1) the exploitation susceptibility reduction 
effects of hypothetical optimal investments 
to increase WMD detection probability, but 
also accounting for (2) the transfer deterrence 
effects those investments may have on a 
would-be attacker’s decision-making. We 
account for these phenomena in context of 
the possible changes in network topology, 
or different attacker transfer pathways and 
network configurations. We also incorporate 
data representing foreign port exploitation 
susceptibility, as the role of foreign ports in 
WMD transfer risk analysis is valuable. We are 
measuring how we change the attractiveness of 
WMD transfer pathway exploitation, supporting 
business cases for existing and emerging WMD 
detection technology, and increasing the rigor 
of WMD transfer risk analysis and mitigation 
by integrating ideas from existing efforts with 
our own concepts into a holistic framework. 
We may benefit from studying the 
effectiveness of emerging WMD detection 
technology in the context of supply chain 
exploitation risk to justify implementation of 
that technology, and from studying the costs 
required to develop, implement, operate and 
maintain that technology. Also, the deterrence 
effectiveness and resulting unconditional 
WMD transfer risk of existing solutions such as 
the Megaports Initiative, CBP radiation portal 
monitors, and other detection initiatives might 
be analyzed. The combined effects of both 
existing and new technology in a port could 
be modeled, as could the effects of replacing 
existing technology with new technology 
altogether. 
We have given examples of deterrence 
effectiveness analysis and resulting risk, with 
other policy implications, in our case study. 
With such deterrence effectiveness and risk 
reduction metrics, the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture’s layered defense approach to 
enhancing supply chain security against WMD 
transfer could be enhanced. The RNTRA 
methodology may benefit from concepts 
discussed in our approach. Also, policymakers 
could have rigorous justification for their 
investment decisions as well as additional 
metrics to report. Ultimately, our proposed 
approach could contribute to the improvement 
of the GNDA, and help to increase security of 
the maritime supply chain. 
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ABSTRACT
Since 9/11, resilience, a term used widely 
in many disciplines, has occupied a place 
in homeland security policy and programs. 
Peaking in importance as the last decade ended, 
resilience has begun to retreat as an official 
driver of U.S. homeland security strategy. 
Preparedness, which can yield resilience as 
one of its outcomes, has become the official 
focus. However, resilience is still used in a 
variety of ways with different meanings by 
homeland security officials and in various 
official documents. Non-governmental experts 
and institutions have not slackened their efforts 
to research, write about, and teach resilience 
in relation to homeland security. The purpose 
of this article is to demonstrate the ebb and 
flow of resilience in homeland security policy 
and investigate the future role resilience might 
play in homeland security policy.
INTRODUCTION
For many decades, resilience has been a 
relevant concept in variety of fields, including 
psychology, sociology, physics, civil engineering, 
supply chains, economics, business, energy, 
and ecology.1 While resilience had for years 
been applied to aspects of disaster relief such 
as the impact of earthquakes, the concept of 
resilience can be said to have officially entered 
the world of homeland security in response to 
the tragic 9/11 event.2 In the years following, a 
veritable cottage industry on resilience related 
to homeland security appeared in the academic 
and research community throughout the 
nation and across the globe. There have been 
innumerable workshops, conferences, books, 
articles, and courses of study dealing with this 
subject, as well as entire organizations devoted 
to this topic.3 
Resilience Redux:  
Buzzword or Basis for Homeland Security
Jerome H. Kahan
Interest in resilience did not go unnoticed 
in U.S. government circles. In part responding 
to a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission 
to make our nation “stronger, safer, and more 
resilient,” this concept also gained prominence 
in U.S. homeland security policy formulation.4 
As the years passed, the White House and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have 
incorporated resilience into homeland security 
planning processes, implementation programs, 
and operational activities. Employed both 
conceptually and on limited operational levels, 
resilience can be found in such significant 
homeland security documents such as the 
first and second Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Reviews (QHSR) and the National 
Preparedness Goal (NPG).5 
Wide use of resilience in connection with 
homeland security does not mean there has 
been agreement on the definition of this term. 
President Obama offered a generalized meaning 
of resilience expressed broadly as “the ability 
to adapt to changing conditions and withstand 
and rapidly recover from disruption due to 
emergencies.”6 However, the governmental and 
academic homeland security communities have 
not adopted this or any other single definition 
as the agreed meaning of the term. Innumerable 
variations of definitions abound, depending 
upon the needs and perspectives of the definer.7
This article seeks to investigate whether 
resilience should not only continue to serve 
as a broad concept in U.S. homeland security 
strategy, but, more importantly, whether it 
can become a realistic basis for operationally–
oriented policies and programs as the nation 
faces increasingly challenging threats and 
hazards. Among the issues addressed are:
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• The nature and scope of resilience 
definitions.
• Challenges in operationalizing resilience.
• Resilience in U.S. homeland security policy.
• The future of resilience in homeland 
security. 
Meaning of Resilience
Considerable attention has been paid to 
finding a definitive meaning of resilience to 
apply to various aspects of homeland security.8 
Relatively standard sets of meanings for 
resilience can be found in more mature fields 
such as physics, psychology, sociology, and even 
environmental science. As illustrated below, 
there is little if any agreement in government 
or academic circles on the meaning of resilience 
as applied to homeland security. 
Spectrum of Definitions 
In its broadest sense, resilience in the world 
of homeland security has to do with people, 
communities, institutions, and infrastructure 
experiencing an adverse incident or series 
of incidents, withstanding such blows, and 
returning to functionality. The following 
paragraphs present a series of terse statements 
about resilience. Taken together, they tell a 
relatively complete story of resilience as related 
to homeland security—its purpose, principles, 
and parameters.9 
• Resilient systems are flexible and 
adaptable, unlike brittle systems that can 
break when undergoing natural and man-
made hazards. Such systems can absorb 
disturbance, degrade gracefully, and bounce 
back to resume functioning. More resilient 
targets are potentially less susceptible to 
disruption, and therefore of lesser interest 
to terrorists. 
• Resilience ensures that a system can 
continue to function at a certain critical 
minimum level during and in the immediate 
aftermath of a disruption. These systems 
can withstand impacts, restore functioning 
to the pre-incident level, return to a lower 
but acceptable level of functionality, or 
potentially come back to an even more 
resilient posture. 
• Resilient systems can deal with the 
unexpected through flexibility and 
ingenuity. They apply extra effort or take 
adaptive actions that go beyond the inherent 
ability of a system to withstand adverse 
incidents. They can undergo change, learn 
from disasters, and improve their resilience 
as result of experiencing major disruptions. 
• Resilience provides system capabilities to 
recover from both the initial impact and 
the potentially cascading consequences of 
a series of undesirable events. However, 
the reach of resilience as a characteristic 
of a system is relevant across the full set 
of homeland security missions, including 
prevent, protect, and mitigate, not only to 
disaster response and recovery capacities.10
• Resilience is a holistic, integrated, and 
synergistic process of evolving end states, 
whereby adaptive capabilities continually 
improve the level of functioning. It is a 
“dynamic capability” that responds to 
and anticipates changes in the operating 
environment, matures over time, and is 
integral to systems operations and culture. 
Two additional points should be mentioned. 
First, resilience is not equivalent to 
preparedness. Instead, it serves as an outcome 
of preparedness – a term signifying the range 
of activities that public and private homeland 
security stakeholders undertake to enhance 
their ability to effectively deal with threats 
and hazards they might experience.11 Second, 
resilience in the homeland security context 
is inversely related to risk. As the resilience 
of a system increases, the risks it faces due to 
adverse events will tend to decrease.12
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Resilience within Domains
The resilience story has another chapter, 
however. According to a comprehensive study 
of how resilience has developed over the 
past decades, while this concept is by nature 
interdisciplinary, applications have tended to 
fall into discrete fields or domains.13 Numerous 
suggestions have been offered for how to 
formulate the most useful set of domains when 
applied to homeland security.14 The author 
favors a five-part set composed of individuals, 
infrastructure, institutions, ecosystems, and 
communities.15 
Individuals 
This domain applies to individuals who 
experience stressful conditions of all 
kinds. Resilience in this context means the 
capacity of such individuals to withstand 
such experiences and recover as rapidly as 
feasible to a state of personal well- being 
and social and professional functioning.16
Infrastructure
This domain encompasses engineered 
assets, systems, and networks, whether 
physical or cyber. Resilience applied to 
physical systems entails technical and 
structural improvements that enable 
“hard” systems to withstand adverse events 
without functional failure and rapidly 
return to a level of acceptable functionality. 
More sophisticated computer-based actions 
are needed to enhance resilience of “soft” 
cybersysytems.17 
Institutions
This includes social organizations, for profit 
and non-for profit enterprises, businesses, 
corporations, as well as government 
departments and agencies. Emphasis tends 
to be placed on continuity of operations and 
flexibility.18 
Ecosystems
This domain covers living organisms and 
their physical environment. A unique aspect 
of a resilient ecosystem after receiving 
a disruption is its capacity to adapt and 
change to different configurations within its 
inherent “state of being.”19
Communities
This involves finding balanced measures 
that can improve the overall ability of 
a community to withstand threats and 
hazards, continue to function, and return 
to a state of well-being. Given that a 
community is a mixture of individuals 
and societal elements, as well as relevant 
infrastructures, institutions, and ecologies, 
attaining resilience in this domain is very 
challenging.20 
The absence of a common understanding of 
how to define resilience suggests that there is 
no easy one-size-fits-all approach for applying 
resilience in connection with homeland 
security issues. Arguments have been made for 
establishing a common definition of resilience 
for all users and for all purposes.21 However, 
this does not seem feasible. Moreover, a variety 
of definitions has the benefit of providing users 
with flexibility in applying resilience in differing 
situations. 
Users can examine the definitions and 
interpretations of resilience offered above, or 
hunt for more, in order to discover the best 
way of defining this concept for their purposes 
– whether planning to make a system more 
resilient or improving the resilience of a system 
in being. For users preferring a more analytic 
approach, DHS’s Homeland Security Studies 
and Analysis Institute (HSSAI) developed a 
structured framework that would allow users to 
select the basic definitional option best suited to 
their needs, given types of human or naturally 
caused threats, hazards, or disruptions faced by 
the system and the domain it occupies.22 
The author appreciates the fact that a 
diverse set of resilience meanings exists and 
might have value over a common definition. 
On the other hand, if pressed to characterize 
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the meaning of any system in any domain 
“behaving resiliently” in the face of any adverse 
incident, the author would define this as its 
ability to “absorb stress or destructive forces 
through resistance or adaptation, manage or 
maintain basic functions and structures during 
disastrous events, recover or ‘bounce back’ after 
an event, and experience minimum disruption 
… after a hazard event has passed.”23
Operationalizing Resilience
A number of years ago, a distinguished 
economic expert with no homeland security 
expertise wrote “Resilience is in danger of 
becoming a vacuous buzzword from overuse and 
ambiguity…”24 However, turning the concept of 
resilience into operational programs is not an 
easy task. Early initiatives to insert resilience 
operationally into homeland security activities 
and actions were aimed at safeguarding U.S. 
infrastructure. More recent efforts center 
around finding ways to turn the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Reviews (QHSR) into 
realistic actions and operational programs.
Where Are We?
During the latter part of the last decade, the 
notion of Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) began to give way to the idea of Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience (CIR).25 The National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) has 
produced studies on encouraging DHS “to 
provide each critical infrastructure sector 
maximum flexibility to develop and adopt 
resilience strategies that match their operating 
model, asset base, and risk profile,” and has 
generated case studies designed to set sector- 
specific resilience goals, starting with nuclear 
energy and electricity.26 Further work has 
focused on improving infrastructure resilience 
on a regional basis.27 The DHS National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has 
paid increasing attention over the years to 
resilience as a concept for securing the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/
KR) including cybersystems.28
In the realm of community resilience, The 
Community and Regional Resilience Institute 
(CARRI) has for many years sought to develop 
processes for communities to move ahead in 
enhancing their resilience. Finding effective and 
acceptable methods for assessing resilience in 
a community context, however, has continued 
to present major challenges, not only from 
an analytical standpoint, but also from the 
standpoint of incentivizing community leaders 
to invest in strengthening their resilience. 
Pilot programs to address this issue have 
continued.29 The Community Resilience Task 
Force (CRTF), overseen by DHS’s Homeland 
Security Advisory Committee (HSAC), 
observed in a June 2011 report observed that 
many homeland security activities are already 
underway, but “those activities are rarely linked 
explicitly to resilience.”30 
On a more generalized level, in late 2011, 
a George Washington University Homeland 
Security Policy Institute (HSPI) Task Force 
called on national policymakers and homeland 
security practitioners to move beyond the 
conceptual discussion of resilience and advance 
practical and tangible means to realize resilience 
aims.31 With little amplification, this task force 
recommends painting a presumably practical 
“picture of a resilient nation” by applying a 
“systems-based approach that emphasizes risk 
management practices as a unifying theme 
for resilience policy…combining separate 
disciplines of mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery, into a continuum of 
resilience.”32 
From another perspective, that of missions 
rather than domains, a 2012 National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) Report concludes that 
“resilience has assumed heightened importance 
as a homeland security concept, especially 
as natural disasters have become more 
damaging”.33 While calling for incorporation of 
national resilience as a strategic principle and 
discussing issues of performance metrics and 
other analytical challenges, this report only 
addresses how to increase resilience to disasters 
with emphasis on response and recovery. 
Limiting resilience to planning for disaster 
response and recovery, however, falls short of 
viewing resilience as an overarching construct 
for homeland security covering all homeland 
security missions. This is needed if resilience 
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is to become a practical strategic guidepost for 
homeland security planning, policymaking, 
and program formulation.
Resilience capabilities cannot be 
incorporated when disaster strikes, but need 
to be planned and implemented as part of 
preparedness at the national and local level. 
Planning for implementing the concept of 
resilience in practical ways needs to account 
for the fact that resilience encompasses “hard” 
systems (such as infrastructure and assets) as 
well as “soft” systems (such as communities 
and individuals).34 One useful approach for 
planning resilience applications is to establish 
a “resilience profile” depicting how the 
operational performance of a given system 
would be affected by various hazards and how 
this performance profile can be improved 
by investments that incorporate resilience 
capabilities into the system’s features.35
In planning for resilience, readers need to 
be aware that not all systems can or should 
be designed to be resilient, considering their 
purpose and threat environment. For example, 
if a circuit breaker is resilient to a large power 
surge, it may resist shutting down power, with 
adverse consequences to the system.36
Measuring Resilience
Without a credible and pragmatic assessment 
tool for measuring resilience, turning this 
concept into real, cost-effective policies and 
programs does not seem possible. As in the case 
of definitions, the question of how resilience 
can be measured has also been addressed by 
a relatively large number of sources offering a 
wide variety of approaches, with a comparable 
lack of agreement on this issue as well.37 
In a recent report the GAO recommended 
that homeland security officials “develop 
performance measures to assess the extent 
to which asset owners and operators […of 
infrastructure systems] are taking actions 
to resolve resiliency gaps identified during 
the various vulnerability assessments.”38 In 
response, the department noted that efforts 
towards this end have already been initiated, 
with new performance metrics for critical 
infrastructure resilience under review.39 Efforts 
to develop such measures are being undertaken 
within DHS, specifically by S&T.40 
The HSSAI report mentioned above offers 
an approach for developing measures and 
metrics associated with various meanings of 
resilience for a given threat scenario. Again, 
the infrastructure domain represents the best 
domain for measuring resilience. An example of 
such a measure is how well a production system 
behaves in limiting its loss of functionality 
after encountering a disruption, with metrics 
including “the rate and amount of inputs, 
throughputs, or outputs per unit of time.”41 
As suggested above, progress has been 
made in measuring the resilience of critical 
infrastructure elements that are technical 
and structural in nature. When it comes to 
community resilience, for example, this issue 
has been raised repeatedly, though finding 
credible performance measures has been far 
more challenging. 
• The CRTF task force calls for DHS to 
coordinate development of a “community-
based, all-hazards American Resilience 
Assessment (ARA) methodology and 
toolkit,” presumably including steps 
to measure needs and progress.42 It is 
unclear whether DHS has acted upon this 
recommendation.43
• The NAS report calls for community-driven 
and top-down resiliency measures, which 
are relevant to meaningful assessment 
methods. This would be an extremely 
complex undertaking, and it appears that 
there has been no follow- up by the academy. 
• CARRI has sought to understand the 
complex issue of measuring performance 
in connection with community resilience. 
However, it does not appear that the 
needed range of effectiveness measures 
has yet been developed for operational use, 
given the public policy as well as analytical 
challenges in doing so. 
A comprehensive study by Argonne National 
Laboratory rigorously demonstrates the many 
challenges of finding a credible measurement 
method for community resilience. As the study 
points out, “The methodology required to 
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capture resilience at the community/regional 
level is very complex and will involve not only 
surveys of individual assets but discussions 
with stakeholders, identification of critical 
community and regional capabilities, and 
identification of interdependencies among 
these entities.”44 
Before turning to how the government has 
handled resilience, the following observation 
by an academic expert on community resilience 
remains as valid today as it was a few years ago. 
The idea of building resilience to natural 
and man-made disasters is now a dominant 
strategic theme and operational goal in 
the current U.S. national security policy 
discourse…. Researchers in varied and 
distinct disciplines have struggled with the 
concept of resilience in their respective 
fields for decades. Scholars and practitioners 
continue to wrestle with this concept in hope 
of developing useful prescriptive homeland 
security policy guidance, and community-
level assessment tools. While there is still 
much to debate about how to draft precise 
definitions of resilience and its attributes, and 
how to operationalize and apply resilience 
concepts within each discipline, overlap in 
the research of each discipline is significant 
enough to be instructive as to what makes 
systems resilient.45 
Resilience in U.S. Homeland 
Security Policy
In a speech celebrating National Preparedness 
Month in 2009, President Obama reminded 
the nation that the concept of resilience “is not 
new, and different eras in our history reflect 
an unwavering focus on building national 
resilience.”46 In more recent times, stimulated 
by the threat of terrorism and a spate of high 
consequence natural disasters, resilience 
has been a central concept in U.S. homeland 
security policy. It has to varying degrees and 
with differing interpretations, found its way 
into major strategy and planning documents 
issued by the White House and DHS. It has 
also been applied to a number of highly specific 
initiatives. Efforts to operationalize this concept 
have been moving forward, but doing this fully 
and successfully has been challenging. 
Resilience as a National 
Strategy Concept
The concept of resilience did not immediately 
become part of the official lexicon of homeland 
security as part of the nation’s reaction to 
9/11. It was not mentioned in President G. 
W. Bush’s dramatic speech that highlighted 
the dangers of international terrorism and 
how we will fight this threat and not let it 
harm our freedoms and way of life.47 Nor was 
resilience mentioned in connection with the 
missions for the establishment of the Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS), which was given 
responsibilities for coordinating executive 
branch efforts “to detect, prepare for, prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.”48 As 
it was being disbanded in 2002 to make way 
for the creation of DHS, OHS produced the 
first National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS).49 However, this significant first- of- its- 
kind strategic document for homeland security 
did not mention the concept of resilience either.
The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 led to harsh criticisms of how the 
federal government, as well as state and local 
governments, handled this situation. Given that 
catastrophic natural disasters such as Katrina 
cannot be prevented, a far more efficient and 
effective set of capabilities and policies for 
response and recovery must be instituted. To 
improve federal level management of major 
disasters, the Post Katrina Emergency Reform 
Act (PKERA) reorganized FEMA by making it an 
operational component within DHS, with wider 
responsibilities for federal level preparedness 
and the ability for the administrator to report 
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security 
and also to the president. Its missions were 
given as response, recovery, and mitigation as 
well as protection, but there was no mention of 
resilience.50
The second edition of the NSHS, issued 
by the Homeland Security Council in 2007, 
represented a major step forward in producing 
a comprehensive homeland security strategic 
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document that incorporated resilience as an 
element of safeguarding critical infrastructure 
of communities, including such elements as 
communications, supply chains, transportation 
systems, and cybersystems against major terror 
attacks or natural disasters.51 While a major 
step forward in embedding resilience in official 
policy, this document did not discuss resilience 
as applicable to domains other than critical 
infrastructure. 
In early 2008, the DHS Five Year 
Strategic Plan was issued, with the Secretary 
of Homeland Security characterizing the 
American people as resilient and putting forth 
his vision for the security of the homeland as 
“a secure America, a confident public, and a 
strong and resilient society and economy.”52 
In that same year, Congressional interest in 
resilience led to a series of hearings by the 
Homeland Security Committee of the U.S. 
House of Representatives. In this connection, 
the committee chairman declared May 2008 as 
“Resilience Month.”53
Tracing the rising trajectory of resilience 
suggests that the year 2010 represented a 
high point in the significance of this concept 
in homeland security policy. In that year, 
President Obama’s 2010 National Security 
Strategy (NSS) explains, 
We will not be able to deter or prevent every 
single threat. That is why we must also 
enhance our resilience. When incidents occur, 
we must show resilience by maintaining 
critical operations and functions … [while] 
adapting to changing conditions, and prepare 
for, withstand, and rapidly recover from 
disruption… returning to our normal life…54
One month later, the first QHSR, a document 
of major significance for DHS and the HSE 
as a whole, highlighted to Congress and the 
nation the need for resilience – taken to mean 
“fostering individual, community, and system 
robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid 
recovery.”55 The QHSR included resilience 
as part of the “vision” of “ A homeland that is 
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism 
and other hazards, where American interests, 
aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”56 The 
document then goes on to identify resilience as 
one of “three key concepts that are essential to, 
and form the foundation for, a comprehensive 
approach to homeland security.” It also makes 
certain that readers fully understand that 
the president is “uniquely responsible for the 
safety, security, and resilience of the Nation.”57 
Also in 2010 President Obama signed 
Presidential Policy Directive -8 (PPD-8), an 
initiative aimed at strengthening the security 
and resilience of the United States through 
systematic preparation for the threats that 
pose the greatest risk to the security of the 
nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-
attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural 
disasters. The directive employs a definition of 
resilience as “the ability to adapt to changing 
conditions and withstand and rapidly recover 
from disruption due to emergencies.”58 The 
associated NPG, issued in 2010, states its 
purpose as producing “a secure and resilient 
nation with the capabilities required across the 
whole community to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
threats and hazards that pose the greatest 
risk.”59 
Continuing to put priority on resilience 
for critical infrastructure, last year a 
presidential policy directive established “a 
risk-informed approach and a framework for 
critical infrastructure security and resilience 
collaboration.”60 In this same year, a presidential 
executive order set policy on cyber threats to 
critical infrastructure.61 With the bulk of US 
infrastructure in private hands, public-private 
partnerships are said to “advance the security 
and resilience of critical infrastructure under 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.”62
Bringing us up to date, the second QHSR, 
recently issued, does not repeat all the points 
in the first edition on resilience. However, it 
does refer to the NPG purpose of ensuring “[a] 
secure and resilient nation with the capabilities 
required across the whole community to 
prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from the threats and hazards that 
pose the greatest risk.”63 Continuing along 
this line, this QHSR goes on to say, “in this 
manner, national preparedness increases 
security and resilience by helping our Nation 
systematically prepare for the threats and 
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hazards that pose the greatest risk.”64 Through 
these references, the second QHSR seems to be 
making a deliberate effort to ensure that readers 
are aware of the importance of the NPG and the 
overall PPD-8 preparedness effort, which is 
focused on operational-level homeland security 
preparedness activities, as discussed below. 
However, it still treats resilience in more of a 
generalized rather than operational manner. 
Resilience on an Operational 
Level 
As discussed earlier, headway has been made 
relatively early in operationalizing resilience in 
connection with making critical infrastructure 
systems “more reliable, efficient, and resilient” 
by designing in “cost-effective security 
and resilience features.”65 One of the more 
operationally oriented objectives of the DHS 
Fiscal Year 2008-12 Strategic Plan is to “Protect 
and Strengthen the Resilience of the Nation’s 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources”.66 
This and the growing inclusion of resilience 
as a homeland security concept stimulated 
the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis 
Institute (HSSAI) to produce a study on an 
Operational Framework for Resilience, which 
was cleared for public release and published in 
a homeland security journal.67
Towards the end of his first term, pressure 
was put on the Obama Administration to 
operationalize resilience by a number of 
distinguished non-governmental groups. An 
HSPI Task Force concluded in 2011, “The 
White House and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) must advance U.S. capacity 
for resilience or else a loss of momentum will 
result in resilience being little more than a 
buzzword.”68 At about this same time, a senior 
DHS official reportedly asked, “How do we 
operationalize resilience every day as part of the 
work that we do?” The official acknowledged 
that “little is being done …to make it happen,” 
[… but claimed] “that’s something… DHS is 
trying to change.”69 The GAO in 2012 pressed 
DHS to go beyond just a resilience framework 
and develop an implementation strategy that 
includes “steps needed to achieve results, 
by developing priorities, milestones, and 
performance measures; responsible entities, 
their roles compared with those of others, 
and mechanisms needed for successful 
coordination; and sources and types of 
resources and investments associated with 
the strategy, and where those resources and 
investments should be targeted.”70 
Other strategic documents have begun 
to focus on operationalizing the concept of 
resilience. Of special significance is the first 
QHSR. In addition to making resilience a 
prominent concept, this document also treats 
resilience operationally in connection with the 
mission of Ensuring Resilience to Disasters 
through rapid recovery from natural disasters 
or terrorist attacks.71 Resilience is explicitly 
associated with one of the specific goals of the 
Cybersecurity Mission, but does not appear as 
part of other goals for the remaining missions.72 
The second QHSR, reaffirms the relevance 
of resilience to the operational mission of 
Ensuring Resilience to Disasters, but does 
not apply this term in connection with other 
missions or associated goals, as found in the 
first edition.73 
The NPG has much to say about resilience in 
connection with the set of preparedness “core 
capabilities.” Core capabilities are designed to 
support the full spectrum of homeland security 
operational missions – prevent, protect, 
mitigate, respond, and recover. To varying 
degrees and depending upon circumstances, 
most of these core capabilities, when 
incorporated into the various systems that 
together comprise the nation— communities, 
citizens, government entities at all levels, 
private and not-for-profit organizations, 
buildings, transportation systems, businesses, 
institutions, cybersystems, and ecosystems—
have the effect of providing them with the ability 
to “behave resiliently” when experiencing major 
disruptions.74
The following discussion summarizes 
how incorporation of preparedness core 
capabilities can directly or indirectly contribute 
to the resilience of whatever system is being 
endangered. To begin with, there are three 
core capabilities common to all missions, all of 
which explicitly include resilience.75
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• Prior planning for resilience includes drills 
to instill in communities and businesses the 
concept of thinking and acting flexibly and 
creatively in the event of a disaster.
• Public information can explain the basic 
resilience concept of “bending but not 
breaking” when an adverse event is 
experienced and techniques for enabling 
such reactions.
• Operational coordination can support 
resiliency if it includes options for adapting 
to the impact of a disaster by finding ways to 
maintain the essential coordination needed 
to effectively cope with such a challenge. 
Secondly, resilience features and measures 
are implicit in most of the core capabilities 
associated with prevent, protect, respond, and 
recover missions.
• Prevent core capabilities and objectives are 
aimed at identifying thwarting, intercepting, 
redirecting, or at worst lessening the impact 
of threats posed by intelligent adversaries. If 
a lessened impact is experienced, resilience 
will be less stringent, and improvements 
will enable the impacted entity to maintain 
key functions, become stable, and rapidly 
restore its performance.
• Protect capabilities focus on actions to 
protect the citizens, residents, visitors, 
critical assets, systems, and networks 
against the greatest risks to our nation, 
creating conditions for a safer, more secure, 
and more resilient nation.
• Response capabilities seek to ensure the 
resilience to effectively respond to any 
threat or hazard, saving and sustaining 
lives and stabilizing the incident, as well 
as rapidly meeting basic human needs, 
restoring basic services, establishing a safe 
and secure environment, and supporting 
the transition to recovery. 
• Recovery capabilities support resilience 
in restoration of a community’s physical 
structures as well as providing a continuum 
of care to support physical, communications, 
health, safety, psychological, and emotional 
needs of the community, including response 
and recovery personnel.
Thirdly, resilience appears explicitly in core 
capabilities under the mitigation mission, one 
of the more recently added homeland security 
missions that is actually an outcome of the 
other missions being successful.76
• Community Resilience seeks to provide 
the ability to behave resiliently across all 
the phases of a given threat or hazard—to 
resist, absorb an impact, degrade gracefully 
if necessary but maintain critical functions, 
respond effectively and remain a short 
time in that position, and recover full 
performance rapidly.77
• Long-term Vulnerability Reduction aims 
at lessening the likelihood, severity, and 
duration of adverse consequences related 
to these adverse incidents. Such outcomes 
can be obtained in part by incorporating 
appropriate resilience core capabilities of 
communities, critical infrastructures, and 
key resources.
• Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment 
entails assessment of risk and disaster 
resilience so that decision makers, 
responders, and community members 
can take informed, specific actions to 
reduce their entity’s risk and increase their 
resilience. 
To wrap up this discussion, the DHS Strategic 
Plan for FY2012 -16 rests upon the five 
QHSR missions, with resilience tied to the 
mission of disaster relief, but also connected 
in an operational sense to making critical 
infrastructure resilient to both traditional and 
cyber threats.78
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Tactical Initiatives 
Resilience has continued to influence a series of 
initiatives at what might be called the “tactical 
level” – not emphasizing strategic concepts, 
but working from the bottom up “by taking 
important steps to help our state and local 
partners strengthen the resilience of their 
infrastructure, computer networks, and of their 
communities and citizens.”79 A number of steps 
have been taken towards meeting these rather 
expansive goals. 
Item: DHS Definition of Resilience. The 
Resilience Integration Team (RIT), formed by 
The Office of Resilience Policy (ORP), seeks to 
provide component DHS agencies with a single, 
consistent, department-wide understanding of 
resilience and helps components understand 
how their activities address DHS’s proposed 
resilience objectives.80 ORP officials appear 
to have failed thus far in even producing an 
approved generalized policy statement, given 
the less then cooperative reactions from the 
components across the Department.81
Item: Resilience STARTM. The Resilience 
STARTM Home Pilot Project, modeled after the 
existing Energy STAR Program, entails DHS 
working with homeowners and builders to 
assist in designing or remodeling structures 
with features that can enhance their resilience 
to high consequence natural disasters they 
are facing. It is unclear how successful 
this initiative will turn out to be, as many 
economic and socio-political challenges need 
to be overcome. However, this initiative has at 
least been given visibility in Congress.82
Item: Regional Infrastructure Resilience. 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-
21 calls for advancing national unity 
through strengthening and maintaining 
secure, functioning, and resilient critical 
infrastructure.83 The Regional Resiliency 
Assessment Program (RRAP) is an 
interagency assessment of a specified set of 
U.S. critical infrastructure and key assets, 
combined with a regional analysis of the 
surrounding infrastructure, including key 
interdependencies. RRAP evaluates critical 
infrastructure “clusters,” regions, and 
systems to reduce the nation’s vulnerability 
to all-hazard threats by coordinating efforts to 
enhance CI/KR resiliency and security across 
geographic regions.84 
Item: Incentivize private businesses. DHS 
is leading in an interagency effort to provide 
voluntary incentives for small and large 
businesses to take steps that enhance their 
resilience. The case is being made that 
improved resilience can enhance the success 
of private businesses. Guidelines are being 
set for estimating private sector preparedness 
and identifying needed improvements.85
Item: New Technologies. The DHS Science 
and Technology Directorate (S&T) has 
been developing new technologies, models, 
and other tools that promote resilience. A 
summit of experts hosted by the S&T Office 
of University Programs addressed how 
science and technology can “contribute to 
shaping our resiliency blueprint by instilling 
scientific rigor into the processes that will 
shape our future, […and] how can the nation’s 
operational resilience be improved?”86 
Item: Campus Resilience Pilot Program. 
Under the Campus Resilience Pilot Program 
(CR Pilot) DHS works with seven selected 
colleges and universities “to draw on existing 
resources, collaborate with federal, state and 
local stakeholders and identify new innovative 
approaches to promote campus resilience.”87
Item: Human Resilience. The Together 
Employee and Organizational Resilience 
Program was developed to enhance the health 
and well-being of all DHS employees. The 
program is bringing together employees from 
across the Department, managers as well as 
staff, to discuss best practices and creative 
concepts for identifying resilience issues.88
It remains to be seen how effective these 
initiatives will turn out to be or whether others 
may be launched.
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CONCLUSION
While the basic idea of resilience seems 
relatively straightforward, upon closer scrutiny 
this question of credibly and effectively 
operationalizing resilience across the nation 
at all public and private levels is inherently 
complex. The fact that we see resilience 
appearing on the level of homeland security 
missions, as discussed earlier, is clearly a step 
forward. 
What we do not see, however, are analytic 
guideposts on how to plan and execute the 
establishment of concrete resilience programs 
for all classes of important systems that might 
experience specified adverse events across all 
domains for all levels of stakeholders. Also 
missing are guidelines for how to measure needs 
or gaps in resilience and progress achieved 
after steps are taken. There are challenges in 
defining, assessing, and integrating threats, 
targets, and risks, as well as uncertainties in 
understanding and analyzing large numbers 
of interrelated elements. Policy, resource, and 
other constraints also need to be considered. 
In terms of bringing analytic capabilities to 
bear, a group of experts argues that a “systems 
approach” can help in analyzing the nature of 
resilience, which “ entails viewing systems as 
complex networks with dynamic behavior and 
many interdependencies that could be exploited 
by adversaries.’’89 Such complex networks 
tend to be difficult to understand and analyze, 
with outcomes that are either non-existent or 
virtually impossible to understand.90
Without concerns over analytic complexity 
or even meanings and measurements, resilience 
might well continue to be used in simple ways 
to prepare a community or business to deal 
with different threats and hazards, as in the 
tactical applications of resilience by DHS, such 
as those listed earlier. Furthermore, the world 
of academia will almost certainly continue to 
address the issue of resilience through writings 
to be published, courses to be taught, and 
conferences to attend. Looked at another way, 
if resilience is to be a leading homeland security 
concept, advocates might see that “achieving 
resilience is not a destination, but a journey on 
which we must lead all citizens.”91 Presumably, 
“we” stands, not only for DHS and other federal 
agencies, but also state and local governments, 
communities, and the academic and research 
fields.
This article explored homeland security 
through the lens of resilience. However, upon 
completion of the material in this article, 
the author has reached what may seem like 
an odd conclusion. He would ask readers to 
appreciate the idea that too much of a focus 
on operationalizing resilience would have the 
effect of putting the resilience cart before the 
preparedness horse. This means that PPD-8 
implementation, at the moment, is leading the 
way in trying to improve national preparedness 
from the bottom–up as well as from the top-
down.92 If PPD-8 implementation progresses 
and nationwide as well as regional and local 
preparedness improves, the resilience of 
individuals, communities, businesses, NGOs, 
and all levels of government will perforce 
tend to increase. Given the analytical and 
governance challenges PPD-8 implementation 
faces, however, if this initiative fails to improve 
preparedness across the nation at all levels, 
these resilience benefits will not emerge. 
Whatever the future of PPD-8, homeland 
security policies and programs, the author 
would agree that issues of defining and 
measuring resilience will almost certainly 
remain an active topic. Resilience mavens, be of 
good cheer. This term will remain resilient for 
a long time, although not competing with the 
cockroach: a species that has been on earth for 
over 350 million years, known for its hardiness 
and ability to survive in the most demanding 
situations, even nuclear war.93
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ABSTRACT
Qualitative risk ranking systems are often 
used to assess homeland security threats 
due to their simplicity and intuitive nature. 
However, their appropriate use is limited by 
subtle common underlying difficulties that 
render them inconsistent with quantitative 
risk assessments. A better way to assess 
homeland security threats is to use simple 
fully quantitative risk models coupled with 
managerial review and judgment.
Ranking the relative risk of various perceived 
homeland security threats is a necessary activity 
for security experts. Time and resources are 
finite and policymakers understandably want 
to address threats in accordance with their 
magnitude and urgency. Given that there are 
many ways to rank security risks, how shall 
we proceed? Some argue that qualitative risk 
ranking is simpler, more transparent, and 
less data intensive than fully quantitative risk 
ranking; therefore, a qualitative approach is 
more likely to be used by decision makers during 
a crisis.1 So should we primarily use qualitative 
risk ranking for homeland security threats? 
The short answer is no. Although qualitative 
risk ranking systems are popular, this practice 
is not advisable for the following reasons: (1) 
qualitative risk ranking is inconsistent and in 
some situations may have reversed rankings 
compared to quantitative risk ranking; and (2) 
when the range in risk to be evaluated is large 
or one risk is orders of magnitudes larger than 
the others, qualitative risk ranking may mask 
important information regarding differences in 
risk.2
Because the idea of ranking reversal is 
counterintuitive, a simple example of rank 
inconsistency originally proposed by Cox et al. is 
appropriate.3 First, let us assume a hypothetical 
A Cautionary Note on Qualitative Risk Ranking 
of Homeland Security Threats 
Daniel J. Rozell
three parameter risk model for a bioterrorism 
agent (e.g., accessibility, transmissibility, 
and virulence) where each parameter can be 
assigned a discrete value of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 
and that values of 1 or 2 correspond to “low” 
(L), 3 or 4 are “medium” (M), and 5 or 6 are 
“high” (H). Now, if we compare the risks of two 
potential bioterrorism agents, A and B, which 
have parameter values of (3, 3, 6) and (4, 4, 4) 
respectively, these will have qualitative rankings 
of (M, M, H) and (M, M, M) respectively. Using 
the qualitative rankings, we would decide 
that, all other things being equal, bioterrorism 
agent A is more of a threat than agent B. 
However, the quantitative ranking may not be 
consistent with the qualitative assessment. If 
the parameters happen to be additive, the sum 
of the parameters is the same (i.e., A = B = 12) 
and we would now say that agent A and B have 
the same level of risk. The same conclusion 
applies if the parameters are averaged (i.e., 
A = B = 4). Instead, if the parameters are 
multiplicative, the product of A is less than the 
product of B (A = 36, B = 64) and we would now 
conclude that agent B is riskier than A. Thus, 
we cannot assume that even simple rankings 
are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent. 
Unfortunately, regardless of the level of 
complexity, no qualitative risk ranking system 
that preserves order (i.e., represents risk with 
an increasing monotonic function) can escape 
this inconsistency between qualitative and 
quantitative risk rankings.4
Now let us consider the very simplest version 
of the previous example where there is a one-
to-one mapping of qualitative and quantitative 
scales such that “low” (L) corresponds to a value 
of 1, “medium” (M) to a value of 2, and “high” (H) 
to a value of 3. Now the potential bioterrorism 
agents A and B that have three parameter 
model ratings of (M, M, H) and (M, M, M) 
respectively will correspond to (2, 2, 3) and (2, 
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2, 2) respectively. In this case, the correct order 
will be preserved for the quantitative rankings, 
but we have an important restriction. That is, 
there must always be a one-to-one mapping of 
qualitative and quantitative scales. Whenever 
a qualitative rank can have multiple values, 
the result is the inconsistency seen in the first 
example. The important implication here is 
that there can be no variation in risk within a 
category. That is, any agents ranked as a “high” 
risk must not be rankable within that qualitative 
categorical label. This works if there is no more 
than one agent within each categorical label or 
if lack of knowledge prevents anything other 
than very broad risk ranking. However, if it is 
believed that one risk is larger than another, 
it is not advisable to give them the same 
qualitative categorical label. This is a common 
issue when the top qualitative rank is a catch-
all for very large values (e.g., human morbidity 
rate categories of: 0-1%, 1.1-10%, 10.1-20%, and 
>20%).5 This can result in the loss of important 
distinctions in relative risk – especially when 
there are outliers in the data set. 
A common complementary tool of qualitative 
risk ranking is the semi-quantitative risk matrix 
– a table that uses likelihood and impact as the 
rows and columns and ranks events with high 
probability and high consequence as being high 
risk.6 The technique is also popular because 
it mistakenly appears to provide a simple, 
intuitive, transparent and visual justification 
for risk rankings.7 However, when attempting to 
convert a qualitative risk matrix (e.g., one that 
uses low/medium/high ordinal rankings) to a 
quantitative ranking, it can be demonstrated that 
whenever likelihood and impact are negatively 
correlated (i.e., when the most unlikely events 
have the largest impact – common in terrorism 
assessments) the qualitative risk matrix can 
actually invert the ranking and give results that 
are worse than making decisions randomly.8 
Since the uncertainty in homeland security risk 
assessment is generally substantial, it is unlikely 
that the correlation between probability and 
consequence will be known. Thus, semi-
quantitative risk matrices are a questionable 
endeavor and it is unfortunate that they have 
become popular among organizations that 
want to be proactive in managing risk.9
Given the difficulties of qualitative and 
semi-qualitative risk ranking systems, it is 
inadvisable to use them even in emergency 
situations. If time and resources are very 
limited, it is better to use either a very simple 
fully quantitative risk assessment,10 or informal 
expert managerial review and judgment.11 In 
this case, a simple quantitative risk assessment 
consists of restricting the analysis to only the 
most essential parameters while still using 
uncategorized numerical data for ranking. 
Likewise, the use of expert judgment, the 
simplest and potentially most comprehensive 
approach, transparently acknowledges the 
subjectivity in many homeland security risk 
assessments caused by general lack of data. A 
strength of expert judgment over qualitative 
risk ranking is the avoidance of hiding the 
inherent subjectivity behind a methodology 
that appears objective, yet has known, but 
subtle, flaws. When more time and resources 
are available, a variety of fully quantitative 
risk assessment techniques exist including: 
various logic trees (e.g., probability or decision 
trees), influence diagrams, systems dynamics, 
Bayesian network analysis, and game theory.12 
However, purely quantitative methods have also 
been critiqued for being overly narrow by using 
simple probabilities and expectation values as 
representations of risk.13 Likewise, arguments 
have been made against using probabilistic 
risk assessment as a primary decision tool 
because we cannot account for terrorists’ 
knowledge of our assessments; rather, robust 
decision processes that attempt to maximize 
resilience may be more appropriate.14 Of 
course, maximizing resilience is a complex task 
in itself with its own set of difficulties analogous 
to qualitative risk ranking.15
In summary, while there are no perfect 
methods, qualitative risk ranking systems 
have important known limitations that 
contradict their appearance of simplicity and 
transparency. To assess the relative risk of 
potential homeland security threats, a simple 
quantitative risk ranking used in conjunction 
with unranked qualitative risk descriptions and 
expert judgment are more likely to yield results 
useful to homeland security policymakers.
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ABSTRACT
Due to increasing system sophistication 
and affordability, unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) are becoming more popular 
among hobbyists and businesses. UAS also 
pose a threat to homeland security as they 
could be used for nefarious activity such as 
preoperational surveillance or as weapons. 
Consequently, law enforcement officers and 
fusion centers have experienced an increase in 
suspicious activity reporting related to UAS. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
has not yet finalized a policy for integrating 
UAS into the national airspace, leaving law 
enforcement officers without a clear protocol 
for contact with UAS operators. This paper first 
examines UAS policy at the federal, state, and 
local levels. A discussion of recent incidents is 
provided to demonstrate the threat of UAS and 
the enforcement action taken. To bridge the 
gap between current policy and enforcement 
tools, this paper proposes a solution of creating 
local ordinances restricting UAS operations to 
protect critical infrastructure and preserve 
public safety.
INTRODUCTION
The expansion of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS)1 operations for defense applications in 
the last two decades has driven growth in the 
UAS on Main Street: 
Policy and Enforcement at the Local Level
Alison Yakabe
commercial UAS industry where the casual 
enthusiast can now purchase a ready-to-fly 
system for less than $300. UAS have emerged 
as inexpensive and innovative photography and 
video platforms, often drawing recreational 
and commercial operators to fly around 
infrastructure assets of regional or national 
significance. Sites such as reservoirs, stadiums, 
bridges, and ports are intriguing subjects 
for videography but also vulnerable critical 
facilities. As a result, law enforcement officers 
and fusion centers have experienced an increase 
in suspicious activity reporting related to UAS. 
Due to increasing availability and system 
sophistication, UAS pose a threat to homeland 
security as they could be used for nefarious 
activity such as preoperational surveillance or 
as weapons.
In addition to threatening critical 
infrastructure, UAS pose a threat to public 
safety. A UAS could crash and injure bystanders 
as the result of the operator losing control of 
the data link due to equipment malfunction or 
malicious hacking of the device. Furthermore, 
UAS could be accessorized with a firearm or 
improvised explosive and deployed in a crowded 
area. The responsibility for contacting and 
determining the motivation of UAS operators 
falls to local law enforcement.
Federal and state regulations have failed 
to provide the law enforcement community 
with any coherent guidelines for conducting 
encounters with UAS operators. This paper 
proposes a strategy to mitigate UAS threats to 
critical infrastructure and public safety whereby 
municipalities and county governments develop 
and implement registration criteria for UAS 
operators and “no-fly” zones around sensitive 
areas. The idea of using local ordinances to 
protect against loss-of-life and structural 
damage provides a rare occasion where the 
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aims of civil liberties groups, UAS hobbyists, 
and law enforcement officials may coincide.
Current Policy Environment
As the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
struggles to implement a coherent UAS policy, 
local law enforcement officers need a more 
immediate solution to address the surge in 
popularity of UAS used for commercial and 
recreational purposes. 
Congress first tasked the FAA with integrating 
UAS into the national airspace when it passed 
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 
as Public Law 112-95 on February 14, 2012. The 
Act served the dual purpose of authorizing FAA 
funding for the next 4 years and prioritizing 
the safe integration of civil unmanned aircraft 
into the national airspace system by September 
30, 2015.2 The Act also stipulated that the 
FAA must publish a 5-year roadmap for UAS 
policy within 12 months of enactment detailing 
the process of introducing civil UAS into the 
national airspace.3 The FAA published the 
roadmap 9 months late in November 2013. The 
FAA has missed other deadlines including the 
naming of 6 test ranges to conduct research 
for UAS integration. The sites were named in 
December 2013, one year and three months 
outside of the 180 day requirement specified in 
the Modernization and Reform Act. See Table 1 
for a summary of FAA Regulations pertaining 
to UAS Operations.
In July 2014 the FAA published a notice 
consolidating FAA regulations and directives 
pertaining to UAS operations in the national 
airspace. The notice states that UAS users must 
obtain authority for operations under one of 
three programs: 1) For UAS operating as public 
aircraft, authority comes from the Certificate 
of Waiver or Authorization (COA) on a case-
by case basis.4 2) For UAS operating as civil 
aircraft (private sector), authority is derived 
from a Special Airworthiness Certificate (SAC) 
and covers only limited operations.5 3) Lastly, 
model aircraft flights are governed by the 
Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model 
Aircraft.6
FAA regulations governing UAS operating 
as public aircraft are currently the most robust 
as they encompass use by the Department of 
Defense (DOD). The extension of federal UAS 
operations has been implemented through the 
COA process to include other agencies such as 
NASA, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the Department of the Interior as well 
as state and local entities. These certificates 
are generally issued for a timeframe of 12-24 
months and application is restricted to public 
operators for specific activities. As of December 
4, 2013 the FAA listed only 545 active COAs.7
The FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act of 2012 established a streamlined COA 
approval process for local law enforcement, 
first responders, and academic institutions.8 
These public UAS may be used for varied 
purposes including ordnance detection, search 
and rescue, damage assessments, and −most 
controversially− surveillance. Such use cases 
represent a logical extension to federal agency 
operations. UAS eligible for the COA program 
must be operated by public agencies, weigh 4.4 
pounds or less, operate within line-of-sight of 
controller, fly below 400 feet, during daylight 
hours, within Class G airspace,9 and at least 
5 statute miles from any airport, heliport, 
seaplane base, spaceport, or other location with 
aviation activities.10 Initially, an organization 
will receive a COA for training and performance 
evaluation. Once the entity has demonstrated 
proficiency in flying its UAS, they will receive 
an operational COA expanding the allowable 
operational weight to 25 pounds.11 Although 
law enforcement and emergency management 
applications for UAS show much potential, 
their use is entangled in debate over privacy 
considerations around the 4th Amendment 
prohibition of unreasonable search and 
seizure. This article deals specifically with 
threats to critical infrastructure and public 
safety and does not consider law enforcement 
and emergency management UAS significant 
threats to either. As a result, analysis of the 
policy and enforcement environment for public 
UAS is beyond the scope of this paper.
The criteria for obtaining an SAC apply only 
to the private sector (civil aircraft) and are more 
restrictive than those of the COA program. 
Experimental category SACs are issued for 
research and development, crew training, or 
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sales demonstration purposes and prohibit 
civilian companies from operating UAS for 
compensation or hire.12 Companies with active 
experimental SACs include General Atomics, 
Lockheed, and Raytheon.13 Restricted category 
SACs allow for commercial operations. To date 
only the Insitu ScanEagle and AeroVironment 
Puma are authorized in this category to 
conduct pipeline surveys for BP in Prudhoe 
Bay, Alaska.14 On December 12, 2014 the FAA 
released Order 8000.372A which establishes a 
framework for granting SACs to UAS affiliated 
with the six UAS test ranges in the U.S.15 These 
certificates will be issued in the experimental 
category and not for commercial purposes.16 
The FAA began moving forward to expand 
commercial UAS use in September 2014. 
Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act entitled “Special Rules for Certain 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems” gives the Secretary 
of Transportation authority to expedite 
operational approval for UAS that “do not 
create a hazard to users of the national airspace 
system or the public or pose a threat to national 
security.”17 The Act also allows the secretary to 
determine if these UAS require airworthiness 
certificates, COAs, or SACs.18 Since September 
25, 2014 the FAA has announced exemptions 
from existing certification requirements for 
137 companies operating UAS for commercial 
purposes.19 The first six exemptions went to 
businesses affiliated with the Motion Picture 
Association of America and were granted for 
aerial photography and videography.20 The 
FAA has since approved requests for companies 
to use UAS for business purposes including 
construction site monitoring, aerial surveying, 
oil rig flare stack inspection, real estate 
marketing, and precision agriculture.21 The 
fact that the initial exemptions were granted to 
single operators from several major segments 
of the commercial UAS market is symbolic 
and represents progress toward opening U.S. 
airspace to civil UAS. However the FAA was 
over 2 years late in meeting the deadline for 
invoking the Section 333 provision set out in 
the Modernization and Reform Act, increasing 
the likelihood that full integration of UAS into 
the national airspace will be delayed further.22 
The Section 333 exemption process is 
onerous and may not prove sustainable for the 
FAA in the long run. Petitions and responses 
are lengthy, with detailed descriptions of 
the unmanned aircraft system, the pilot-
in-command (PIC), the UAS operating 
parameters, and public interest involved in the 
proposed commercial activity.23 In addition, 
the FAA requires each UAS pilot-in-command 
to maintain a current pilot certificate and valid 
airman medical certificate.24 This statutory 
requirement comes from 49 USC § 44711 
which prohibits a person from serving “in any 
capacity as an airman with respect to a civil 
aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance used, 
or intended for use, in air commerce…without 
an airman certificate authorizing the airman to 
serve in the capability for which the certificate 
was used.”25 The decision to require similar pilot 
certifications for both manned and unmanned 
aircraft operators may serve as a barrier to 
entry for low-budget companies seeking to use 
UAS, however as of April 2015 the FAA had 
received over 900 exemption requests.26 Given 
their minimal success in enforcing UAS use 
restrictions to date, it is uncertain if the FAA 
will have appropriate staffing to deal with this 
surge of Section 333 petitions. 
Due to the complexities and narrow criteria 
required to obtain a Special Airworthiness 
Certificate or Section 333 exemption for 
commercial operations, an ordinary citizen 
or company may claim to operate a UAS as 
a model aircraft to avoid regulation by the 
FAA. Although civil UAS blur the boundary 
between model aircraft and manned aircraft, 
the distinction between a model aircraft 
and UAS is significant. Section 336 of the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act entitled 
“Special Rule for Model Aircraft” established 
an exemption for model aircraft from any 
future FAA regulation.27 The Special Rule 
protects the longstanding legitimate use of 
model aircraft for recreational purposes. 
Section 336 acknowledges the importance of 
the Academy of Model Aeronautics in the U.S. 
as a “community-based organization” and their 
success in implementing an operational safety 
program for a legion of dedicated hobbyists. 
The statute requirements in Section 336 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 11 Article 4 (June 2015) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Yakabe,  UAS on Main Street 4
are similar to the FAA’s 1981 Model Aircraft 
Advisory Circular 91-57 (AC 91-57), but provide 
added specificity and regulatory power. AC 
91-57 was intended to apply to remote or
radio controlled model aircraft and did not
account for the expanded range, data link, and
capabilities of the unmanned aircraft in use
today. Unlike Section 336, AC 91-57 does not
carry the weight of law and only encourages
voluntary compliance.28
The FAA’s “Interpretation of the Special Rule 
for Model Aircraft” issued in June 2014 draws 
on the statutory requirements of Section 336 to 
provide specific metrics by which to differentiate 
model aircraft from UAS. It outlines five criteria 
for classifying a model aircraft as 1) flown strictly 
for hobby or recreational use, 2) operated in 
accordance with a community-based set of 
safety guidelines, 3) limited to not more than 
55 pounds, 4) operated in a manner that does 
not interfere with manned aircraft, and 5) 
when operating within 5 miles of an airport, the 
operator of the aircraft must provide the airport 
operator and the airport air traffic control tower 
with prior notice.29 Section 336 also identifies 
line-of-sight operation as the distinguishing 
characteristic of a model aircraft.30 Video 
feeds available to UAS operators often do not 
require line-of-sight contact to sustain flight 
and can serve as an easy way to distinguish a 
UAS from a model aircraft. Although Section 
336 protects traditional modelers from 
forthcoming FAA regulations for UAS, it also 
states that the FAA retains authority to “pursue 
enforcement action against persons operating 
model aircraft who endanger the safety of the 
national airspace system.”31 Taken holistically, 
the FAA’s interpretation of Section 336 may 
assist law enforcement officers in identifying 
UAS operations that require further scrutiny.
In February 2015 the FAA published a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking for the Operation 
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems to further integrate UAS operations into 
the national airspace. The proposed rule would 
allow small, registered UAS under 55 pounds to 
operate for business purposes without a COA, 
Section 333 exemption, private pilot’s license, 
or airworthiness certification.32 Although 
these provisions reduce the administrative 
requirements needed for commercial entities 
to fly a UAS, the rulemaking contains several 
operations-based restrictions. For example, 
devices must be operated only in line-of-
sight range, during daylight hours, away from 
people, and below 500 feet.33 These restrictions 
could stifle some forms of commercial activity 
that depend on distance or extended operations 
such as pipeline monitoring, surveying, or 
parcel delivery. It is important to note that the 
rulemaking becomes binding only after closure 
of a 60-day comment period and after the FAA 
reviews the findings and reissues it as a final 
rule. Until such time, Section 333 exemptions 
remain the only legitimate avenue to pursue 
commercial operation of a UAS. The FAA is 
already 9 months behind schedule in publishing 
that final rule, again making it unlikely that 
they will meet the final FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act deadline for safe integration of UAS 
into the national airspace system by September 
30, 2015.34 
Table 1. General FAA Regulations for UAS Operations
Civil (Commercial)
Special Airworthiness Certificate 
(SAC)
● Experimental Category SACs issued to companies for research,
development, crew training, market surveys, prohibit commercial use
● Restricted Category SACs are more rare, issued for specific purposes
allowing commercial use
Section 333- 
FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act
● Case-by-case exemptions for commercial UAS operations that do not
threaten airspace safety or national security
● Requires operator to hold at least private pilot's license
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Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
for Small UAS
● Allows small UAS under 55 pounds to operate for commercial purposes
without SAC as long as they are within line-of-sight, during daylight hours,
and below 500 feet
● Streamlines Section 333 exemption; does not require private pilot's license
for UAS operator
● Prohibits careless or reckless operation
● Nonbinding until reissued by FAA as a final rule
Public  
(Governments and Agencies)
Certificate of Authorization (COA) ● Allows operation of specific aircraft for specific purpose in specific area● Average 60-day timeline from application to approval
Model Aircraft (Recreational)
Section 336- 
FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act
● No FAA approval needed for hobby or recreational use of UAS
● Device must weigh less than 55 pounds and operate within line -of-sight
and at least 5 miles from an airport
● Prohibits interference with manned aircraft
● Exempts model aircraft from future FAA rulemaking
Although the FAA serves as the only federal 
agency with authority to regulate airspace safety, 
states retain some authority to restrict UAS use. 
For example, FAA regulations would preempt 
a state law attempting to limit the operation 
of an aircraft, set airworthiness standards, 
or create pilot requirements.35 However, the 
FAA acknowledges that state legislation could 
restrict the use of certain aircraft −including 
UAS− by a state agency, local police or by a state 
department or university.36 Such statutes could 
be used to supplement federal regulations. State 
and local governments also have authority to 
prohibit UAS aviation activities from their land 
or waterways.37 For example, a UAS operator 
might be prohibited from flying a device while 
on state-owned property.38
States have acted quickly to pass laws 
governing UAS use to compensate for the 
FAA’s slow pace in developing UAS policy. 
Since April 2013, legislation aiming to restrict 
UAS operations has passed in 15 states and 
deals primarily with constraining use by law 
enforcement agencies to protect the privacy of 
citizens.39 These issues fall outside the FAA’s 
mission to ensure airspace safety and state 
policy positions vary from complete prohibition 
to limited acceptance. A summary of state laws 
governing UAS use is provided in Table 2.
Early on, the states of Virginia and North 
Carolina took a conservative approach to UAS 
operations by enacting short term bans on their 
use by public agencies. This strategy allows 
more time for policymakers to develop privacy 
policies.40 The Virginia ban extends through 
July 1, 2015 and the North Carolina prohibition 
extends to December 31, 2015. Taking the 
time to craft thorough policies from the outset 
will protect the law enforcement community, 
businesses, and private citizens in the long run, 
at which point such state laws will presumably 
be amended to allow UAS use. Other states 
including Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, 
and Alaska have chosen a more metered 
approach to limit public agency use of UAS as 
it relates to the 4th Amendment prohibition of 
unreasonable search and seizure.
Some states have enacted legislation that 
goes beyond regulating public safety use of 
UAS. The states of Texas, Idaho, Tennessee, and 
North Carolina stand out for governing UAS 
use by recreational and commercial users as 
well. This approach shows that states recognize 
commercial entities and private citizens are 
flying UAS in ways that are not effectively 
regulated by the FAA. For example, real estate, 
delivery, and agricultural applications for 
UAS are well documented on YouTube despite 
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current FAA policy prohibiting commercial 
UAS operation without a Special Airworthiness 
Certificate (SAC) or exemption.41 Implementing 
UAS policy at the state level builds a good 
foundation to encourage commercial growth 
while seeking to limit unlawful uses of UAS.
Tennessee Code was amended in May 
2014 to define legitimate UAS business 
operations. Lawful commercial purposes in 
the Volunteer State include collecting data 
for routing, inspection, and maintenance of 
utility facilities, vegetation assessment, and 
real estate marketing.42 Texas Government 
Code Chapter 223, also known as the Texas 
Privacy Act, entered into law on September 
1, 2013 and centers on privacy concerns over 
images, recordings, and data collected by UAS. 
It prohibits UAS photography and filming of 
property or persons without consent.43 The Act 
also outlines 19 legitimate purposes for UAS 
flights including assessing vegetation growth, 
real estate photography for marketing purposes, 
oil pipeline surveillance, and inspection 
of utility facilities.44 Similar to the Texas 
regulations, Idaho Code Title 21-213, which 
was enacted April 11, 2013, establishes UAS 
use restrictions for unwarranted surveillance 
of persons or property while also providing a 
list of legitimate uses. Approved operations 
in Idaho include commercial photography, 
photographing public gatherings on public or 
private land, and owner inspection of land or 
facilities.45
Beyond legitimizing UAS operations for 
business purposes, in June of 2014 Louisiana 
enacted a law aiming to protect critical 
infrastructure assets from criminal UAS 
activity. Louisiana Revised Statute 14-337 
defines unlawful UAS activity as the “intentional 
use of an unmanned aircraft system to conduct 
surveillance of, gather evidence, or collect 
information about, or photographically or 
electronically record a targeted facility without 
the prior written consent of the owner of 
the targeted facility.”46 It goes on to define 
targeted facilities as petroleum and alumina 
refineries, chemical and rubber manufacturing 
facilities, and nuclear power electric generation 
facilities.47 While the FAA can regulate airspace, 
Louisiana’s statute provides an added element 
of specificity on the ground. The classification 
of vulnerable infrastructure facilities varies 
due to regional geographic, economic, and 
industrial differences. The Louisiana legislation 
demonstrates that it may be more appropriate 
to classify such assets at the local or state level.
In addition to activity or asset-based UAS 
legislation, states can also enforce takeoff and 
landing restrictions on their real property. In 
April 2014 the State of Wisconsin enacted a 
UAS law that prohibits flying over state land and 
water in a way that is “imminently dangerous 
or damaging to persons or property lawfully 
on the land or water beneath.”48 The subjective 
nature of the terms “dangerous or damaging” 
allows for greater officer interpretation of the 
operating circumstances than would an outright 
UAS ban over state-owned or private property. 
As a result, the Wisconsin law may minimize 
the burden on law enforcement officers because 
they will presumably only conduct encounters 
with “dangerous or damaging” UAS operators 
rather than with every single one.
Oregon Revised Statute 837, enacted in July 
2013, does not describe acceptable UAS use 
cases for the private sector, but does include 
proscriptions for all manner of nefarious 
operations. The law also outlines specific cases 
in which law enforcement may use a drone to 
acquire information. It goes on to require that 
any public agency operating a UAS first must 
register it with the Oregon Department of 
Aviation.49 North Carolina’s UAS law also sets 
out licensing requirements for commercial 
UAS operators through the state’s Department 
of Aviation.50 The act of assigning jurisdiction 
over UAS to a state agency establishes UAS into 
each state’s existing aerospace framework. It 
also shows that lawmakers in Oregon and North 
Carolina believe UAS will become increasingly 
important assets in airspace. While a state-level 
foundation for UAS policy may fill in the gaps 
left by the FAA, the accompanying tools for 
enforcement are equally important to mitigate 
the threat environment.
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Table 2. State UAS Laws
State Citation Key Points
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT.  § 14-337 (2014)
● Defines unlawful UAS activities





● Identifies allowable commercial UAS operations
● UAS photography or videography requires consent of individual who owns
or lawfully occupies property captured in the imagery
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 21-213 (2013)
● Restricts UAS use for unwarranted surveillance of persons or property
● Identifies approved commercial operations
Oregon
OR. REV. STAT. 
837 § 360 
(2013)
● Prohibits weaponization of UAS






● Identifies 19 legitimate commercial purposes for UAS operations
● Prohibits UAS photography and filming of property or persons without
prior consent
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 114.04 (2014)








● Prohibits UAS surveillance of private property without owner or lessee
consent
● Short term ban on UAS use by public agencies expires Dec 31, 2015
Illinois 725 ILCS § 167 (2015)






● Requires search warrant or exception for law enforcement use of UAS





● Requires search warrant for law enforcement to collect evidence using
UAS
Indiana I.C. § 35-33-5-11 (2014)
● Requires law enforcement to obtain search warrant before using UAS,
provides exceptions
● Protects electronic data from search without warrant
Iowa IOWA CODE § 808.15 (2014)
● Requires search warrant for law enforcement to collect evidence using
UAS





● Restricts law enforcement use of UAS to collect evidence
● Prohibits search and seizure using a UAS without a warrant
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● Short term ban on UAS use by public agencies expires July 1, 2015
Threat
UAS threats to privacy have gained the 
broadest media coverage and state response, 
however commercial and recreational UAS 
threaten critical infrastructure and public 
safety at the local level. As a result of increasing 
availability and system sophistication, 
actors with malicious intent may exploit 
UAS capabilities to conduct pre-operational 
surveillance or use them as weapons in kinetic 
attacks. By nature of their reliance on datalink 
technology, UAS are vulnerable to accidents, 
which poses an intrinsic threat to public safety. 
Recent national case examples demonstrate 
that these threats remain largely unaddressed 
by FAA. This policy gap provides an opportunity 
for state government and local jurisdictions to 
implement their own UAS policies.
Out-of-the box UAS systems are freely 
available for purchase on manufacturer websites 
or through online retailers. Platforms range in 
quality from battery-operated toys mounted 
with cameras to diesel-powered craft capable of 
handling 20-pound payloads. Fixed-wing and 
multi-rotor devices can fly pre-programmed 
routes or via data link with flight times ranging 
from 5 minutes to 54 hours. Communications 
between the device and operator occur via Wi-
Fi or radio frequency in the 2.4-2.485 GHz or 
72-76 MHz range, respectively.51 Typical Wi-Fi
data link range is line-of-sight or about 1000
feet, however transmitter, receiver, and antenna
upgrades on radio controlled models can
extend the range from 1-3 miles.52 The motion
stability of multi-rotor systems is particularly
attractive for collecting high-quality video. Due
to this range of capabilities, UAS are popular
among both casual enthusiasts and business
enterprises.
The threat posed by UAS to infrastructure 
assets and public safety is linked directly to 
their improved capabilities over other attack 
vectors. The most unique characteristic of a 
UAS is its ability to fly automated routes using 
GPS or first-person view (FPV). FPV describes 
the experience where a UAS equipped with 
a camera uses Wi-Fi bandwidth to transmit a 
video signal to the control console in the hands 
of the operator. GPS flight paths and FPV 
allow malicious actors to bypass traditional 
physical security measures such as barriers 
or checkpoints and remain outside the fray. 
As a result, UAS may be used to conduct 
surveillance operations in areas where entry 
might otherwise be prohibited. UAS also do 
not require as much take-off and landing space 
as manned aircraft, and can navigate at low 
altitudes through crowded areas.53
While remote operation is desirable for 
conducting kinetic attacks, the threat of 
weaponized UAS is currently mitigated by 
payload capabilities. Off-the shelf recreational 
UAS weigh anywhere from 2 to 5 pounds and 
simply cannot support a significant payload 
of explosives. Larger, more expensive models 
can lift up to 20 pounds; however this quantity 
of explosive material would not be sufficient 
to cause significant structural damage to a 
building.54 Such a detonation would definitely 
cause loss of life in a crowded area and for 
this reason the threat of a weaponized UAS 
in densely populated areas such as sporting 
events is particularly concerning. A UAS 
could operate as a dispersal mechanism for 
biological or chemical agents; however this 
threat is currently mitigated by the high level of 
expertise needed to aerosolize the agent and to 
build a remote dispersal capability.55
Despite the fact that the threat of weaponized 
UAS is currently mitigated by payload 
capabilities, malicious actors still possess the 
intent to use UAS in a kinetic attack. A pair 
of recent federal cases highlights the intent 
component of a physical UAS threat in the U.S. 
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On April 7, 2014 the FBI arrested Moroccan 
citizen El Mehdi Semlali Fathi as a part of an 
immigration investigation that also revealed 
his aspirations to conduct a bomb attack using 
a UAS.56 According to FBI recordings, Fathi 
inquired to a third party about pliers, a cutter, 
and wires, claiming that the items were intended 
for a bomb.57 He also stated that he made a 
chemical bomb in high school and discussed 
chemical explosives.58 Specifically, Fathi spoke 
of his plans to fly bombs via “a plane, a remote-
controlled hobby-type airplane” into a federal 
building.59 In September 2014 Fathi pleaded 
guilty to one count of perjury in an immigration 
matter but was not charged with anything 
related to terrorism. Despite the lack of formal 
charges, the Fathi recordings illustrate the 
notional intent to use UAS in kinetic attacks.
In another federal case Rezwan Ferdaus was 
sentenced to 17 years in prison after pleading 
guilty to attempting to damage and destroy a 
federal building by means of an explosive and 
attempting to provide material support to 
terrorists in 2012.60 For almost a year, Ferdaus 
planned and took steps to use remote controlled 
model aircraft as bombs to terrorize the U.S. 
Ferdaus informed undercover FBI agents, 
whom he believed to be members of al Qaeda, 
that he planned to obtain two remote controlled 
aircraft, fill them with explosives, and fly them 
into the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol using their 
built-in GPS systems.61 Ferdaus sought 25 
pounds of C-4 plastic explosives to be loaded 
onto the UAS for the attack.62 This example 
demonstrates that Ferdaus believed existing 
UAS capabilities could be used to execute his 
terroristic intent.
In addition to posing a physical threat, 
UAS operated as surveillance platforms 
represent a passive collection threat to critical 
infrastructure. UAS may be used in the vicinity 
of critical infrastructure to gather visual 
information. The following national examples 
suggest that commercially available (sometimes 
homemade) systems have the capability to 
conduct surveillance on protected assets. They 
also illustrate the complexities involved in 
determining the intent of a UAS operator and 
the varied enforcement tools employed by law 
enforcement officers to take action against 
dangerous or potentially nefarious flight 
activities.
In the predawn hours of January 26 2015, a 
U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
employee lost control of his DJI Phantom 
quadcopter while operating it for recreational 
purposes from his apartment near the White 
House. The device crashed on White House 
property and was recovered by the U.S. 
Secret Service.63 The incident demonstrates 
the vulnerability of federal facilities to UAS 
overflights and the lack of physical security 
measures to protect against them, even for the 
most critical of infrastructure assets. The U.S. 
Department of Justice announced on March 18, 
2015 that they would not press criminal charges 
against the UAS operator.64 The FAA launched 
a review of the incident and may pursue 
administrative action against the operator 
because all Washington, DC is included in a 
Special Flight Rules Area of national defense 
airspace in which all model aircraft and UAS 
operations are prohibited.65
On May 5, 2014 a quad-copter crashed onto 
a 30th floor balcony of the Metropolitan Square 
Building in St. Louis, Missouri.66 Police were 
not able to locate the operator of the UAS on-
scene, however a man did come forward later 
that week to claim ownership of the device.67 
The man stated he was using the UAS to take 
video footage of historic buildings. Local police 
notified the FAA of the incident and the FAA 
responded that no Federal Air Regulations 
(FARs) had been violated.68 Ultimately the 
police did not file charges against the operator 
due to lack of criminal intent. Although the 
downed UAS did not cause any physical damage 
to the Metropolitan building, this incident 
demonstrates the potential threat of UAS use 
for conducting surveillance of infrastructure 
locations.
New York City has successfully used its 
existing criminal statutes to bring charges 
against a dangerous UAS operator. In October 
2013, the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) arrested David Zablidowsky for 
flying his personal UAS over Manhattan. 
Zablidowsky’s device crashed outside of Grand 
Central Station and while no one was injured, 
NYPD cited him for second degree “reckless 
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endangerment.”69 Specifically Zablidowsky 
was arrested for “flying a remote controlled 
helicopter off a balcony, losing control, 
causing it to crash to the ground from an 
unreasonable height creating a substantial risk 
of serious physical injury.”70 NYPD identified 
Zablidowsky by footage from the camera on his 
UAS, taken inadvertently while he was setting 
up to launch.71 In New York, second degree 
reckless endangerment qualifies as a Class 
A misdemeanor and would carry a penalty of 
up to a year in prison if Zablidowsky is found 
guilty.72 The State of New York has not yet 
passed any kind of UAS law that might play into 
the investigation.73 It was not until March 2014 
that the FAA independently attempted to assess 
Zablidowsky a $2200 civil penalty for violation 
of 14 CFR Sections 91.13(a) and 91.131(a)(1). 
This incident shows that unlike the FAA, local 
law enforcement can respond more efficiently 
to UAS incidents.
Another incident in New York State 
highlights the overlap between protecting 
critical infrastructure and preserving privacy. 
In a July 2014 incident, State Troopers in 
Kingston, NY used an existing statute to 
prohibit UAS activity. The troopers responded 
to an incident of a UAS flying outside of the 
Mid-Hudson medical facility. The device was 
equipped with a video camera and operating 10-
15 feet from windows that looked in on patient 
examination rooms.74 As a result of this UAS 
flight and accompanying videography, New 
York State Police charged David P. Beesmer 
with a Class E felony for unlawful surveillance 
in the second degree.75 A class E felony carries 
a prison sentence of 6 months up to 4 years.76
Although the State Troopers took successful 
enforcement action against Beesmer, his case 
brings to light the potential benefits of enacting 
facilities-based UAS flight restrictions. 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies 
Healthcare and Public Health assets as one of 
16 designated critical infrastructure sectors.77 
Hospitals and medical facilities are so classified 
due to the life-saving services they provide in 
response to natural and manmade disasters.78 
A UAS flying around the Mid-Hudson Medical 
Center in the aftermath of a mass-casualty event 
could disrupt emergency services operations 
or potentially provide a malicious actor with 
information about treatment protocols. On a 
day-to-day basis, hospitals store hazardous 
chemicals and controlled substances, as well 
as radioactive material for their radiology 
departments and UAS could be used to gather 
information on ways to access these materials. 
In addition to threatening the general 
operations of the facility, the Beesmer case 
shows that UAS can compromise the privacy 
of patients through passive surveillance. In 
this instance, a regulation restricting UAS use 
around medical facilities would be desirable for 
civil liberties groups as well as for the public 
safety community.
The threat posed by UAS to public safety 
is underscored by a similar instance of a UAS 
endangering the public. In August 2013, a 
UAS crashed into the stands of the Petersburg, 
VA Motorsports Park during an event called 
the “Great Bull Run.” The accident injured 
four people who were all successfully treated 
onsite.79 Unlike the Zablidowsky and Beesmer 
cases, local law enforcement officials were not 
able to identify the UAS operator.80 Although a 
local statute would probably do little to deter 
nefarious actors from flying a UAS over a 
crowded area, it would reduce the likelihood 
that casual enthusiasts would be flying over 
the event and therefore minimize the risk of 
accidental loss-of-control and crashing. 
The UAS threat to public safety and critical 
infrastructure converges at high capacity 
stadium events. According to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, stadiums 
themselves are part of the Commercial Facilities 
Sector of critical infrastructure and attract 
tens of thousands of people during scheduled 
events.81 In October 2014 the FAA reissued a 
longstanding special security Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) that establishes Temporary Flight 
Restrictions (TFRs) for stadium sporting events 
to specifically prohibit UAS operations at NFL 
games, NCAA Division I football games, Major 
League Baseball games, and NASCAR Xfinity 
Cup races.82 Local law enforcement officers 
are encouraged to report suspected violations 
of NOTAM 4/3621 to their local FAA Flight 
Standards District Office.83 FAA Special Notice 
4/0811 issued in 2009 advises pilots to avoid 
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airspace around power plants, dams, refineries, 
industrial complexes, military installations, and 
similar facilities.84 The FAA has demonstrated 
its intent to apply this Special Notice 4/0811 
to all aircraft including UAS to ensure airspace 
safety.85 Unlike NOTAM 4/3621, Special Notice 
4/0811 advises compliance but stops short 
of establishing a flight restriction. Table 3 
summarizes specific FAA use restrictions for 
UAS that may impact local law enforcement 
personnel. The effectiveness of information 
sharing to take enforcement action against 
violators of these notices is still unknown as the 
FAA has not yet made public data on the number 
of reported violations they have received 
from local officers. Even so, the example of 
restricting UAS flights over stadiums could 
be implemented as a local policy for assets or 
events that attract large numbers of people such 
as shopping centers, parades, office buildings, 
or beaches. 
Table 3. Event and Location-specific FAA restrictions for UAS
Regulation Issued Details
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 
4/3621 2014
● Creates Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) prohibiting UAS use 
at outdoor stadiums and sporting events 
● Includes NFL, MLB, NASCAR Xfinity Cup, Indy Car, and Div. I 
College Football games
Security Special Notice for 
Disney Theme Park 2014
● Permanently prohibits all aircraft operations over Disney Park in 
Orlando, FL 
● Includes unmanned and remotely piloted aircraft
Washington, DC Flight 
Restricted Zone (FRZ) 2010
● Designates Washington, DC as National Defense Airspace and 
Special Flight Rules Area  
● Permanently prohibits model aircraft and UAS operations
Special Notice 4/0811 2009
● Advises against aircraft operation in vicinity of power plants, dams, 
refineries, industrial complexes, military installations 
● Interpreted to include both manned and unmanned aircraft
In early January 2015, the FAA published a 
long-awaited letter entitled “Law Enforcement 
Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS 
Operations.”86 The 12-page document does 
not contain any new regulations, but provides 
detailed information for law enforcement 
officers encountering UAS or UAS operators. 
It outlines the FAA’s legal authority to 
restrict unauthorized and dangerous UAS 
operations and requests the support of local 
law enforcement to limit such activities. The 
document emphasizes the importance of local 
law enforcement officers in collecting field 
information on each UAS-related encounter 
and provides a list of actions that these officers 
can take to assist the FAA in ensuring the 
safety of the national airspace system. The FAA 
encourages immediate notification of suspected 
violations of federal UAS regulations to one of 
6 FAA Regional Operations Centers.87 Although 
a welcome resource, this Guidance Letter does 
not directly improve the enforcement options 
available to local officers. Instead it seems to 
confirm that the FAA lacks a sufficient staff of 
Special Agents to enforce federal regulations 
and intends to rely on local sworn personnel 
to collect information and report suspicious 
UAS activity. This strategy reaffirms the need 
to develop locally-based UAS restrictions to 
improve the enforcement environment.
Analysis of reported UAS incidents to the 
Northern California Regional Intelligence 
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Center (NCRIC) in 2013-2014 indicates that 
UAS use is increasing and places an additional 
responsibility on law enforcement to determine 
operator intent. NCRIC suspicious activity 
reporting provides an aggregate metric of 
UAS activity at the regional level. Located 
in San Francisco, the NCRIC functions as a 
clearinghouse for information sharing among 
law enforcement agencies for 15 counties 
in California and is one of 78 fusion centers 
across the U.S. As such, the center is ideally 
situated to gather, analyze, and disseminate 
information related to emerging threats such 
as UAS operations. In addition, local agencies 
look to the NCRIC to pass down information 
regarding new federal policies and initiatives. 
This function is particularly germane to UAS 
as the FAA is delayed in developing nationwide 
policy. The increasing popularity of UAS 
by recreational users has resulted in more 
suspicious activity reports primarily because 
it is difficult to evaluate intent of the operator. 
It should be noted that most instances of UAS 
activity involve harmless hobbyists and are not 
necessarily indicative of criminal or terrorist 
activity.
Based on first-hand database access, in the 
time period 2013-2014 the Northern California 
Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) observed 
an increase in suspicious activity reporting 
related to UAS. In the calendar year 2013 the 
NCRIC received two UAS-specific suspicious 
activity reports. In 2014 the NCRIC received 
nine reports for UAS-related activity. The 
increase in suspicious activity reporting over 
the past two years confirms that UAS are 
becoming more popular. The incidence of 
greater numbers of devices operating in the 
airspace raises the potential for accidents or 
injuries to bystanders and increases the threat 
to public safety. The majority of the reports 
came from densely-populated urban areas. 
This may be because urban settings provide 
more interesting subject matter for UAS 
operators to film and because there is a greater 
density of law enforcement officers available to 
respond to such activity. It is also significant 
that eight of the eleven total incidents 
involved flights near infrastructure assets 
such as structural landmarks or special events 
locations. This behavior has been observed in 
other metropolitan areas including Seattle, 
Charlotte, and Tampa.88 The concentration 
of the incidents in highly developed locations 
highlights the importance of local ordinances 
for regulating UAS operations.
Enforcement
In addition to problems in developing UAS 
policy, the FAA suffers from a weak enforcement 
protocol. Rather than enforcing criminal law 
as do federal law enforcement agencies –FBI, 
DEA, CBP, ICE, etc.– the FAA serves as a 
regulatory agency tasked to create and enforce 
the rules published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR § 91), commonly called 
FARs. In order of severity the tools available to 
the FAA to enforce the FARs are “oral or written 
counseling; administrative action, including 
remedial training; legal enforcement action; 
and referral for criminal prosecution.”89 The 
FAA takes administrative action against safety 
violations by revoking pilot certificates or by 
seeking monetary civil penalties.90 Cases dealing 
with suspected criminal conduct are referred to 
the Department of Transportation Office of the 
Inspector General or to the appropriate local, 
state, or federal law enforcement agency for 
prosecution.91
The current FAA enforcement mechanism 
does not translate well to the domain of 
unmanned aircraft. Whereas conventional 
pilots are certificated and fly registered aircraft 
from recognized locations (airports), UAS 
do not fit neatly into this existing regulatory 
framework.92 Consider the following scenario: 
When the FAA receives a report of a traditional 
airplane pilot flying recklessly around a 
bridge; they typically open an investigation 
and consider the preponderance of evidence 
to determine whether or not to strip the pilot 
of his certificate.93 If the pilot then attempted 
to fly without a certificate he would be in 
violation of Title 49 U.S. Code where an 
individual “knowingly and willfully operates 
or attempts to operate an aircraft eligible for 
registration under section 44102 of this Title 
knowing that the certificate of registration is 
suspended or revoked.”94 Now in violation of 
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U.S. Code, criminal penalties against the pilot 
would be enforced by a federal law enforcement 
agency, not the FAA.95 The licensing situation 
is different with UAS. Unless a UAS has been 
granted a COA, SAC, or exemption by the FAA, 
the UAS operator will most likely have neither a 
pilot’s license nor a registered device. Without 
these documents the FAA does not have the 
ability to take certificate action against most 
UAS operators and must rely more heavily on 
civil penalties.
FAA regulations also do not preclude 
a state or local agency from prosecuting 
criminal matters involving aviation or from 
implementing more restrictive guidelines for 
operations. As a regulatory body the FAA can 
only enforce civil or administrative law with 
respect to airspace, while local law enforcement 
agencies can act on their own criminal 
statutes.96 For example, Class G airspace (1200 
feet or lower above ground level) is considered 
uncontrolled airspace and not regulated by 
air traffic control.97 States or cities may seek 
to control UAS operations in class G airspace 
to expand upon federal regulations or attempt 
to control specific UAS use cases that the FAA 
does not.
The status of the first case in which the 
FAA prosecuted a civil operator of a model 
airplane with a camera attached shows that 
FAA policy does not effectively safeguard local 
infrastructure assets and ensure public safety 
from UAS operations. The incident involved a 
subject named Raphael Pirker flying a Ritewing 
Zephyr model aircraft to take pictures of the 
University of Virginia Medical Center in 2011, 
a task for which he was paid. In this case, the 
FAA sought to assess Pirker a civil penalty 
of $10,000 for violating 14 U.S.C. § 91.13(a) 
which states that “no person may operate an 
aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as 
to endanger the life or property of another.”98 
Pirker claimed that he was operating a model 
aircraft rather than a UAS and filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the charges against him based on 
the fact that FARs do not have authority over 
model aircraft flight operations.99 A judge from 
the National Transportation Safety Board –
the agency charged with investigating and 
prosecuting all civil aviation-related incidents– 
initially granted Pirker’s Motion to Dismiss 
finding that there does not exist an enforceable 
FAA rule or CFR that applies to model aircraft 
or for classifying model aircraft as a UAS.100 The 
FAA Administrator appealed that decision and 
won a small victory when it was reversed on 
November 17, 2014. This NTSB judge cited 49 
U.S.C. § 40102 (a)(6) where the term ““aircraft” 
means any contrivance intended, used, or 
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air” and found 
that the FAA does have authority to prohibit 
careless and reckless operation of unmanned 
aircraft based on 14 CFR § 91.13(a).101 The 
November decision remanded the case back to 
the NTSB law judge to determine if Pirker did 
indeed operate his UAS in a careless or reckless 
manner.102 The case was settled out of court 
in January 2015 when Pirker agreed to pay 
the FAA an $1100 fine.103 Considering that the 
flight in question took place in 2011, the FAA’s 
inability to take timely action against Pirker 
has been interpreted by the UAS community 
as a sign of federal enforcement impotence and 
demonstrates the need for local UAS laws to 
preserve public safety. 
The Pirker case marks the first time the 
FAA attempted to fine an individual UAS 
operator, however the Administration has 
employed other enforcement tools and 
penalties to curtail civil UAS operations. Upon 
learning of unauthorized UAS flight activity, 
the FAA has implemented the following chain 
of consequences in order of severity: verbal 
warning, a warning letter, and an order to stop 
the operation.104 For example, when Lakemaid 
Beer Company posted a YouTube video showing 
a UAS delivering a 12-pack of its beer to ice 
fisherman in Minnesota, FAA officials called 
the company president with a verbal warning 
to stop operations.105 As of February 2014, the 
FAA had sent out 17 “cease and desist” letters 
to companies across the U.S.106 In one such 
letter sent to TornadoVideos.net in Norman, 
Oklahoma, the FAA representative claimed that 
the company’s website indicated that they may 
be operating UAS for the commercial purpose of 
selling videos and conducting tornado research 
without proper authorization.107 Although it 
is unknown how many phone calls or emails 
the FAA has sent out to suspected operators, 
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all violators were discovered from complaints, 
open source information, advertising, or gray 
literature. This enforcement strategy aims to 
limit the growth of commercial UAS enterprise, 
however small scale operations could easily 
avoid FAA scrutiny by limiting their media 
exposure.
State legislation increases enforceability 
by describing penalties for illegal use of UAS. 
Tennessee’s statute acknowledges that the 
sharing of data collected by UAS also poses a 
threat to commercial security. In Tennessee 
Code “surreptitious commercial surveillance” 
occurs when a UAS operator captures an image 
with the intent of collecting data on a person 
or property.108 Such unwanted surveillance is 
considered a Class B misdemeanor punishable 
by up to 6 months in jail and/or a $500 fine.109 
It is a further Class A misdemeanor offense to 
disclose, display, or distribute that data, which 
comes with a penalty of up to 12 months in jail 
and a $2500 fine.110
The Louisiana UAS law establishes a fine of 
up to $500 and 6 months in prison for using 
a UAS to conduct surveillance on specifically 
defined targeted facilities.111 A second 
conviction raises the fine ceiling to $2000 and 
the potential prison term to one year.112
Idaho law establishes a civil penalty of 
$1000 for violation of its UAS use restrictions 
against unwarranted surveillance.113 The Texas 
Privacy Act provides for a civil penalty of $5000 
for UAS images captured in a single sweep 
without the express consent of the individual 
or property owner being photographed.114 
The Act also classifies this offense as a Class 
C misdemeanor.115 The disclosure, display, or 
distribution of said images is also punishable 
in Texas by a fine of $10000 per episode and 
classified as a Class B misdemeanor.116
Oregon took a forward-thinking approach 
to restricting UAS activity by establishing 
explicit penalties for weaponizing or hacking 
UAS. Oregon legislators acknowledged the 
idea that UAS command and control systems 
are vulnerable to cyber-attack by establishing 
criminal penalties for intentionally interfering 
or gaining unauthorized control over drones 
licensed by the FAA, DOD or state and local 
agencies.117 For example, interfering with or 
gaining control of a UAS licensed by the FAA 
or operated by a public entity in Oregon is 
considered a Class C felony.118 The Oregon 
statute also created a Class A felony provision 
for persons firing bullets or projectiles from 
a UAS, using a UAS with laser directed at an 
aircraft, or crashing a UAS into an aircraft.119 
Wisconsin similarly criminalizes the use of a 
weaponized drone with the penalty of a Class H 
felony.120  Possessing or using a UAS as a weapon 
in North Carolina is a Class E felony punishable 
by up to 5 years in prison.121 While the severity 
of the penalties varies from state to state, each 
piece of legislation provides law enforcement 
with clear guidelines for identifying and citing 
UAS activity that might endanger the public or 
threaten infrastructure assets.
While 15 states have implemented UAS 
legislation, as of January 2015 only one 
municipality in the U.S. has implemented a 
local ordinance specifically restricting UAS use. 
On March 20, 2013 the city of St. Bonifacius, 
Minnesota (pop. 2,286) enacted a UAS ban over 
its airspace. Section 9-9.3 of St. Bonifacius City 
Ordinance 115 reads: “Prohibition. No person, 
entity, governmental unit or law enforcement 
agency may operate a Drone within the air space 
of the City.”122 St. Bonifacius defines “air space 
of the City” as airspace below 600 feet.123 Section 
9-9.5 of the ordinance establishes a penalty for 
violation whereby “Use or operation of a drone 
within the airspace of the City in violation of this 
Ordinance shall be a misdemeanor, punishable 
in accordance with State Law.”
On May 21, 2013 the city of Evanston, Illinois 
(pop. 74,486), passed an “anti-drone” resolution 
although it does not carry the same weight as an 
ordinance. The Evanston City Council resolution 
declares a 2 year moratorium on the use of UAS 
in the city, however it contains exemptions for 
hobby and model aircraft.124 The exemptions 
may serve to introduce confusion into the bill 
that a categorical ban on UAS use would avoid. 
The Evanston resolution only expresses City 
Council’s support for the moratorium and does 
not outline penalties for non-compliance as 
an ordinance would. A handful of other cities 
have passed ordinances restricting UAS use by 
government agencies, however they stop short 
of creating “no-drone zones.”125
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Beyond categorical bans, local governments 
may incorporate UAS use restrictions into 
broader ordinances. In March 2013, the 
township of Conoy, Pennsylvania (pop. 3,248) 
enacted Ordinance 1-3-14 which defines and 
prohibits specific nuisances in the township.126 
The ordinance defines a nuisance as “the 
unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful 
use of public or private property which causes 
injury, damage, hurt, inconvenience, annoyance 
or discomfort to any person or resident in the 
legitimate enjoyment of his reasonable rights of 
a person or property.”127 Among other activities 
such as storing garbage or junked vehicles 
and letting buildings fall into disrepair, the 
ordinance prohibits “the operation of remote 
controlled or other non-tethered aircraft over 
property not owned by the operator and without 
the permission of the property owner” on any 
public or private property in Conoy Township 
if that action is determined to constitute 
a nuisance.128 The ordinance also outlines 
penalties for noncompliance, beginning with 
a written notice and escalating to a $300 fine 
for each violation. Unlike the St. Bonifacius 
example, the Conoy ordinance does not address 
airspace jurisdiction and therefore avoids any 
potential conflicts over FAA authority. As a 
result, the nuisance ordinance may prove to be 
more enforceable than a zone-based airspace 
restriction on UAS operations.
Due to the urban nexus of UAS activity 
evidenced in NCRIC reporting, enforcing UAS 
flight restrictions around areas of specific land 
use is perhaps easier than trying to create 
airspace regulations that respect FAA authority. 
The National Parks Service took this approach 
by enacting their “3-point system” in 2014 to 
prohibit UAS takeoff, landing, and operation 
from or on park-owned property.129 The City of 
Los Angeles had a similar existing Municipal 
Code dating to 1979 that was invoked in August 
2014 when Los Angeles Port Police cited Daniel 
Saulmon with a misdemeanor for flying his 
UAS over the San Pedro, CA harbor in violation 
of Los Angeles Municipal Code 63.44 (B)(8).130 
In California a misdemeanor is punishable 
by up to a $1,000 fine and/or 6 months in 
county jail.131 Section 63.44 of the Municipal 
Code prohibits certain activities on property 
owned by the city or controlled by the Harbor 
Department specifying that “No person shall 
land, release, take off or fly any balloon, except 
children toy balloons not inflated with any 
flammable material, helicopter, parakite, hang 
glider, aircraft, or powered models thereof, 
except in areas specifically set aside therefor.”132 
For the Saulmon incident the language of 
“aircraft, or powered models thereof” was 
interpreted to include UAS and could be used 
to restrict UAS activity on other city properties. 
This example demonstrates that local codes 
written well before the invention of UAS may 
include broad language that can still be used 
by law enforcement personnel to restrict their 
use. While such creative solutions can limit 
potentially dangerous UAS operations, clear 
and specific UAS laws are still imperative for 
improving the enforcement environment at the 
local level.
Moving Forward
There exists an immediate need to bridge 
the gap between policy and enforcement action 
for UAS operations that might endanger critical 
infrastructure or innocent bystanders. Passing 
local ordinances represents a key step towards 
mitigating these threats.   
To begin from scratch, a local ordinance 
would include a pre-established scale for law 
enforcement officers to escalate a UAS incident. 
Consider the following scenario in the current 
policy environment: A security official at a high-
rise in a major urban area reports to the police 
that a UAS is flying outside of the building. A 
local patrol officer is dispatched to investigate 
the incident by making consensual contact 
with the operator. If an operator refuses to 
answer questions or provide identification 
in this “walk-and-talk” encounter, the officer 
is not in a position to detain the subject or 
seize their UAS because they lack reasonable 
suspicion to do so.133 Developing municipal or 
countywide ordinances would allow for more 
comprehensive reporting of incidents and 
increase local enforcement authority to restrict 
reckless or nefarious UAS operations. For 
example, if an individual hobbyist is cited twice 
for illegal overflights or reckless operation they 
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might be charged with a misdemeanor, required 
to pay a monetary penalty, and forfeit their 
device. This type of standard procedure would 
eliminate any “gray area” for enforcement at 
the local level.
In addition to establishing standards for 
officers dealing with UAS incidents, local 
ordinances would also include provisions for 
creating no-fly zones. As discussed earlier, Air 
Traffic Control is not responsible for airspace 
below 1200 ft. Only 5 buildings in the U.S. exceed 
this threshold, so in most cases cities would 
be within their rights to restrict operations 
in airspace around high-rises. A sample 
municipal code might also create no-fly zones 
in and around specific assets such as electrical 
substations, shopping centers, arenas, hotels, 
residential areas, or museums. Another avenue 
would be to create a categorical prohibition 
barring any UAS operations in a defined urban 
area while public parks and open space could 
be designated as “in-bounds.” This might take 
the reverse form of Los Angeles Municipal 
Code 63.44 and is not unreasonable; especially 
considering the fact that conventional model 
airplane hobbyists are accustomed to flying 
their craft away from urban areas.
The intersection of interests among 
municipal governments, businesses, the public 
safety community, civil liberties groups, as 
well as model airplane and UAS hobbyists 
will facilitate the development of local 
ordinances to govern use. Legislators and law 
enforcement liaisons will be able to enlist the 
support of a broad coalition of groups. Making 
allies of these entities will facilitate efficient 
policymaking by hedging against dissent at 
city council meetings. For example, municipal 
governments would support no-fly zones for 
UAS in order to protect their constituents and 
tax base from physical threats. Commercial 
enterprises want to protect their facilities and 
equipment from unauthorized surveillance. 
The law enforcement and first responder 
communities would support local ordinances 
because creating no-fly areas will minimize 
public endangerment and increase the 
authority of officers to protect the population. 
Civil liberties groups that typically oppose UAS 
use for surveillance as a violation of privacy 
may actually lend their backing to an ordinance 
that limits UAS operations. While hobbyists 
might initially resist restrictions on their 
model aircraft or UAS flying, any concessions 
they make in accepting no-fly zones could be 
rewarded by expanding allowable operations in 
other parts of the city or county. In this way, 
stakeholders from all sides may ultimately 
become allies in establishing local ordinances 
to prevent potential damage and fatalities 
caused by UAS.
As with any piece of legislation, UAS 
ordinances will also encounter opposition. 
The most vocal opponents of no-fly zones 
might be commercial operators, or those flying 
UAS for a profit. Markets for services such as 
cinematography, real-estate photography, and 
shipping have already emerged in metropolitan 
areas. Businesses earn money by using UAS to 
achieve unique perspectives and faster delivery 
times so their effectiveness would be hindered 
by no-fly zones. One potential solution would 
be to charge a fee for registering a UAS and 
imposing fines for violating the licensing 
criteria or the no-fly zones. As a part of the 
licensing process, UAS owners would also be 
required to furnish proof of liability insurance. 
The FAA’s practice of granting Section 333 
airworthiness exemptions while still requiring 
pilot and medical certificates may represent 
the maximum reach of their regulatory power 
over civil UAS. Local jurisdictions will still be 
responsible for most face-to-face encounters 
with operators. In this way, a local UAS 
registration requirement could function 
similarly to a fishing license or permit. 
A local registration program or ordinance 
might also reduce the demand for city and 
county resources from the current enforcement 
environment. For example, an officer 
confronting a dangerous UAS operator without 
appropriate authority to cite the subject 
wastes both time and money because there is 
rarely a definitive outcome, only an ongoing 
investigation.134 That single encounter requires 
additional investigative and analytic resources 
to build a case against the subject whereas an 
ordinance would ultimately shift those costs 
over to clerks assigned to process the citations. 
These workers are often employed at lower 
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wages than sworn personnel.135 A well-worded 
and specific UAS ordinance that minimizes 
ambiguity is also essential to minimize the 
reporting and administrative burden. Any 
kind of local UAS policy has the potential to 
increase the workload for city officials and 
administrators, however registration fees and 
fines could serve to offset costs and perhaps 
as sources of revenue for the municipality. Of 
course life-safety is the first priority of any public 
safety organization, and resource allocation for 
enforcing UAS statutes would compete with 
preventing more “traditional” criminal activity 
such as gangs, drugs, and homicide.
A local regulation against UAS flights 
around specifically prioritized assets or 
events and an accompanying registration 
program will serve to standardize reporting, 
citation procedures, and penalties. Enacting 
a local ordinance establishes a systematic 
approach by which law enforcement officers 
can make contact with UAS operators, and 
gives these officers the code they need to take 
appropriate enforcement action. Conducting 
more encounters will ultimately contribute 
to increasing homeland security by providing 
more accurate information to differentiate 
malicious UAS activity from harmless hobby 
flights. This data can then be used for crime 
analysis, resource allocation, and predictive 
policing. The action taken by local jurisdictions 
to protect critical infrastructure and preserve 
public safety addresses more nuanced UAS 
uses than state or federal legislation and may 
be achieved more quickly. While the FAA 
continues to send out cease and desist letters 
to problem UAS operators, local governments 
should seize this unique opportunity to claim 
their own enforcement authority.
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ABSTRACT
The emergency services community must 
recognize that the world is constantly changing 
and adjust accordingly. It will have to be more 
nimble and proactive with its capabilities if it 
wants to prepare effectively for future threats 
and respond to atypical emergencies. Over the 
past several years, fire, law enforcement and 
emergency medical services communities have 
not adapted their missions or capabilities to 
prepare, train, and respond effectively in a joint 
capacity to perhaps the two most imminent, 
nonconforming threats facing communities 
across America – the active shooter and fire as 
a weapon. These are incidents that necessitate 
an integrated response; traditional single 
agency “stove piped” responses will not be 
effective in saving lives and property. If we do 
not integrate Fire/EMS and law enforcement 
capabilities for these imminent threats, not 
only will civilian lives be lost, but those of first 
responders will be as well.
INTRODUCTION
Fire fighters face the risk of being hurt, injured 
or killed responding to community-based 
emergencies throughout the United States. 
Whether responding to a hazardous materials 
incident,  medical emergency or a structure 
fire, fire fighters take an oath to save others and 
in doing so often risk their own lives. Since the 
1960s the fire service has gradually expanded 
its mission and scope of service most notably to 
include emergency medicine in the 1960-70s.1 
This was then followed by hazardous materials 
response in the 1980s.2  Technical rescue came 
to fruition as a discipline in the 1990s, while 
weapons of mass destruction and homeland 
security consequence management  added 
additional mission sets in the 1990s and post 
9/11.3
To Save Lives and Property: 
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While the fire service has a tradition of 
expanding its mission to meet the needs of the 
community, the change has been more reactive 
than proactive and slow to evolve. The clearest 
example of this is the September 11th and 
anthrax attacks of 2001. The fire service was 
woefully unprepared for these events. The fire 
service tends to be bound by tradition which 
can weigh down progress and must adapt its 
mission to the threats and needs of this rapidly 
changing, more interconnected world. The fire 
service will have to be more forward leaning in 
developing its capabilities if it wants to  prepare 
effectively for future threats and respond to 
atypical emergencies. Over the past several 
years, the fire service has not adapted its mission 
or its capabilities to prepare, train, and respond 
effectively to perhaps the two most imminent, 
nonconforming threats facing communities 
across America: the active shooter and fire as 
a weapon. 
Over the past several years, there have 
been numerous national and international 
incidents that have required a combined 
law enforcement, fire, and EMS response.4 
These tragic events necessitated operational 
personnel to perform novel tactics to mitigate 
threats that required a multidisciplinary 
response. International terrorist organizations 
and criminals have utilized fire and firearms 
to evoke fear in communities, regions and 
nations.5 Intelligence reporting has indicated 
that these types of complex attacks are being 
considered by terrorist organizations, and as a 
whole, the emergency response community is 
not prepared to handle these events effectively.6 
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Both active shooter and fire-as-a-weapon 
incidents require combined fire, EMS, and law 
enforcement response. Preparing for these 
types of emergencies will require a fundamental 
shift in mission space for these aforementioned 
agencies. Traditional single agency “stove 
piped” responses will not be effective in saving 
lives and property as pointed out by Douglas 
Weeks. 
The utilization of conventional means and 
methods against an unconventional threat is 
akin to putting a square peg in a round hole; 
although it might work in some circumstances, 
it is rarely a very good fit. This square-peg, 
round-hole idea exists because conventional 
practices were never developed with the 
flexibility, operational scope, and complexity 
required to manage the threat of terrorism.8
If we do not integrate Fire/ EMS and law 
enforcement capabilities for these imminent 
threats, not only will civilian lives be lost, but 
first responders will suffer as well. Our fire 
service leaders have a duty to prepare and train 
for these events simply based on the threat; 
these events are possible in any community. 
The Active Shooter
The mass killings in Aurora, Colorado (2012) 
and Newtown, Connecticut (2012) continue to 
bring to light the real risk and absolute horror 
of what both the law enforcement and Fire/
EMS responders must be prepared to face. 
Events such as these have spawned federal 
initiatives and calls for action to control lethal 
weapons and improve mental health resources. 
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Yet, amongst all of the rhetoric for change, 
there is only now dialogue regarding the pre-
hospital medical response to these events, and 
how and where improvements and progress 
can be made.
The law enforcement community changed 
their tactical response paradigm to active 
shooter and mass killing events after the tragedy 
at Columbine in 1999. Prior to that seminal 
event, the standard law enforcement response 
to active shooter and mass killing events was 
based upon the “5 Cs”: contain, control, call 
SWAT, communicate with the perpetrator, 
and come up with a tentative plan. Based upon 
the concept that these events were actually 
hostage barricades and that the perpetrator(s) 
did not have a specific intent to kill, the initial 
patrol response was to create a hard perimeter 
around the incident site, evacuate those 
who could be evacuated easily, and establish 
communications with the perpetrators while 
waiting for the special tactical response assets 
to arrive. By the standards of the time, the law 
enforcement response to the Columbine High 
School massacre was sound, and considered to 
be completely consistent with the established 
doctrine. 
However, after Columbine, public and 
professional criticism of the tactical response 
began the process of introspection in the law 
enforcement community. A significant driver 
for that introspection came as a result of the 
Columbine Review Commission. Established 
by Governor Bill Owens after the event, the 
summary report observed that during “the 
46 minute rampage… to the commission’s 
knowledge, no efforts were made to engage, 
contain, or capture the perpetrators.”9 The 
resulting commission recommendations 
included, “law enforcement policy and training 
should emphasize that the highest priority 
of law enforcement officers, after arriving at 
the scene of a crisis, is to stop any ongoing 
assault” and that “all officers… should be 
trained in the concept and skills of rapid 
emergency deployment.”10  Additionally, police 
research that was published during the time 
after Columbine demonstrated that a single 
unchallenged shooter could acquire, target and 
shoot a new victim about every 5 seconds.11 
Therefore it stands to reason that the faster the 
active threat is mitigated, the lower the rate of 
casualties will be.
The rapid deployment model was based 
on the idea that reducing ‘trigger time’ would 
reduce the number of casualties that are 
incurred.12 Research by the SEALE Police 
Academy demonstrated that aggressive action 
was the most effective countermeasure in 
stopping the active shooter, even if it is only 
a single individual.13 This was shown to be 
the case in the 1998 shootings at Thurston 
High School in Oregon.14  This principle was 
demonstrated again in 2011 when unarmed 
civilians in Tucson, Arizona helped end an 
active shooter incident.15
As a result of the public outcry, the Columbine 
Commission’s clear criticism, and law 
enforcement research, the accepted standard 
operational law enforcement response  to the 
active shooter was changed from a ‘surround 
and wait’ model to one of rapid deployment 
of the first arriving patrol officers on the scene 
with the objective of immediately engaging and 
mitigating the on-going violence. Instead of 
waiting for highly trained and outfitted SWAT 
teams, the first arriving patrol officers are now 
expected to  form contact teams immediately 
and move aggressively to contain or eliminate 
the shooter. Using impromptu intelligence 
from victims and persons evacuating, these 
teams bypass locked doors and move towards 
the sound of shooting.
Ironically, this rapid response model was 
not completely new to the law enforcement 
community as it had been successfully utilized, 
albeit in an unprepared and impromptu 
fashion, during prior active killing events. A 
rapidly assembled team of two Austin police 
officers and a maintenance man ended the 
Texas Clock Tower incident of 1968.16 The 
Luby’s Restaurant massacre in 1991 was also 
ended by a rapid police response. Despite the 
gunman having more ammunition and many 
victims nearby, police officers responding to the 
shooting exchanged fire with him, forcing him 
to retreat into a bathroom where he ended his 
own life.17 However, it took the watershed event 
of Columbine along with the accompanying 
criticisms of the response, to finally change the 
police response paradigm.
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Applying Lessons Learned to Fire 
and EMS
When considering the change in law 
enforcement tactics and culture, more 
important than the recognition of an 
operational gap and the resulting shift in active 
shooter tactics was the rapid culture change and 
acceptance of the new response model in the 
law enforcement community. After Columbine, 
not only did law enforcement leaders learn 
from their mistakes, but the average patrol 
officer readily agreed to accept more personal 
risk in response to these events.18  The mission 
of confronting an active shooter, which was 
once reserved for specially selected and highly 
trained tactical personnel, had now shifted to 
the responsibility of patrol officers.19 
The Fire/EMS medical response paradigm 
to such events, however, has not evolved to 
meet the threat. Although recent shootings 
have begun to clearly demonstrate the Fire/
EMS response gap, the impetus for reactive 
change may not be at critical mass yet. To date, 
there has not been a truly seminal event in the 
public realm to bring harsh criticism on the 
shortcomings of the current Fire/EMS response 
protocols for active shooter events. 
Current Practice: the Stage-and-Wait 
Paradigm
At the heart of the longstanding Fire/EMS 
paradigm to high threat events is the concept 
of staging assets safely off-scene until the scene 
can be declared “safe” by law enforcement. For 
perspective, at Columbine, this took several 
hours of slow, methodical searching of the 
building despite the shooters lying dead in 
the library after 45 minutes.20 In fact, Coach 
William David Sanders, the only teacher to 
be killed in the shooting, initially survived his 
wounds, but bled to death over the three hours 
it took for SWAT teams to evacuate him.  This 
was made all the more salient by the fact that 
the students in the room with him posted a 
sign in the outside window, clearly visible to 
the responding tactical teams, that read, “1 
bleeding to death.” 21
From a medical perspective, ‘stage and 
wait’ will likely increase the mortality rate in 
these events. After extensive review of combat 
medical data, the military changed its paradigm 
of response in the 1990s to one that is designed 
to place stabilizing medical care at the patient’s 
side within a “few seconds to minutes of 
wounding”.22 Combat medical data shows that 
in penetrating trauma there is a predictable 
death curve where the majority of fatal combat 
injuries die within 30 minutes of wounding. In 
the Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness 
Team (WDMET) study after Vietnam, it was 
concluded that in combat, 42% of deaths occur 
immediately, 26% occur within 5 minutes, 16% 
within 30 minutes, and 8-10% within 2 hours. 
Only 10% of all of the combat deaths studied 
occurred once medical care had been initiated; 
90% of deaths occurred prior to any medical 
care.23 
In a common sense summary of the data, 
every minute with uncontrolled injury increases 
the death rate, so rapid application of medical 
stabilization of the wounded is lifesaving. The 
primacy and effectiveness of this ‘point of 
wounding’ care continues to hold true when 
reviewing all of the current combat medical 
data. Given this, in the current War on Terror 
(WOT), the operational medical emphasis is on 
training every combat soldier, not just those 
designated as medics, in simple basic lifesaving 
skills to be applied as soon as tactically feasible 
followed by rapid evacuation to care. As with 
the idea of rapid tactical police response to 
end the on-going killing, the medical concept 
of rapidly applied care seems to be intuitive: 
the sooner the first responders initiate rescue 
and treatment of the wounded, the greater the 
chance that the victims will survive. 
Often advanced in support of the stage-and-
wait paradigm is the notion that the operation, 
at least until scene security can be established, 
should belong to law enforcement, and that 
law enforcement personnel could and should 
be used to evacuate the wounded out to the 
staged Fire/EMS personnel. This argument is 
supported by some law enforcement agencies 
citing logistical and operational strain and some 
posit that they are unable to train their patrol 
officers in escorted Fire/EMS operations. They 
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often cite a lack of finances, training, and most 
disturbingly, a lack of confidence in the ability 
of their local Fire/EMS personnel to work in 
areas of higher risk.24
There are several issues that arise with 
the model of exclusive primary rescue by law 
enforcement. The first and foremost is that 
law enforcement personnel have a tactical, not 
a rescue or medical mission. In the current 
response model, all law enforcement response 
personnel are trained to “go to the sound of 
shooting” including stepping over and around 
injured victims. The main objective in tactical 
active shooter response hinges on immediately 
stopping the violence and securing the scene, 
both of which require multiple personnel and 
tactical objectives. This doesn’t even begin to 
account for the personnel requirements for 
scene preservation and evidence collection. 
Clearly, law enforcement bears a heavy burden 
in the response to an active shooter. 
Law enforcement officers are a limited 
resource, and should not be required to be 
the only response asset to initiate rescue and 
medical operations. Even with a maximal 
response by law enforcement personnel, in a 
scenario with high numbers of casualties, the 
likelihood of having the required numbers to 
complete the immediate tactical objectives as 
well as to stabilize and  evacuate the wounded 
is highly unlikely. This means that in systems 
where either law enforcement or Fire/EMS 
rejects the idea of coordinated medical 
operations in areas of higher risk, there will be 
wounded that continue to lie, and continue to 
die, while the primary tactical objectives are 
addressed. 
Additionally, unless specifically trained 
and carrying the proper equipment, the vast 
majority of law enforcement officers are unable 
to provide even basic medical stabilization of 
the wounded prior to evacuation. This means 
that the injured victim who is exsanguinating 
rapidly from a thigh wound will continue 
to exsanguinate during evacuation by law 
enforcement from the point of wounding to 
the ‘safe’ area where medical assets are staged. 
Keeping medical personnel out of the Indirect 
Threat (Warm) zone means that little treatment 
is being provided to the wounded, and that 
stabilizing and often lifesaving care will be 
significantly delayed.
Balancing Risk and Need
There are many common arguments against 
change in Fire/EMS response to active 
shooting/active killing events. Typically, the 
default argument against the early deployment 
of Fire/EMS assets is based upon the idea 
that operating in an unsecured environment 
represents  too much risk for the responders 
to assume and that scene safety is paramount 
above all other considerations. The concept of 
scene safety is one that is ingrained in all fire 
and EMS personnel from the earliest stages 
of training. Based on the idea that most Line 
of Duty Deaths (LODD) and injuries occur as 
a result of errors or oversights during routine 
operations, the scene safety paradigm has been 
continually reinforced by fire service initiatives 
to keep preventable injuries and loss of life in 
responding personnel to a minimum. However, 
a gap becomes apparent when this paradigm 
is applied to the active shooter and fire as a 
weapon threat scenarios. Essentially, first 
responders gain greater safety at the expense of 
injured civilians in need of rescue. In complex 
high threat scenarios, this policy of absolute 
scene safety for first responders prohibits 
mitigated risk acceptance. 
Risk comes in many forms for the Fire/EMS 
service, and there may be an inconsistency in 
the thought process that allows acceptable risk 
in some scenarios but not in others. There is 
great risk to the well-being of the responder in 
every fire that is fought. In 2011 81 firefighters 
lost their lives in Line of Duty Deaths (LODD): 
28 on-scene on an active fire, 20 after the fire, 
and 8 while responding.25 Statistics show that 
on the average, 80-100 firefighters die in the 
performance of their duties every year. Thus, 
the culture of firefighting is one in which there 
is conscious acceptance of the risk in fires and 
technical response, yet that same risk is rejected 
in the name of safety when it comes to ballistic 
or explosive scenarios. 
The same holds true for non-fire EMS 
providers. In a study of occupational risk for 
EMS during the period of 1992-1997, there were 
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67 ground-related and 19 air-ambulance related 
LODDs.26 Published statistics demonstrate that 
there is approximately one emergency medical 
worker killed every month and scores others 
injured in transportation-related incidents.27 It 
has been shown in multiple studies that lights 
and siren response to medical emergencies is 
rarely necessary and does not change patient 
outcome. 28 Yet, there are few EMS responders 
who consider or question the risk when going 
priority on a call. The Fire/EMS paradigm and 
culture appears to be one that accepts risk, often 
unnecessarily, as long as that risk is addressed 
by certain scenarios that fall within the common 
operational paradigm. In reality, however, risk 
is risk, and a LODD is tragic regardless of the 
scenario in which it occurred.  
In a study of first responder participation 
in active shooter events over 33 years, only 4 
incidents were documented where responders 
were killed or injured.29 All of the injured were 
first arriving law enforcement personnel. They 
were wounded either upon first arrival at the 
scene or while actively pursuing/engaging the 
shooter. During that same period of time over 
3000 firefighters and EMS personnel were 
killed responding to or operating in standard 
“risk acceptable operations.”30 
More recently, there have been two 
significant responder injuries in active shooter 
incidents.  First, Sergeant Kimberly Munley 
was shot during the 2009 Ft. Hood response.31 
And  Lt. Brian Murphy was shot during the 2012 
Sikh Temple shooting in Wisconsin.32  The low 
number of responder injuries to active shooter 
events is even more significant in that these 
law enforcement responders were aggressively 
pursuing and trying to confront the perpetrator. 
They were not medical/rescue first responders 
working behind the contact teams in areas that 
had been cleared but not secured. 
The recent tragic event in Webster, New 
York is considered to be a different scenario and 
should not be used as an argument of excessive 
risk. These firefighters were ambushed from a 
long distance without warning or any indication 
of threat as they responded to a known house 
fire33. Even the current paradigm of safe 
staging would not have prevented the loss of 
life in this scenario. In fact, there are almost no 
preventative actions that could account for that 
form of ambush attack. The concern that one 
or more additional shooters could be hidden 
or lying in wait to specifically ambush and 
attack first responders after the initial contact 
teams have moved through an area could be 
conceivable. It is possible that a shooter could 
hide, wait for the initial police response to move 
through the area where he is hidden, and then 
attack the second or third wave of responders. 
Review of the history of these events and the 
motives of the individuals involved, shows that 
such an attack is extremely unlikely, however. 
First, out of all the documented active shooter 
incidents in the United States since 1966, there 
have been only two cases where there was 
more than one shooter. The first was the 1998 
attack at Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, 
Arkansas, and the second was the tragedy at 
Columbine High School.34 It is difficult for two 
persons to have the desire to initiate a heinous 
attack, effectively plan without discovery, and 
have enough of an understanding and real time 
operational awareness regarding the response 
to the event to successfully complete such a 
delayed ambush. Lying in wait is the exact 
opposite of what appears to be the objective of 
such attacks, which is to create havoc and kill 
as many as possible. Law enforcement research 
into the common characteristics of the active 
shooter profile supports that an ambush of the 
responders behind the contact teams is highly 
unlikely.35  Police research demonstrates the 
unlikelihood of an ambush attack: 
[T]hey generally try to avoid police, do not 
hide or lie in wait for officers and typically 
fold upon armed confrontation …They choose 
unarmed, defenseless innocents for a reason: 
they have no wish to encounter someone 
who can hurt them. They are personally 
risk and pain avoidant. The tracking history 
of these murderers has proved them to be 
unlikely to be aggressive with police or other 
responders. If pressed, they are more likely to 
kill themselves.36
However, the delayed ambush scenario 
in the middle of an active law enforcement 
response, although an extremely small risk, 
is a risk nonetheless. For this reason, Fire/
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EMS warm zone medical care and rescue 
operations should always be coordinated and 
in conjunction with law enforcement providing 
security.  Rescue personnel can be outfitted and 
trained in proper ballistic personal protective 
equipment if jurisdictionally appropriate.
Who Should Provide On-scene Care?
Tactical medics embedded with SWAT or other 
specialized law enforcement teams could be 
proposed as a solution to the gap in Fire/EMS 
response to active shooter/active killing events. 
The justification for this might be that these 
personnel have trained with law enforcement, 
are outfitted with similar personal protective 
equipment, are familiar with law enforcement 
operations, and that they have volunteered to 
work alongside law enforcement and accept a 
higher level of risk. Certainly, tactical medics 
are specially trained to work in high threat 
environments and are both exceptionally useful 
and, if immediately available, are one of the 
appropriate immediate assets to be deployed in 
active shooter scenarios. 
Proponents of tactical medics as the solution 
could refer to the 2007 Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute shootings as proof of concept.37 
Although the early deployment of tactical 
medics certainly saved at least two lives 
during this incident, the problem is that this 
argument overlooks the fact that these SWAT 
teams and their embedded medics were staged 
and immediately available. If the University 
Emergency Operations Plan had not been 
enacted before the onset of the Norris Hall 
attack, these medics would not have been there 
and no care would have been rendered inside 
the building, at least early on in the response.38 
Tactical medics represent a specialized 
resource in the active shooter Fire/EMS 
response paradigm similar to the specialized 
SWAT teams used in the law enforcement 
response paradigm. It should be noted that 
law enforcement has moved away from relying 
on specialized SWAT teams for the immediate 
response in active shooter situations due to the 
time constraints of getting resources on scene 
expeditiously. 
Not to undermine their importance or value, 
but there are multiple issues with relying on 
tactical medics as the sole indirect threat care 
rescue/medical asset. In all but a few full-time 
SWAT teams, tactical medics are part-time and 
are therefore not always available. Even in full-
time teams, because they respond as part of the 
SWAT package, the on-scene time for tactical 
medics will be slower than first responding 
Fire/EMS assets. Tactical medics have a 
defined mission to provide medical support for 
the SWAT team officers and the SWAT tactical 
mission. Thus, they cannot initiate mass 
wounding care until the primary mission of the 
SWAT team is completed. And finally tactical 
medics are an extremely limited resource, with 
most SWAT teams only having one or at most 
two medics during any operation. The ability 
of one or two medics to care for a scene with 
multiple severely injured casualties spread over 
a geographical area is extremely limited.
The last argument against Fire/EMS 
response paradigm shift comes down to history. 
Despite good evidence and a healthy dose of 
common sense supporting a shift, the resistant 
firefighter and/or medic could fall back on 
an argument based on tradition and existing 
doctrine.   Fire/rescue and EMS training is based 
largely on apprenticeship-like learning where 
the student emulates what he/she has been told 
and shown by his/her superiors; this can lead to 
propagation of operations and procedures that 
are not grounded in evidence. Additionally, as 
a whole, human beings are uncomfortable with 
change. This natural resistance makes change 
slow and cumbersome, and requires time, 
patience and a lot of discussion. Change is never 
easy, especially when it addresses one of the 
earliest and most culturally entrenched ideas 
in operational response. So, how should these 
holdouts be addressed? The answer  is to move 
forward decisively with solid training, tactics, 
and equipment to develop an operational 
paradigm that allows for medical operations in 
the setting of mitigated risk. This will decrease 
the uphill climb that comes with overcoming 
operational inertia and, in the end, will help to 
ease the assimilation of a new paradigm.
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A New Model for Responding to 
Active Shooter Incidents
The arguments both for and against Fire/EMS 
paradigm shift are most often related to the 
points discussed above. The major themes cited 
again and again involve perceived operational 
risk, law enforcement responsibility, tactical 
EMS, medical protocols, and the historical 
operational perspective. When closely 
examining these arguments in light of the 
evidence available on true risk and operational 
restraints, one can quickly discern the need for 
change.
A new Fire/EMS response paradigm for 
active shooters must be implemented. In it, the 
first-in Fire/EMS responders must work with 
first responding law enforcement officers to 
deploy rapidly into areas that have been cleared 
but not secured, and to initiate treatment and 
rescue of injured victims. To clarify, as with the 
law enforcement response, this must be the first 
arriving Fire/EMS assets on scene, not special 
operations or tactical medical teams. The law 
enforcement patrol officers must provide 
security for the Fire/EMS personnel during 
operations. The latter must have appropriate 
medical supplies and equipment and must 
be trained in some basic law enforcement 
movement/tactics. These Fire/EMS responders 
must base their treatments on the medical 
principles of civilian Tactical Emergency 
Casualty Care, not military Tactical Combat 
Casualty Care, to meet the standard of care for 
application of medicine in civilian high threat 
scenarios. 
Indirect threat care and high threat medicine 
are outside the typical EMS protocol, but it 
would not require radically new standards of 
care or a prohibitive amount of new training. 
Although care provided to the wounded in 
areas of mitigated threat requires a different 
approach than traditional EMS, this does not 
represent a significant and expensive training 
mandate. Developed by a consensus group 
of operational medical experts using military 
battlefield medical guidelines as a foundation, 
the guidelines of Tactical Emergency Casualty 
Care (TECC) represent simple evidenced-
based best practice medical guidelines for care 
provided by any caregiver at or near the point 
of wounding during high-risk operations.39 It is 
threat-based care that defines the relationship 
between the provider and the threat, and defines 
the minimum of what is ‘needed’ medically for 
life saving measures in lieu of the standard EMS 
approach that emphasizes what is ‘nice’ to do. 
Developmentally, TECC is the civilian 
appropriate, civilian guided translation of the 
successful military Tactical Combat Casualty 
Care (TCCC) guidelines.40 TCCC was written 
for the military medical personnel treating 
a military population in a military setting. 
Although there is a robust industry built 
around teaching the military TCCC concepts to 
civilian responders in ‘cookie cutter’ courses, 
the students finishing these courses ultimately 
have to alter what they learned, or depending 
on their scope of practice, ignore certain 
learning objectives to be able to operationalize. 
The basic issue with carte blanche application 
of military dogma is that the situational aspects 
of civilian operations are different than those 
of military operations. TECC  was written by 
civilians for civilian use, and accounts for the 
aspects of the civilian setting and scope that 
do not exist in the military. These different 
aspects include scope of practice, liability, 
special populations (geriatrics and pediatrics), 
and baseline health of the population. Since 
TECC is a set of guidelines and not protocols, 
it is incumbent upon the local EMS system 
to evaluate the extent to which TECC can 
supplement or enhance local EMS protocols. 
In instances where medical authority and 
oversight currently conflict with TECC, these 
areas should be evaluated by the authority 
having jurisdiction (AHJ) with significant 
physician oversight in the process.
Fire as a Weapon
Fire as a weapon refers to the use of fire by 
criminals or terrorists to kill, maim, and/or 
evoke fear. Fire is an easy, inexpensive weapon 
to deploy effectively. It is easy to purchase 
flammable products without raising suspicion. 
Although not as potent as explosive materials, 
modest amounts of flammables are easy to 
conceal in common items such as bottles or 
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household cleaning containers. Compared with 
bomb-making, many incendiary devices require 
very little technical expertise to assemble. Most 
importantly, even a small fire has the potential 
to produce results that are deadly, visibly 
impressive, and newsworthy. International 
terrorists and violent extremists routinely 
advocate the use of fire in their propaganda.41 
The use of fire as a weapon is as old as 
fire itself. In recent years, fire has become 
increasingly common as a means of causing 
death and destruction.42 These incidents have 
been challenging as illustrated in the 2008 
Mumbai attack, where hundreds of people 
were trapped above an intentionally set fire 
in a massive hotel.43 Another incident of note 
would be the 2003 double subway train fire, 
which began as a suicide attempt and killed 
198 in Daegu, South Korea.44 Domestically 
we have seen smaller versions of these events 
such as in 2012 when an armed hostage taker 
in Los Angeles barricaded himself inside a 
residence and then set fire to it, endangering 
nearby occupancies.45 Frequently, fire is also 
a byproduct of bombings and explosions. For 
example, during the 2004 hostage taking at the 
Beslan Middle School in Russia, the explosions 
that preceded the rescue attempt caused a fire 
that resulted in many deaths.46 
Since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the use 
of fire as a weapon may be experiencing a 
resurgence. Recent terrorist pronouncements, 
including articles in Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula’s Inspire magazine, have encouraged 
‘pyro-terrorism.47  In addition, FDNY’s 
Watchline report stated that fire is a ubiquitous 
threat in demonstrations against the United 
States. The report states that“[s]ince the attacks 
on U.S. diplomatic missions (Benghazi, Libya) 
on the anniversary of 9/11, one commonality 
among demonstrations, which have spread to 
more than twenty Muslim majority countries 
from Morocco to Indonesia, is the use of fire to 
either express the protesters’ anger or to garner 
media attention.”48 
Taken alone, each of these incidents 
represents a possible scenario that a fire 
department should be prepared to mitigate. 
Taken together, these incidents form a pattern 
that justifies greater focus and preparedness by 
the emergency response community. Fire as a 
weapon has a long, evolving history of use by 
terrorists and extremists and may be finding 
an increasingly prevalent role in terrorists’ 
tactics, techniques, and planning. The threat 
is immediate and leaves no justification for not 
being prepared. However, the fire service has 
been slow to respond to the evolving threat of 
fire as a weapon.
Lessons Not Learned
Perhaps the most significant missed opportunity 
for the US fire service to learn from the use of 
fire as a weapon stems from the Columbine High 
School attack of April 20, 1999. The Columbine 
Commission Report found that 
The Columbine High School tragedy was 
the work of two disgruntled seniors at the 
school, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, who 
determined to kill as many teachers and 
fellow students as possible, first, by planting 
and detonating two 20-pound propane bombs 
in the cafeteria and then by shooting survivors 
fleeing the inferno they hoped to create.”49 
Although the perpetrators ultimately failed in 
their attempts to detonate the large propane 
bombs, “they managed to detonate smaller 
bombs, one of which was attached to a container 
of flammable liquid. The resulting fire bomb 
activated the cafeteria sprinkler system, and 
soon thereafter the sprinkler and fire alarm 
system were activated throughout the school 
building.”50  In all the report indicates that 99 
explosive devices were found: 
[They were]of various sizes and magnitudes 
in preparation for their attack…Seventy-six 
of the devices were located in and around 
the school, thirteen were discovered in the 
killers’ cars in the parking lot and eight 
more unexploded bombs were found in their 
homes. Two diversionary bombs (backpacks 
loaded with pipe bombs, aerosol canisters and 
propane tanks) had been partially detonated 
in a field about three miles southwest of the 
high school.51 
If the Columbine assailants had successfully 
ignited their incendiary devices, then the 
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attack may have played out very differently. 
An argument can be made that had fire been 
more of a factor in the incident, the response 
to the use of fire as a weapon may have also 
resulted in a paradigm shift for the fire service. 
Law enforcement received the majority of 
the criticism for taking so long to search 
and evacuate the school. However, had the 
assailants’ incendiary devices operated as 
intended, responder operations would have 
been significantly delayed. If law enforcement 
officers were waiting for fire fighters to 
extinguish the fire, and fire fighters were waiting 
for law enforcement to secure the scene, then 
the enduring image of Columbine may have 
been fire fighters and law enforcement standing 
by as the school – and those trapped inside – 
burned. The United States Fire Administration 
report on Columbine highlighted the need for 
an integrated response capability that could 
address the unique demands of the Columbine 
attack and observed that such incidents, 
“demand nontraditional responses and 
tactics.”52
Unfortunately, it appears that the fire 
service has failed to learn from the potential 
consequences of Columbine and Mumbai. 
Many fire departments continue to operate with 
a ‘standby’ policy for active shooter and fire-
as-a-weapon incidents. Unfortunately, within 
the fire service, potential consequences rarely 
motivate change. When there is significant loss 
of life, the fire service is more likely to prioritize 
the issue or problem. 
The major fire protection codes, laws, 
and regulations are a prime example. After 
incidents where there has been a significant loss 
of life, major changes have been enacted. For 
example, the 1942 Coconut Grove Nightclub 
fire killed 492 patrons and resulted in changes 
to exit door and capacity regulations, as well 
as laws banning the utilization of flammable 
decorations.53 The 1958 Our Lady of Angels 
school fire in Chicago killed 92 school children 
and three teachers, and resulted in sweeping 
changes in school safety regulations.54 The 
Station Night Club fire in 2003 killed 100 people 
and resulted in the NFPA enacting tough new 
code provisions for fire sprinklers and crowd 
management in “nightclub-type venues.”55 
Change is slow to occur in other areas of the 
fire service as well. Whether it relates to seat 
belts, heart disease, or wearing self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA), the fire service is 
rarely proactive. The reasons for this reactive 
mentality are varied and complex and as long 
as it remains a characteristic of the fire services, 
lives will continue to be lost. 
Whose job is it?
Whenever weapons, bombs or explosives are 
involved in an emergency incident, the fire 
service typically plays a supporting role in the 
response to law enforcement.  Generally, the 
frontline fire fighter doesn’t have the knowledge, 
skills, abilities, training or equipment to respond 
effectively and mitigate these types of incidents. 
Likewise, law enforcement doesn’t have the 
training and tools to handle advanced life 
support medical emergencies or structure fires. 
Every day these typical threats are managed by 
each respective discipline; however, when the 
threat requires both disciplines to mitigate the 
circumstances through tactical interventions, 
what do we do?   
Traditionally police and fire departments 
have put policies in place that require law 
enforcement officers and/or fire fighters to 
“standby” if the incident falls under the purview 
of the other. Alternatively we witness our officers 
and fire fighters perform outside their scope of 
practice and comfort zone and ultimately give 
them awards or honor their supreme sacrifice. 
For active shooter and fire-as-a-weapon events, 
standby policies may prove to do more harm 
than good as noted by Paul Atwater.
The lessons of Columbine – and now 26/11 
Mumbai – reveal that the “standby” policy 
prevents fire fighters from taking calculated 
risks to save lives or mitigate life threatening 
hazards during a paramilitary style attack. 
Unless the fire service finds a way to move 
beyond the “standby” policy – and into the 
“warm zone” of potential violence – then fire 
fighters will remain unprepared for the next 
paramilitary style attack against the U.S. 
homeland.56 
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A standby policy may prevent injuries and 
deaths to fire fighters, but added responder safety 
comes at the expense of response capability. 
Fire fighters on standby can’t mitigate hazards 
or save lives. If this is an acceptable level of fire 
department service, then that message should 
be communicated not only to the citizens, but 
to other responding agencies and departments, 
so that they can plan accordingly.  
The London Fire Brigade (LFB) is a modern 
example of successfully integrated efforts 
between fire and police departments.  After 
the July 7th, 2005 subway attacks (7/7) the 
LFB changed their tactics to a more aggressive 
operating posture in high risk areas based 
on real-time risk/benefit assessment by 
command.57  The official coroner’s report 
released on the 7/7 incident vindicated the 
LFB; however public perception of the response 
system that kept responders from early rescue 
operations during this incident forced a change 
in tactics.58  As such, in the years leading up 
to the 2012 London Olympic Games, LFB 
researched international best practices and 
worked with operational partners to develop 
and implement a new approach to high-threat 
scenarios including “specific incident plans 
that take into account the threats and hazards 
outlined in the Olympic Safety and Security 
Strategic Risk Assessment.”59 
The fire service must also address the 
inconvenient truth that many of our fire fighters 
will act when innocent lives are in the balance 
regardless if there are “standby” policies or not. 
Many fire fighters and police officers are willing 
to put themselves in harm’s way despite the 
risks. They see such action as just doing their 
job as Frank McElroy argues. 
Fire fighters also have a history of performing 
extremely dangerous activities beyond the 
scope of their training and equipment when 
such actions were the only way to save a life…
it is reasonable to assume that fire fighters will 
continue to place themselves in great danger 
to rescue those who would otherwise die, 
whether the dangers involved are from a fire 
or hostile gunmen.60
A seminal event exemplifying these 
phenomena is the Freddie’s Fashion Mart fire in 
Harlem NY in 1995.61 If history is said to repeat 
itself and we are serious about learning from 
our mistakes and/or past, serious introspection 
should be given to this incident.  If we have 
first responders that are willing to operate in 
these atypical events, why not provide them 
with the appropriate education, training, and 
equipment to increase their chances of survival 
when they do act?
Expectations of the nation
The general public expects the vast majority 
of emergencies to be handled effectively and 
managed by emergency response organizations. 
During a terrorist attack, public expectation 
for effective response will be even higher. 
Some of the increased expectation is related 
to the amount of time and public monetary 
expenditure that has been dedicated to post-
9/11 emergency response. Undeniably, since 
9/11 billions have been given to police and fire 
departments throughout the United States. As 
Amanda Ripley notes, “All across the nation 
we have snapped plates of armor onto our 
professional lifesavers. In return, we have very 
high expectations for those brave men and 
women.”62 Fire and law enforcement agencies 
throughout the United States have collectively 
been given huge sums of money to prepare 
for terrorist incidents; the public expects us to 
respond effectively to these events. Increased 
public expectation will also be a natural 
psychological reaction to an attack. As Paul 
Atwater argues, “In a moment of great national 
trauma playing out on television screens around 
the world,” inaction would not be consistent 
with the expectations – or the needs - of the 
nation.63 
Following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the focus was on chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN); however, 
the 9/11 attacks utilized none of these agents. 
Rather, the terrorists utilized fire as a weapon 
in the most extreme way imaginable. Yet, over a 
decade later, the fire service has not been more 
attentive to this threat. Many fire departments 
maintain standby policies for active shooter and 
fire-as-a-weapon incidents, despite awareness 
that these policies may be inconsistent with 
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public expectations.  Because we have not fully 
informed the public that we will not respond, 
we may have left our communities under the 
incorrect assumption that we will. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is 
our mission to “protect and serve”.  Fire and 
police personnel are strategically positioned 
throughout the community to respond to 
emergencies rapidly and effectively. Along 
these lines community stakeholders have come 
to expect a certain level of responsiveness and 
ability to adapt to most policing challenges. 
Community oriented policing has been 
advocated and advanced in practice over the 
last several years.  Likewise fire departments 
are increasingly canvassing their response 
areas for not only fire and life safety hazards 
but also to gain additional awareness in the 
community, build community trust, and to be 
an advocate for all hazards preparedness and 
individual resiliency during emergent times. 
Both the police and fire departments, already 
rightly extended and interwoven into the 
community, have much at risk with significant 
fallout possible if community expectations are 
not met.
CONCLUSION
The active shooter and fire as a weapon response 
requires a mixed playbook to mitigate effectively 
emergencies that cross single occupational 
boundaries. The interdependencies of 
emergency services organizations become more 
prevalent on high visibility, multi-casualty, 
poly-incident objective events.  However a joint 
response model should not be confused with 
role creep and/or advocating for an instance 
where one individual or team has a dual role. 
Arguably, due to the nature of the threat and 
proximity of the threat to the provider, certain 
skill sets must be transferred across agencies. 
Tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) 
and mitigating fire under an active threat 
should become an accepted innovation for 
the community.  Eventually, when generally 
accepted across the emergency services sector 
as a mandatory capability, it will be culturally 
ingrained as what is expected for the citizenry. 
Emergency medical services, hazardous 
materials and technical rescue became standard 
services provided within the fire service as did 
SWAT within law enforcement.  TECC provides 
a framework for high threat medicine which 
should be adopted for normalization within the 
entire emergency services sector.
The arguments presented here are intended 
to exemplify the systemic way of quantifying the 
relationship of the provider to the threat and 
victim, and are solely based upon a mitigated 
risk model that has been inherent to both police 
and fire response for generations.  For those 
that serve, we risk much to save much, we risk 
little to save little, and we risk next to nothing to 
save nothing.64  Not implementing a mitigated 
risk model during incidents of active shooter or 
fire as a threat is antithetical to this professed 
philosophy. 
We should risk much for active threat 
incidents when much is to be gained by 
mitigating those risks with effective tactics 
(inherent to each responding agency), 
techniques (TECC based response protocols), 
and procedures (unified commands and 
integrated joint action plans).  This will require 
real groundwork and cultural change prior to 
incident initiation.  
The scope and breadth of these intricate 
and interrelated moving parts require adaptive 
change, the most complex type of change 
possible to realize.  Such change requires 
leadership on a monumental scale that affects 
the “hearts and minds” of providers and decision 
makers alike across multiple disciplines and 
stakeholders. Many previous disciplines now 
readily accepted within the fire service were 
initially rejected as not being at the core of the 
fire service mission.  Today that sentiment is 
significantly different.  Compelling analysis, 
best practices, and data have been presented to 
help mold what we think is an effective future 
framework to a complex multi-faceted issue 
that today’s homeland security leader must 
effectively address to save lives and property.
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ABSTRACT
The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai was 
characterized by a sense of public confusion 
and frustration. Throughout the event, the 
attackers were able to avoid an operationally 
superior counterterrorism force and for 
four consecutive days managed to spread 
terror in India’s most populous city. One of 
the main contributing factors in the LeT and 
JuD’s success was their innovative use of lean 
everyday technology. Not only did technology 
give the attackers detailed information 
about their targets before the attack, but the 
information they received during the attack 
gave the terrorists a sustained tactical edge. 
After the attacks two primary questions 
remain. How did this happen? What, if 
anything, can be done to disrupt and prevent 
this style of terrorist attack? This essay will 
review the background of the pre-attack 
phase, provide an analysis of the attack itself, 
and finally conclude with a set of actionable 
items and lessons learned for practitioners.
INTRODUCTION
The November 26, 2008 terrorist attack in 
Mumbai was an eye opening experience for 
many in the public safety community and 
signaled a new wave of small-arms attacks 
that has continued steadily for the past seven 
years.1 The main question from the aftermath 
of the attack is still relevant today. How do a 
small number of terrorist operatives run a 
disciplined, coordinated, and sustained attack 
on a large metropolitan area with virtual 
impunity? The short answer was, and still is, 
technology. The situational use of cell phones 
and other low-fi tools gave the Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT) and Jamaat ul Dawa (JuD) attackers 
November, 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attack: 
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Joshua L. Kelly and Shahrzad Rizvi
detailed information about their targets before 
the attack and a sustained tactical advantage 
during the attack.2 This essay will analyze the 
use of technology in the Mumbai attack, and 
will conclude with a set of lessons learned and 
recommendations for practitioners moving 
forward.
Background
This essay is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the social and 
political climate that led to the attacks, but 
rather to review the use of technology during the 
attack itself, and to provide recommendations 
for practitioners to mitigate or prevent another 
Mumbai. For a more thorough background 
see Christine Fair’s analysis in her testimony 
before the Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security 
and Infrastructure Protection.”3 Having said 
that, in order to provide a foundation for the 
overall analysis, it is necessary first to review 
how the attackers planned, acquired, and used 
technology during the lead up to the Mumbai 
attack.
Preparation
To overcome a militarily superior adversary 
during a terrorist or guerrilla style operation, 
it is essential for the attackers to capitalize 
on the element of surprise. To maximize that 
advantage during this event, planners from the 
LeT and JuD determined that their operators 
would require advanced situational awareness; 
handlers in Pakistan would need to study their 
targets meticulously beforehand and find a 
way to feed the attackers real-time information 
during the event itself.
The Continued Relevance of the 
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David Headley (aka Daood Gilani) was tapped 
to accomplish this task. In the months leading 
up to the attack, Headley visited Mumbai five 
times to collect video, photographs, and GPS 
locations of key targets.4 The most valuable 
of his visits was used to map the landing site. 
By mapping the landing site in advance via 
Google Earth, Headley allowed the attackers 
to enter India at a predetermined site where 
he knew they would face limited resistance.5  It 
is clear that David Headley’s use of everyday 
technology (Google Earth, handheld camera, 
etc.) helped him avoid detection, but how was 
he able to acquire such in-depth intelligence 
without any red flags being raised on the front 
end? Again, the answer lies in how the LeT and 
JuD acquired their technology and the kinds of 
technology they used.
How the Terrorists 
Acquired Technology
The consumerization of technology in Southern 
Asia has not only allowed the cities of Bangalore 
and Mumbai to become regional “silicon 
valleys”, but has also increased the access to 
information and communications technologies 
for criminals and terrorists. Hasan Gafoor, 
Mumbai’s police commissioner, provided 
an excellent summary following the attacks. 
“Once complicated technologies, including 
GPS systems and satellite phones have become 
simpler to operate, terrorists, like everyone else, 
have become adept at using them.”6 Basically, 
the Mumbai attackers were able to avoid 
detection because the tools that they used-- 
GPS markers, Google Earth, camera phones, 
and cable television--are virtually impossible 
for public safety officials to track and limit. 
The only exception to their reliance on low-
fi tools was the operative’s choice of phones. 
Analysts found out rather quickly during the 
attack that the on-the-ground managers and 
remote planners were masking their locations.7 
The operators in Mumbai used satellite phones 
to communicate with their handlers  in Lahore, 
Pakistan, who were themselves supposedly 
using VoIP (internet) operated phones to 
further cover their tracks.
While these phones were being procured 
in the weeks leading up to the attack, an 
inconsistency with one of the purchasers 
actually raised a red flag that almost gave the 
attackers up. The individual who purchased the 
phones for Lashkar-e-Taiba through providers 
in New Jersey, USA, claimed that his name was 
Kharak Singh and that he was from India, yet 
he provided a Pakistani Passport number for 
the transaction.8 The vendor of the technology, 
Callphonex, asked via e-mail, “If you’re from 
India, why do you have a Pakistani passport?”9 
Unfortunately, this question was asked on 
November 25, 2008, and by then the attackers 
had already left for Mumbai. This event is 
an example of the speed at which terrorists 
can operate and a reminder that the current 
counterterrorism measures designed to flag 
suspicious behavior may be inadequate to 
uncover and disrupt operations by agile terror 
networks of this sort. 
Attack Phase
While the groundwork for the operation was 
years in the making, the attack itself lasted from 
November 26, 2008 to November 29, 2008 and 
was carried out by the LeT and JuD using four 
attack teams operating initially on five different 
targets: Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus ; Leopold 
Café ; Taj Mahal Hotel ; Oberoi Trident ; and 
Nariman House Jewish Community Center.  In 
order to maximize confusion and distract first 
responders, the attackers detonated two taxi 
bombs at Wadi Bunder and Vile Parle. When 
all was said and done the attackers killed 172 
individuals and wounded an additional 308. 
On top of the civilian casualties nine out of ten 
of the attackers were themselves killed during 
the attack.10
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Figure 1. The Six Initial Target Locations11
Technology and Situational 
Awareness
The Mumbai attack was not the first terror 
attack in which the media and other public 
sources were used inadvertently to release 
tactical information to the wrong audience. In 
1972 during the Munich massacre, the hostage 
takers watched the television broadcast within 
the Olympic dorms. In the Westgate mall 
attack in Kenya, the Al Shabaab attackers 
received updates via their cell phones.12 In 
order to understand the extent to which the 
Mumbai attackers were reliant on public source 
technology for on-the-ground advantages, 
it is helpful to review the following captured 
conversation between the attackers and their 
handlers that was intercepted during the 
event.13 
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The following conversation occurred at the Taj Mahal Hotel early in the attack.
November 27, 2008 - 3:10 a.m.
Terrorist: Greetings!
Handler: Greetings! There are three Ministers and one Secretary of the Cabinet in your 
hotel. We don’t know in which room.
Terrorist: Oh! That is good news! It is the icing on the cake!
Handler: Find those 3 - 4 persons and get whatever you want from India.
Terrorist: Pray that we find them.
(Ministry of External Affairs India, 2009)14
of technology.17 Using this assumption as a 
starting point, the following section provides 
four recommendations for public safety 
officials to mitigate this style of attack. In 
order to help counter this fluid use of low-fi 
technology and increase the speed at which 
they can respond, managers should work to 
integrate improvisation into their planning and 
exercise process, limit bureaucratic red tape 
that prevents inter-organizational cooperation, 
double down on community-centric active 
shooter training, and be open to operationally 
adopting new and innovative technology.
Planning and Exercising for 
Improvisation
In the United States, the Incident Command 
System (ICS) has been almost universally 
adopted by Emergency Managers and 
Homeland Security organizations across 
the country.18 During the Mumbai attack, 
Indian emergency managers had planned for 
attacks, but they lacked a modular and flexible 
structure when it came to communicating and 
responding in a non-routine fashion.19 ICS 
provides a structure and starting point with 
which, at least theoretically, these challenges 
can be overcome.  However, over a decade of 
research shows that while ICS can be effective 
in helping managers respond flexibly to events, 
it can also be hampered by issues with training 
depth and may need to be supplemented with 
focused bottom up planning.20
Managers need to acknowledge the strengths 
and limitations of ICS and focus their planning 
efforts on capability-based frameworks such as 
From that communication it is clear that the 
terrorists had a mission with specific targets 
and were being fed intelligence from the 
outside.  Marc Goodman, from the Future 
Crimes Institute, provided another example 
of this information-sharing pattern from that 
same day. 
Terrorists entered the hotel room of a hostage 
who claimed to be a teacher. It did not make 
sense that a teacher stayed in a suite. The 
attackers called their handlers with the name 
of the hostage. The handlers in the operations 
center ‘Googled’ this person’s named and 
asked the attackers. ‘Is this person bald? Does 
he wear glasses? Is he heavyset?’ the attackers 
responded yes whereby the handlers told 
them ‘we found him online, kill him’.15  
This could very well be the first example 
of terrorists using Google as a tactical tool 
during an event. Additionally,  at one point the 
handlers picked up on a Twitter image that was 
broadcast by the BBC and relayed it directly 
to the attackers. The “Tweet pic” actually gave 
away the location of the Indian counterterrorism 
forces storming the Nariman House during the 
waning moments of the event, and resulted 
in the terrorists counter-attacking the assault 
forces storming the building from the roof.16
Lessons Learned and Actionable 
Next Steps 
While a slow response by the Indian Security 
Forces certainly played a part in the 172 
deaths during the event, an arguably more 
important factor is the LET’s innovative use 
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Stripling’s Evidence-Based Planning Criteria, 
which help foster improvisation and which 
may help managers to avoid situation-based 
planning.21 In addition to leaner planning, 
exercises that incorporate things like McEntire’s 
Spontaneous Planning concept and Kendra and 
Wachtendorf’s research into improvisation are 
great ways to start building flexibility into the 
culture of an organization.22
Limit Bureaucracy
Para, the special forces unit of the Indian 
Army, was delayed in responding to the event 
because they did not have their own air assets 
to travel from New Delhi to Mumbai. Another 
bureaucratic weakness that characterized the 
response to the event was the fact that the 
Indian Navy, which is stationed within Mumbai 
itself, initially could not respond to the attack 
because they needed a Navy officer to sign off 
on their release before they could use military 
assets on a civilian response.23 However small, 
these delays prevented responders from 
engaging before the terrorists had a chance to 
settle into their environment and assault their 
primary objectives. While it is always advisable 
to try and streamline processes wherever 
possible, the Mumbai attack is a great reminder 
of what happens when bureaucracy handcuffs 
responders who are facing a tech savvy, lean, 
and adaptable adversary.
The Importance of Active Shooter 
Training and Resources
Surprisingly, in November of 2008, Mumbai 
front line responders had not active shooting 
training, and the city of Mumbai had no rapid 
response force or SWAT team unit to speak 
of.24 While local law enforcement organizations 
in the U.S. train frequently for active shooter 
scenarios, unfortunately the training often stops 
there. As recommended in the FBI’s 2013 study 
on active shooter events and the Final Report of 
the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, non-law 
enforcement community organizations such as 
schools and businesses need to leverage active 
shooter events such as Mumbai to gain access 
to better resources and to justify organization-
wide training.25
Counter Technology with 
Technology
The biggest advantage that the perpetrators 
of the Mumbai attack had was a monopoly 
of pre-event information and the element of 
surprise. This advantage can be mitigated by 
employing some fairly new tools, such as real-
time analytics and pre-event data mining, to 
stop attacks in progress and to balance the 
information asymmetry that occurs during the 
early phase of an attack. 
Currently, most Emergency Operations 
Centers (EOC) have live television feeds from 
several outlets to choose from during an 
event. EOC’s are formatted in this way so that 
managers may have real-time information 
in the quickest manner possible. To further 
increase situational awareness during fluid 
events, emergency responders must now 
expand their sources of information to include 
social media and other developing networks.
Monitoring social media can easily become 
overwhelming for emergency managers. At one 
point during the Mumbai attack there were over 
1,000 Twitter messages being posted per minute 
regarding the event.26 This is where responders 
should utilize social media aggregators 
to monitor trends and to relay relevant 
information in real time. Such technologies 
include Hootsuite, which collects social media 
information, and SwiftRiver which aggregates 
social media data.27 These technologies include 
natural language processing, which gives geo-
referential context and information validation 
to previously raw information. Simply put, 
social media situational and crisis awareness 
needs to be “outsourced” to the appropriate 
software so that more resources can be 
redirected towards responding to an event.28 
One of the most successful real world uses of 
this style of monitoring was when the Boston 
Police Department was able to monitor its social 
media channels in real time during the Boston 
Marathon Bombing and use that information 
to assist in identifying and locating the two 
bombing suspects in rapid succession.29
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Moving Forward
The increased availability and affordability of 
technology will only make it easier for another 
terrorist group to replicate the results of the 
Mumbai attack. Unfortunately, attacks such 
as the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, the 2014 
Peshawar school massacre in Pakistan, and the 
2015 attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris 
serve to remind us that Mumbai- style attacks 
are the new normal for terrorists.30 Just as 
the Boston Police Department did during the 
2013 Marathon Bombing, responders need to 
know, digitally speaking, where to look during 
an event and also how to integrate outside 
agencies quickly and seamlessly into their 
response.31 There is a particular need to leverage 
the increase in publicly available data and to 
process that data in real time using things like 
data aggregators (i.e. HootSuite, SwiftRiver, 
etc.) and social media monitors.32 On top 
of adapting new technology and promoting 
inter-organizational coordination, it is also 
important for organizations to double down on 
community-centric active shooter training and 
to adopt a culture of flexible planning using 
frameworks such as Stripling’s Evidence-Based 
Planning Criteria and McEntire’s Spontaneous 
Planning concept.33 By integrating some of these 
new tools and tweaking some old best practices 
such as planning and training, managers can 
stay one step ahead of an active shooter style 
attack and mitigate, if not prevent, the next 
Mumbai. 34
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ABSTRACT
The recent emergence of two separate 
outbreaks of two new viruses has generated 
renewed interest in the threat of pandemics. 
For a significant portion of the total fatalities 
associated with these infections the cause 
of death was due to an over-reaction of an 
infected body’s immune system. This research 
explores possible pharmaceutical interventions 
that would help expand the list of options 
public health could employ in a response. 
For inclusion in state stockpiles, medications 
must meet three specific criteria: medical 
efficacy, cost, and logistical considerations. 
We identified four medications that could 
be employed (three statins - atorvastatin, 
simvastatin, and gemfibrozil and an antiviral 
– ribavirin) and present options for their
inclusion into state stockpiles. Through this
research we have attempted to open a dialogue
with other federal and state planners as they
wrestle with the same challenges within their
home agencies.
INTRODUCTION
While the Ebola crisis in Africa has recently 
captured the media’s attention, influenza and 
other pandemic strain viruses remain by far the 
largest killer viruses facing the U.S.  Seasonal 
flu-associated deaths in the United States have 
ranged from about 3,000 per season to about 
49,000 per season.1 Over the span of fifteen 
years public health has witnessed a series of 
pandemic viruses.  In the late 1990s the world 
watched the emergence of the H5N1 avian 
influenza virus (that continues to smolder in 
Asia).  In 2003 the SARS coronavirus erupted 
out of southeast China.  And in 2009 the H1N1 
influenza pandemic emanated out of Mexico. 
Expanding Public Health’s Capabilities in Response to the 
Increasing Threats Posed by Novel, Pandemic Strain Viruses
Daniel P. Mackie and Anke Richter 
The recent emergence of two separate and 
concurrent outbreaks of two new viruses-- 
the H7N9 type-A influenza emanating from 
southeastern China and, the Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) coming out of northeastern Saudi 
Arabia-- has generated renewed interest in 
the threat of pandemics.2  Science tells us that 
these naturally occurring pandemics are both 
normal, and to some extent, cyclical: it is not 
a matter of ‘if’ humanity will see some sort of 
pandemic strain viral pandemic, but ‘when.’3
Although the 1918 Influenza and 2003 SARS 
Outbreak are separated by eighty-five years 
and decades of medical advances, the biological 
processes that take the lives of those who 
succumb to either of these illnesses are quite 
similar. Each of these infections is an invasion of 
a novel virus into the human body’s respiratory 
system. For a significant portion of the total 
fatalities associated with each of these infections 
(some researchers have attributed as much as 
50%), the cause of death was often described 
as ‘viral pneumonia’ as opposed to traditional 
bacterial pneumonia. In the intervening years 
since the 1918 event, physicians have developed 
a term for this pathological process that puts 
extreme stress on the lungs: Acute Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome (ARDS). Almost unique 
to each of these illnesses, this syndrome is an 
over-reaction of an infected body’s immune 
system to contain and defeat an invading 
pathogen.4 For this reason, we will consider 
novel influenza and novel pandemic strain 
viruses together in this manuscript since they 
pose a similar treatment conundrum. 
Since the SARS outbreak in 2003, there 
has been a vast amount of research devoted 
to developing treatment strategies to combat 
ARDS. The literature on the effectiveness of 
these emerging treatment strategies is mixed 
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at best, but several of them may be useful for 
treating future novel viruses.  Many states have 
existing stockpiles of medications originating 
from the CDC release in preparation for the 
2009/2010 H1N1 epidemic.5  Stockpiles are a 
difficult question for states to tackle because 
they are often for illnesses that may not yet 
exist (e.g. a novel strain that has yet-to-mutate), 
they require a sizeable investment of resources 
upfront, and they require sizeable time/
effort/resources to properly maintain over 
long periods. While we do not address all of 
these state-specific fundamental issues, we do 
examine potentially useful options for a state 
wishing to supplement its existing stockpile of 
medications to provide some capabilities when 
confronting ARDS. This research is the first 
attempt to plan policy for this type of scenario.
Pandemics are of particular concern because 
disease is truly widespread, typically global, and 
frequently associated with a more virulent strain 
of virus (with the ensuing increase in fatality 
rates).  Even if one of these novel influenza or 
pandemic strain viruses is only affecting a single 
country or state, there is still concern because 
the treatments required may quickly overwhelm 
existing capabilities.  Depending on the ability 
to obtain supplies rapidly in an epidemic, it 
may become necessary to consider developing 
stockpiles.  While the private sector health  care 
system provides medical treatments, it is not 
required to maintain a stockpile of prescription 
medications or personal protective equipment. 
The private sector healthcare system may keep 
a few days’ worth of supplies, but functions 
under the assumption that it can be readily 
resupplied.  In case of a widespread disease, 
this assumption may no longer hold true, so 
the private sector healthcare system would 
suddenly need to rely on the state and federal 
public health resources to adequately resupply 
it with the needed medications and equipment. 
The United States has invested significant 
time/energy/resources in preparation for 
a large-scale biological event. One of these 
investments in biosecurity led to the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) creating and maintaining its Division of
Strategic National Stockpile, which maintains a
“$3.5B portfolio of antibiotics, medical supplies,
antidotes, antitoxins, antivirals, vaccines, and 
other pharmaceuticals” in the strategic national 
stockpile (SNS).6   A large proportion of the 
SNS is comprised of antibiotics and antivirals, 
so from a planning perspective, state and local 
public health agencies would likely be able to 
provide medications needed to treat bacterial 
pneumonia cases.7  However it is unclear the 
extent to which those materials would be useful 
in countering the deadly effects of ARDS within 
patients during a pandemic.  In order to be better 
prepared, a state may choose to supplement 
its existing stockpile to include medications 
that may prove useful in combatting ARDS. 
There are many options in various stages of 
development for such a stockpile, and the issue 
is how to identify good candidate medications. 
In particular, a good candidate medication 
would be one that has the greatest chance of 
having medical efficacy with a novel pandemic 
strain virus, one that is affordable to procure, 
and one that can be stored in existing stockpile 
facilities.  Therefore, this paper will consider 
three specific criteria: medical efficacy, cost, 
and logistical considerations.  Medical efficacy 
is considered in Section 1, Review of Medical 
Treatment Options.  Cost, affordability, and 
logistical considerations are addressed in 
Section 2, Stockpile Considerations.  Logistical 
considerations are limited to being able to 
incorporate the medication into existing 
stockpile facilities.  Next, we estimate the 
approximate number of treatments (full courses 
of the medication) that would be required 
for the state and then determine the cost of 
this stockpile of medications using a widely 
available website. The State of Nevada is used 
as an example for these calculations, but other 
states can easily implement this methodology 
to obtain estimates for their situation. Next, 
the section explores what would be funding 
limits that could be considered as “affordable” 
by states.  Section 3 provides the results of 
limiting medically efficacious therapies by 
the affordability constraint and the logistical 
stockpile constraint to provide a set of potential 
therapies that a state could consider including 
in their stockpile.  Section 4 discusses the 
limitations of the analysis. The final section 
provides a discussion of possible options 
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available to states that decide to enhance and 
supplement their existing stockpiles to be able 
to combat ARDS.
Review of the Medical 
Treatment Options
The current body of knowledge surrounding 
potential treatment options for influenza and 
pandemic strain viruses appears to focus on two 
mechanisms to reduce disease in people who 
are severely ill: 1) limit virus replication in the 
host cell; and/or, 2) suppression of the body’s 
hyper-immune response to inhibit ARDS. The 
literature revealed five classes of drugs that 
have demonstrated an ability to either inhibit 
virus replication, or to suppress the immune 
system: 1) antivirals; 2) statins; 3) interferons; 
4) corticosteroids; and, 5) herbal/alternative 
medications.  In the following sections, we 
discuss how each of these medications can have 
a beneficial effect in treatment and we provide 
a summary of the extent of the experimentation 
with their use.  We do not consider potential 
side-effects as they are numerous, varied, and 
patient specific as to which will occur.
Antiviral Medications
When an invading virus approaches a possible 
host cell, it needs a ‘key’ to enter the host cell’s 
outer wall. This process is achieved by a protein 
on the virus’ surface called hemagglutinin (H or 
HA). Influenza viruses have sixteen (16) of these 
H proteins on their surface; so from the virus’ 
perspective, they have sixteen possible ‘keys’ to 
try upon the host cell’s outer wall. If the correct 
key is matched to the correct keyhole then 
the virus is allowed to open and pass through 
the cell’s outer wall. Once that happens, the 
invading virus hijacks the host cell’s replication 
system and makes thousands (to millions) of 
copies of itself, which usually results in the host 
cell’s death. When that process is complete, 
those new copies of the virus once again need 
to pass through the outer wall of the host 
cell; except this time they need to go from the 
inside of the cell to the outside of the cell. In 
order to achieve that, each virus has another 
set of surface proteins called neuraminidase 
(N or NA). Influenza viruses have nine (9) of 
these N proteins on their surface; so from their 
perspective they have nine possible keys to try 
from inside the host cell’s outer wall.8 
Antivirals work either by blocking some/
all of the sixteen H keyholes (hemagglutinin 
inhibitors) or by blocking some/all of the 
nine neuraminidase keyholes (neuraminidase 
inhibitors). This process helps to limit virus 
replication, thus lowering host cell infection. 
The current state stockpiles of Oseltamivir/
Tamiflu® and Zanamivir/Relenza® are good 
examples of neuraminidase inhibitors.9
Statin Medications
Most of us would recognize statins for their 
traditional role in lowering cholesterol in 
the bloodstream. However, statins also have 
both an anti-inflammatory and an immune-
modulatory effect. It is these additional 
benefits to statin use that authors like Fedson, 
Vandermeer, and Walsh discuss in relation to 
pandemic strain influenzas.10 Statins do not 
impact virus replication, yet they do help to 
suppress the body’s immune response. They 
are being explored as a potential treatment to 
ARDS.
Interferon Medications
Although interferons would technically be listed 
as antivirals, we have separated them from that 
class because of their unique mode of action. 
These naturally-occurring proteins are made 
and secreted by the cells of our body’s immune 
system. They come in three classes: alpha (used 
to treat cancers and viral infections); beta (used 
to treat multiple sclerosis); and gamma (used 
for treating chronic granulomatous disease). 
The mechanism of action of interferons is not 
well understood, but this class of medications 
helps to modulate the body’s immune system 
response to challenges from viruses, bacteria, 
cancers, and foreign substances that impact 
the body. Although interferon alphas do not 
directly kill viruses, they do help to boost the 
body’s immune system, and to prevent a hyper 
response by that system.11 Although interferon 
is more commonly discussed as a treatment 
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for diseases such as leukemia, AIDS-related 
Kaposi’s sarcoma, or chronic hepatitis B and 
C, there is also an extensive literature about 
using it to enhance the body’s immune system 
against pandemic strain influenzas, as well as 
novel HCo-Vs (specifically interferon-α2b).12
Corticosteroid Medications
This class of medication is similar to the natural 
hormones produced within our bodies that 
help to control many important functions such 
as blood sugar levels, salt levels, as well as our 
immune system’s function. These medications 
are often used to help treat diseases that cause 
inflammation, which novel viruses would most 
likely cause within the human lung following 
infection.13 This class of medication works by 
blocking substances within the human body 
that cause swelling. During the 2003/2004 
SARS epidemic corticosteroids (generally) 
fell out of favor with the medical community 
because they suppressed the entire immune 
system: both the good and the bad components 
of that system’s response.
Herbal / Alternative Medications
The literature often describes these 
medications as being “complementary” and 
“anti-inflammatory” in nature, with their 
effects primarily targeted on the host response 
rather than the virus replication. The Alleva et 
al. article includes a long list of Chinese herbs 
that are often described as ‘adjunct treatment 
therapies’ to antivirals.14  Although these herbal 
medications are not currently licensed within 
the U.S., they do warrant further research and 
analysis.
Comparison
In order to be considered for a state stockpile, 
a medication needs to have demonstrated 
a baseline medical efficacy in treating and 
handling medical complications associated 
with novel pandemic strain viruses. Table 
1 presents a summary of different therapy 
options discussed in the literature. The ‘Uses’ 
columns describe the different uses for each 
therapy.  The ‘Medical Efficacy’ columns 
provide a synopsis of the therapy’s expected 
medical impacts on patients ill with a pandemic 
strain virus.  The next two columns, The ‘Pros’ 
and ‘Cons,’ provide a brief summary of positive 
and negative aspects associated with the 
therapy as discussed in the literature. As with 
almost any medication, long term immunity 
is not imparted upon the patient (as would be 
achieved through immunizations); so this is a 
Con for all listed therapies.
Table 1: Comparison of Different Therapy Options
• Pros - Positive aspects associated with the medication as discussed in the citations
• Cons - Negative aspects associated with the medication as discussed in the citations
Mono-Therapy Class: Antivirals
Oseltamivir (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus Repli-
cations
•	 Already in national/state 
stockpiles
•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Easily stored long term
•	 FDA licensed for influenza 
type A and B
•	 Possibly mismatched to virus 
strain
•	 Drug Resistance
•	 When used as prophylaxis, re-
peated regimens must be used
Citations - CDC15, Beigel, Bray16, Moscona17, Cooper et al.18, Treanor et al.19, Nicholson et al.20, Aoki et al.21, Salomon et 
al.22
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Relenza (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus Repli-
cations
•	 Already in national/state 
stockpiles
•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Easily stored long term
•	 FDA licensed for influenza 
type A and B
•	 Mismatched to strain
•	 Drug Resistance
•	 When used as prophylaxis, re-
peated regimens must be used
Citations - CDC23, Moscona24, Hayden et al.25, Cooper et al.26, Makela et al.27, Salomon et al.28
Amantadine (adamantane drug)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Affordable
•	 Easily stored long-term
•	 Only approved for influenza type A
•	 Drug resistance problems
Citations - CDC29
Rimantadine (adamantane drug)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Affordable
•	 Easily stored long-term
•	 Only approved for influenza type A
•	 Drug resistance problems
Citations - CDC30
Ribavirin (nucleoside antimetabolite drug)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Easily stored long-term
•	 Generics Available
•	 Not in stockpiles
•	 New to public health
•	 Can induce anemia and/or toxicity 
issues
Citations - van Vonderen et al.31, Hayden32, Chan-Tack et al.33, Salomon et al.34
Mono-Therapy Class: Statins
Atorvastatin (Lipitor®), Rosuvastatin (Crestor®), Simvastatin (Zocor®), 
Gemfibrozil (Lopid®)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Generics are affordable
•	 Readily accessible
•	 Familiar to care givers
•	 Not virus-strain specific
•	 Some key data linked to animal-
only studies
Citations - Fedson35, Walsh36, Kumaki et al.37
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Mono-Therapy Class: Interferons
Interferon-α2b   Intron-A
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Provide a treatment 
option if drug resistance 
issues to AVs arise
•	 Effective against a wide 
range of influenza viruses
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) alpha primarily affects 
influenza viruses and beta affects HCo-
Vs
Citations - Cinatl et al.38, Katze et al.39
Interferon-α2b   PegIntron
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Provide a treatment 
option if drug resistance 
issues to AVs arise
•	 Effective against a wide 
range of viruses
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons 
(alpha, beta, gamma) only alpha affects 
influenza viruses and HCo-Vs
Citations - Cinatl et al.40, Katze et al.41
Interferon-ß1a  Avonex
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Provide a treatment option 
if drug resistance issues to 
other AVs arise
•	 Effective against HCo-V
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons 
(alpha, beta, gamma) beta impacts 
HCo-Vs
•	 Small sample size of studies
Citations - Hensley et al.42, Morgenstern et al.43
Interferon-ß1a  Rebif
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Provide a treatment 
option if drug resistance 
issues to other AVs arise
•	 Effective against HCo-V
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) beta impacts HCo-Vs
•	 Small sample size of studies
Citations - Hensley et al.44, Morgenstern et al.45
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Mono-Therapy Class: Corticosteriods
Prednisone
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons





•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Performed poorly against SARS
•	 Limited efficacy overall
Citations - Con:  Oba46, Pro: Bernard et al.47, Neutral: Stockman et al. 48
Mono-Therapy Class: Herbal Medicines
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Useful adjunct treatments
•	 Targets the host response 
rather than the virus itself
•	 Not FDA approved
•	 Limited data
Citations - Alleva et al.49, Li et al.50
Combo-Therapy
Oseltamivir + Relenza
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment




•	 Already in national/state 
stockpiles
•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Easily stored long term
•	 Possible drug resistance issues
•	 When used as an ongoing 
prophylaxis stockpiles are 
consumed quickly
•	 Animal models in many studies
Citations - Govorkova et al.51, Barik52
Oseltamivir + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment




•	 Easily stored long term
•	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune system’s response
•	 Ribavirin: causes hemolytic anemia 
in high doses, high toxicity, and has 
relatively small therapeutic index
Citations - Govorkova et al.53, Barik54
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Relenza + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Synergistic effect •	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune systems’ response
•	 Ribavirin: cause hemolytic anemia 
in high doses, high toxicity, and has 
relatively small therapeutic index
Citations - Govorkova et al.55, Barik56
Peramivir + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Synergistic effect •	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune systems’ response
•	 Peramivir is approved in Japan and 
Korea only
Citations - Govorkova et al.57
Amantadine + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Enhanced inhibitory 
effect
•	 Synergistic effect
•	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune system’s response
•	 Amantadine has been identified to have 
many drug resistance issues
Citations - Govorkova et al.58, Barik59
Antivirals + Statins
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Addresses virus 
replication issues 
and immune system 
hyper response issues 
concurrently
•	 Some AVs already in 
state/federal stockpiles
•	 Statins are easily 
accessible and familiar to 
clinicians
•	 Still being researched and tested
•	 Small sample size in some studies
•	 Statins are not in SNS/state stockpiles
Citations - Govorkova et al.60, Barik61
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Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, PegIntron/Rebetol Combo Pack
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications




•	 Proven to have an  effect 
against novel viruses
•	 Provides another Tx 
option during pandemics
•	 Each component is 
commonly used in clinic 
settings
•	 Comes as an injectable medication only
•	 From SARS: “May improve outcome, 
but a definitive treatment regimen was 
not clearly established” (see Falzarano 
reference)
Citations - Falzarano et al.62
Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, PegIntron/Rebetol Combo Pack
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications




•	 Proven to have an  effect 
against novel viruses
•	 Provides another Tx option 
during pandemics
•	 Each component is commonly 
used in clinic settings
•	 Comes as an injectable 
medication only
•	 From SARS: “May improve 
outcome, but a definitive 
treatment regimen was not 
clearly established” (see 
Falzarano reference)
Citations - Falzarano et al.63
Table 1 reveals many varying 
recommendations on whether/if these 
therapies should be used, and if so, whether as 
a treatment, as post-exposure prophylaxis, or 
as a combination of the two. Unfortunately, we 
cannot provide a measure of relative efficacy 
between these therapeutic options.  This is due 
to the fact that the source information on the 
medication efficacy comes from the evidence of 
their use gathered during prior pandemic strain 
illnesses and/or in laboratory or experimental 
settings.  This presents a two-fold issue: 1) a 
novel virus is by definition new, so we cannot 
be certain that the medications will provide the 
same benefits at the same levels as seen with 
existing viruses 2) there is no way to conduct 
comparative clinical trials of the medications 
so a true comparative efficacy cannot be 
established. The only two categories we will 
drop from further consideration are herbal 
remedies, as they are not FDA approved and 
there are no conclusive clinical studies on their 
efficacy, and Peramavir, as it is still in Phase II 
clinical trials in the US (and hence still several 
years from receiving FDA approval).  All of 
the medications that we consider in this paper 
have shown at least baseline levels of efficacy in 
treating influenza and pandemic strain viruses 
and their complications.
Stockpile Considerations
Given a basic level of potential medical 
efficacy, the remaining medications are further 
screened in Table 2 to determine whether 
or not they are viable candidates for a state 
stockpile. The three criteria we consider are 
additional medical considerations, cost, and 
logistical considerations. Additional medical 
considerations include two categories which 
indicate whether the medication is known 
to be kept in the strategic national stockpile 
(SNS) and whether the medication is familiar 
to physicians. If medications are known to be 
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already in the SNS, then states are much less 
likely to spend scarce resources on medications 
that already may  be obtainable from a federal 
source.  In addition, many states already have 
some of these medications on-hand in smaller 
scale stockpiles left over from the 2009/2010 
‘push’ of what the CDC released in preparation 
for the prolonged response to H1N1. Therefore, 
when we consider what the SNS already has 
in its inventory, matched with what states 
still have left over from H1N1, we assume that 
these medications would not be considered a 
good choice for a state stockpile.  In addition to 
these issues surrounding existing accessibility 
to stockpiled medications, we also consider 
whether or not physicians are familiar with 
these medications.  A strength of any stockpile 
would be not only its accessibility, but also 
its acceptability by clinicians to employ it.  If 
stockpiled medications are unfamiliar to 
caregivers, then they may be less likely to call 
on them in times of need.     
Since pandemics are, by definition, large in 
scale and wide-ranging, the amount of doses/
regimens that would need to be procured for 
a state stockpile will be substantial. Given the 
fiscal limitations that states face, compounded 
with declining federal funds provided through 
various public health preparedness grants, the 
medication procurement costs would need to 
be affordable. While there is no set definition 
of “affordable”, we chose to limit the price 
tag to a proposed recommendation of 1% of a 
state’s total public health preparedness (PHP) 
annual budget. This percentage was chosen 
based on what the Nevada PHP program 
has retrospectively been able to afford. This 
percentage may vary by state.
State PHP programs will need to rely on 
their existing climate controlled bulk-storage 
warehousing capabilities that were developed 
during the 2009/2010 HIN1 response. To be 
considered as a viable pharmaceutical therapy 
for a state stockpile, the medication must be 
capable of being stored in climate controlled 
facilities long-term, and must have no cold-
chain requirements.
Estimating Costs of 
Stockpile
While medical and logistical considerations 
are readily available online, the process to 
determine cost implications requires additional 
calculations and assumptions. It is important 
to highlight that these cost estimates are only 
rough estimates; more precise calculations 
would require exact treatment guidelines which 
will be developed only after the emergence of a 
specific novel virus.
To calculate the costs of a stockpile, we 
need to estimate two items: 1) the number of 
treatments that will be needed (i.e. how many 
people do we think may require treatment), and 
2) the amount of medication that may be used 
in an individual treatment (which provides the 
amount of medication needed to complete a 
full treatment course for a single individual). 
To estimate the number of treatments needed, 
we relied on the CDC website’s FluAid 2.0 
downloadable software to project a range (e.g., 
minimum (min), mean, and maximum (max)) 
of the number of individuals who will require 
treatment. The software provides three rates 
which can serve as a basis of the calculation: 1) 
the ‘Gross Attack Rate’ (GAR), which measures 
how many people will become clinically ill 
from a novel influenza virus (clinical illness is 
defined as a case that causes some measureable 
economic impact) 2) the ‘Hospitalization Rate’, 
which measures the number of people who fall 
clinically ill who would require hospitalization, 
and 3) the ‘Mortality Rate’, which measures 
the number of clinically ill patients who will 
lose their lives.64
While the GAR gives estimates of the total 
number of people who may fall ill from a novel 
virus, the range of ‘illness’ can span anything 
from ‘barely noticeable’ to ‘life threatening,’ 
and hence, it may include too large a segment 
of our population to be of any real use. The 
hospitalization rate calculation narrows our 
focus to those patients for whom we would be 
most interested in providing potentially life-
saving medications (i.e. to those who are ill 
enough to require hospitalization). This will be 
an underestimate of those seeking treatment, 
but given the limited response capabilities that 
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we project, it would not be unreasonable to 
restrict treatment to this group. The mortality 
rate calculations are useful in that they describe 
to us how many people we stand to lose if we do 
nothing, but they are too narrow for treatment 
planning.  We would want/need to introduce 
these medications prior to knowing exactly 
which patients will succumb to the disease. An 
additional benefit of using the hospitalization 
rate as the basis for our calculations stems from 
the fact that it assumes that patients who will be 
treated will be in a clinical environment where 
potential intravenous drug therapies may be 
administered properly, if any such are found to 
be suitable for state stockpiles.65
Nevada has a total of 2,775,216 residents (as 
of October 1, 2013), with 766,414 of those falling 
within the 0-19 year old group, 1,656,765 in the 
20-64 year old group, and 352,038 in the 65+ 
group.66 These age groups were further split into 
high risk and non-high risk sub-groups using 
the Meltzer, Cox and Fukuda rates cited on the 
CDC’s FluAid 2.0 website.67 For the state of 
Nevada the software predicts the total number 
of hospitalizations to be 1,580 at minimum, 
with a mean of 4,970 and a maximum of 10,112 
hospitalizations. Similar calculations can be 
done for every state or region considering 
adding to its stockpiles. 
While the CDC FluAid 2.0 software used in 
the previous section is specific to pandemic 
influenzas, without any comparable estimating 
techniques for other viruses such as novel 
HCo-V, we chose to use these estimates as a 
basis for any potential novel viruses. 
To estimate the amount of medication 
needed in an individual treatment, we need to 
make some assumptions about the treatment 
regimen. Since we are considering strains of 
virus that may not yet even exist, we decided 
to use the standard multi-day therapy provided 
on the GoodRx website (www.goodrx.com). If 
the GoodRx website does not provide a specific 
multiday regimen, a generic ‘one pill/capsule 
per day for ten days’ treatment regimen is 
applied. 
We developed cost estimates for the min, 
mean, and max hospitalization rates for Nevada 
and the treatment regimens outlined above 
using the GoodRx website. 
Estimating State Funding 
Limits
For many states, including Nevada, their 
state and local PHP programs are completely 
funded by an aligned federal grant formed by 
the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and 
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
(PHEP) cooperative agreement.68 The CDC 
publishes the amount of funding awarded to 
each state and territory.69 According to the 
CDC’s publication for Fiscal Year 2013, the 
state of Nevada receives approximately $9.7M 
in funding. The one percent funding limit for 
Nevada is therefore $97K.
Table 2 shows the additional medical 
considerations, the logistical considerations, 
and the cost considerations (based on Nevada’s 
estimated costs) for each of the treatment 
options identified in Table 1. The first column 
identifies whether or not the therapy is known 
to be in the SNS and whether the therapy is 
familiar to physicians.  The second column 
provides the cost associated with obtaining 
treatment to be able to handle the minimum, 
mean, and maximum estimated hospitalization 
rates.  The final column identifies whether or 
not the therapy can be contained in existing 
bulk storage facilities.  If the answer is “No”, 
this implies that the therapy requires cold 
chain storage (i.e. it must be continuously 
refrigerated).  The final row answers the 
question whether or not the specified therapy 
could be used to build a state-level stockpile. 
Examples of factors which would exclude a 
candidate therapy are: therapy is too expensive 
(e.g. more than one percent of the Nevada’s 
annual PHP budget), therapy requires cold 
chain (the state can only handle bulk storage in 
a climate controlled warehouse), and therapy is 
already included and widely available through 
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
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Table 2: Candidate Therapy Selection (Using Nevada Cost Numbers)
Mono-Therapy Class: Antivirals
Oseltamivir (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations






Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Relenza (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations






Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Amantadine (adamantane drug)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile
Not familiar to Physicians
Min = $3K
Mean = $9K
Max  = $18K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Rimantadine (adamantane drug)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile
Not familiar to Physicians
Min = $45K
Mean = $141K
Max  = $286K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Ribavirin (nucleoside antimetabolite drug)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile





Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
Mono-Therapy Class: Statins
Atorvastatin (Lipitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $49K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $575K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Simvastatin (Zocor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $11K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
Gemfibrozil (Lopid)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $22K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
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Mono-Therapy Class: Interferons
Interferon-α2b   Intron-A
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-α2b   PegIntron
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-ß1a  Avonex
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-ß1a  Rebif
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Mono-Therapy Class: Corticosteroids
Prednisone
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Combo-Therapy
Oseltamivir + Relenza
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Oseltamivir + Ribavirin
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Relenza + Ribavirin
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 11 Article 7 (September 2015) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Mackie & Richter,  Surviving the 'Storm'  16
Amantadine + Ribavirin
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Combo-Therapy: Antivirals + Statins
Oseltamivir + Atorvastatin (Lipitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Oseltamivir + Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Oseltamivir + Simvastatin (Zocor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Relenza + Gemfibrozil (Lopid)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Ribavirin + Atorvastatin (Lipitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Ribavirin + Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Ribavirin + Simvastatin (Zocor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Ribavirin + Gemfibrozil (Lopid)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, PegIntron/Rebetol Combo Pack
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile
Familiar to Physicians
Data not available on 
GoodRx website.  Likely 
to cost more than indi-
vidual PegIntron.
Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Results
As seen in Table 2, the only family of therapies 
that is not considered viable for a state stockpile 
due to logistical considerations are the 
Interferons, because they all require cold-chain 
storage (i.e. the medication requires continuous 
refrigeration) and cannot be stored in existing 
bulk storage warehouses.  In terms of costs, 
Table 2 shows that the costs of medications 
can be much greater than 1% of a state’s federal 
grant formed by the Hospital Preparedness 
Program (HPP) and the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative 
agreement.  For Nevada, the affordability limit 
is approximately $97,000.  Average stockpile 
costs of these medications for Nevada run from 
the cheapest ($9,000) to the most expensive 
($57,000,000).  Combination therapies, on-
patent medications, most antivirals and the 
interferons fall outside the affordability limit. 
In addition, there are several therapies listed 
in Table 2 that appear to be good choices for 
a state stockpile but are excluded because they 
are already included within the CDC’s SNS.70  
Of the remaining therapies, four were 
identified that met the cost consideration: 
ribavirin, atorvastatin, simvastatin, and 
gemfibrozil. 
Limitations
This research was limited by several issues, 
most notably by the fact that it is attempting 
to plan for a virus that does not yet exist. 
Although the references used in this research 
provide a glimpse into what the global public 
health community is discussing, they do not 
provide us with a definitive protocol on how to 
treat novel influenza and novel pandemic strain 
viruses. This research was also limited by a 
lack of knowledge of the full range of medical 
therapies available in the nation’s SNS. For 
security reasons the full list of what is included 
within the nation’s stockpiles is not published 
openly.  
The calculations shown here reflect only 
the Nevada resident population, and do not 
compensate for its additional population 
of visitors. Depending on the time of year, 
Nevada’s overall population can swell by nearly 
twenty percent with the tourist population (e.g. 
New Years’ Eve celebrations on the Las Vegas 
Strip, etc.). As an example for two of the state’s 
largest cities: tourism data report that nearly 
forty million visitors came to Las Vegas in 2012, 
and nearly 4.1 million visitors are expected 
to see Reno each year. Other preparedness 
planning options are being developed to handle 
this issue. 
We chose to use an online accessible (open 
source) pharmaceutical bulk price quoting 
website called GoodRx (www.goodrx.com). 
However, this is only a top-line estimate 
and is not fully reflective of what a health 
department may be able to negotiate if it did 
decide to proceed with a bulk purchase of 
medications.  In addition, we did not attempt 
to address the maintenance issues associated 
with a stockpile (drug rotation, detailed 
logistical considerations including floor space, 
etc.) because most states are maintaining a 
current stockpile of medications from the H1N1 
preparation and already have developed and 
implemented stockpile management plans.
Finally, influenza and MERs-CoV treatment 
is a vibrant, dynamic ever-changing research 
field. As new therapies become available, 
they will also need to be examined using the 
methodological framework developed in this 
paper.
Discussion
This research showed how expensive a potential 
state-level stockpile could become. Medical 
efficacy is not as significant a limiting factor 
as cost and logistical considerations. In this 
era of declining grant funds and an all-hazards 
approach, could/should these ‘few options’ 
even be considered as a possible investment in 
state-level prevention efforts?
An even bigger question is whether or not 
a state should carry an individual state-level 
stockpile.  We do not address this question 
in depth in this paper because many states 
already have a state-level stockpile due to the 
medications they received from the CDC (which 
allocated it from the SNS) in preparation for 
the H1N1 virus in 2009/2010.  Given that states 
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already have an existing stockpile, the next 
question is what it should include.  Given the 
existing US strategic stockpile, it is unlikely that 
states would wish to allocate scarce resources 
to duplicating an existing federal resource. 
However, this does expose states to some risk 
as the SNS is not large enough to provide every 
state all needed medications in the worst case 
scenario. Also, in a slowly growing pandemic, 
the last states affected may also find fewer 
medications available.  These scenarios are very 
unlikely. It is unclear what a state’s role should 
be in supplementing the known stockpile by 
duplicating medications. In this manuscript, 
we assumed that a state would not wish to 
duplicate the SNS and would only consider 
medications that may not already be included 
in the SNS to augment their treatment options. 
The following paragraphs discuss four options 
for supplementing an existing state stockpile to 
provide additional treatment options for novel 
influenza and pandemic strain viruses based on 
the analyses conducted in this paper.
One option would be to expand the 
current state stockpile to include three statins 
(atorvastatin, simvastatin, and gemfibrozil) 
that can help limit the body’s immune response 
within patients suffering from pandemic 
viruses.  The observed medical benefit of 
reducing a physiological response to infection is 
particularly appealing because it is independent 
of a specific virus strain. From a medical 
efficacy point-of-view they are appealing for 
the synergistic effect they have when used 
in tandem with antivirals existing in state 
stockpiles. Although the scientific explanations 
behind these synergistic effects are still being 
studied, the literature makes a strong case for 
the use of antivirals and statins administered 
together as a complementary treatment option. 
These recommended statins are appealing for 
other reasons as well: they are affordable at 
bulk rates (even if all three are purchased at the 
maximum levels, the total purchase cost would 
be under the 1% limit); they are well known 
to both the public and healthcare providers; 
and they are easily stored long-term in climate 
controlled warehouses. The major drawback is 
that they are not useful as prophylaxis, only as 
a treatment. From a state planning perspective, 
to have a set of affordable and complementary 
therapies that work independently of a specific 
virus strain would be a welcomed addition to a 
state-level stockpile.
A second option would be to expand the 
state’s existing stockpile of antivirals to include 
another, ribavirin, as well as adding statins. 
The research indicates that this additional 
antiviral therapy has significant medical 
efficacy when used as either a prophylaxis, or 
as a treatment. The research goes on to discuss 
the synergistic effect this medication has when 
used in conjunction with other antivirals (e.g. 
oseltamivir, relenza, etc.), as well as statins. 
While it would be possible to purchase the 
average levels of the three medications in a 
single purchase and remain below the 1% cut-
off, it is not possible to purchase the maximum 
level. To have another prophylaxis and/or 
treatment option, that complements what is 
already in state stockpiles, would be a force 
multiplier within a public health response to 
pandemic. 
Rather than purchase, maintain and rotate 
supplemental therapies within an existing state 
stockpile, a third option is for a state to create 
contracts with vendors that would be activated 
upon a pre-determined trigger. For example, 
a state may prepare a pre-written contract 
to purchase  a given quantity of therapy ‘A’ 
that would go into effect when a trigger (such 
as Stage 4, the first confirmed human case in 
North America). This option would provide a 
set of medical therapies that would expand the 
current list of options available to public health 
and clinical providers during a pandemic. 
The risk associated with this approach is the 
providers’ ability to deliver on the contracts 
during a pandemic when all contracts of 
this nature will come due at the same time. 
For a state such as Nevada, this is a serious 
consideration as any pandemic that reaches the 
state will most likely have affected California 
first – and the county of Los Angeles has five 
times the population of the state of Nevada.
Finally, a fourth option would be to do 
nothing and continue to rely on existing state 
stockpiles and projected SNS materials.
Since the successful completion of the 
2009/2010 response to the H1N1 pandemic, 
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many states have acquired and maintained 
state stockpiles of antiviral medications and 
PPE. As those same states prepare for future 
pandemics involving novel viruses, some state 
planners are looking to expand their current 
stockpiles to include more treatment and 
prophylaxis options. This manuscript identifies 
four such medications, an antiviral that could be 
used as a treatment option or as a prophylaxis 
option: ribavirin; and three statins that could 
be employed solely as treatment options: 
atorvastatin, simvastatin, and gemfibrozil. 
In planning for pandemics that would 
involve viruses that may not yet exist, this 
ability to expand state stockpiles with more 
treatment/prophylaxis options may be a sound 
investment. Nearly all prevention efforts come 
with some kind of cost, be they in money, time, 
or space; yet these recommended medical 
therapies are preventative efforts against 
some of the most dangerous threats posed to 
humanity: pandemics. Through this research 
we have attempted to open a dialogue with 
other federal and state planners as they wrestle 
with the same challenges within their home 
agencies.
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ABSTRACT
Transit networks are integral to the economy 
and to society, but at the same time they could 
allow terrorists to transport weapons of mass 
destruction into any city. Road networks 
are especially vulnerable, because they lack 
natural checkpoints unlike air networks that 
have security measures in place at all major 
airports. One approach to mitigate this risk is 
ensuring that every road route passes through 
at least one security checkpoint.  Using the 
Ford-Fulkerson maximum-flow algorithm, 
we generate a minimum set of checkpoint 
locations within a ring-shaped buffer area 
surrounding the 50 largest US urban areas. 
We study how the number of checkpoints 
changes as we increase the buffer width to 
perform a cost-benefit analysis and to identify 
groups of cities that behave similarly. The set 
of required checkpoints is surprisingly small 
(10-124) despite the hundreds of thousands of 
road arcs in those areas, making it feasible to 
protect all major cities.
Introduction
Road networks are integral to the economy and 
to society, but are also a source of vulnerability. 
The same streets that allow first responders 
to  arrive quickly at the scene of a disaster can 
also allow a terrorist to bring a heavy weapon 
into the heart of a densely populated region. 
One approach to mitigate the risk of such 
an event is to deploy a system of checkpoints 
around locations we wish to protect in such a 
way that every incoming road route requires 
passing through one of these checkpoints. 
Depending on factors such as expected risk of 
attack and cost of implementation, checkpoints 
could be large radiation detector installations 
where every suspicious vehicle is stopped 
and searched, locations of automated sensor 
systems that remotely alert authorities to 
suspicious vehicles, or, if the appearance of 
the perpetrator is known, locations to station 
police to visually inspect incoming traffic. 
The checkpoints should be far enough from 
the city center so that authorities have time 
to interdict an attacker before they reach the 
densely populated and developed city center. 
Thus the challenge is to identify locations 
that allow inspecting all incoming traffic, and 
hopefully to find that in large urban areas that 
have hundreds of thousands of road segments, 
the number of required checkpoints is small 
enough to make it practical to deploy the 
necessary security measures. In this paper, we 
address the problem of identifying the number 
and location of the needed security checkpoints, 
but do not elaborate on the specific security 
measures required at each checkpoint.
One approach to finding optimal 
locations for checkpoints is to search first for 
a minimum set of checkpoints for a selected 
region. That is, we seek to identify the smallest 
number of road segments such that every 
possible route into the region to be protected 
passes through a checkpoint. This set is known 
as the minimum cut set (MCS) in graph 
theory as cutting these links would completely 
disconnect the two portions of the network. As 
demonstrated by Barnett et al.1, this problem 
can be solved on large urban road networks 
using the Ford-Fulkerson maximum flow 
algorithm.2 Whereas the cost of an individual 
checkpoint depends on various factors 
including the road type, the number of lanes, 
and the checkpoint type, the MCS is a feature of 
the network structure and as such can be found 
without consideration of these factors.
Identifying Security Checkpoint Locations 
to Protect the Major U.S. Urban Areas 
Daniel M. Watkins, Leticia Cuéllar, Deborah A. Kubicek, Erick Rodriguez, Phillip D. Stroud
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Barnett et al. found that for New York 
City, more than 700 road arcs cross into a 
circle with a radius of 15 miles, centered at 
Times Square.3 It is reasonable to expect that 
by taking advantage of natural features such 
as parks, bridges, and open spaces, the MCS 
would be smaller. By allowing the cut set to be 
located anywhere within a 30 mile wide band 
outside the 15 mile radius circle, Barnett et al. 
generated a cut set containing only 89 road 
segments.4 This is a surprising and promising 
result, as it indicates that the size of the MCS 
of an urban road network is small relative to 
the number of incoming arcs. Thus the idea of 
protecting assets in a large urban area becomes 
feasible by securing access to a relatively small 
number of security checkpoints.
In this paper, we demonstrate 
empirically that the results from New York City 
are typical. Specifically, we present results on 
the size of cut sets of the 50 largest urban areas 
in the United States and on how the size varies 
as a function of the protected area and the size 
of the buffer zone.
We demonstrate how to use the 
minimum cut set results for protecting high 
value targets. We simulate two scenarios. In 
the first, the decision maker fixes the region 
to protect, and is free to place checkpoints 
anywhere outside that region. Extending the 
outer boundary of the buffer area in 1-mile 
increments, we observe the decrease in the 
number of checkpoints and see whether there 
is an optimum width for the buffer area. In the 
second scenario, the decision maker has a fixed 
jurisdiction, and would like to protect as many 
of its assets as possible while still only placing 
checkpoints within his/her jurisdiction. In this 
case, we fix the outer boundary of the buffer area 
and observe the increases in cost as the inner 
boundary is expanded in 1-mile increments. 
Results from both scenarios demonstrate that 
while there is a great deal of variety in the 
topology of urban road networks, even in the 
worst case the number of checkpoints required 
to defend the city is practicable.  
Methods
As in Barnett et al.5, we only consider 
checkpoints on inbound road segments rather 
than checkpoints at intersections. Unlike 
checkpoints on intersections, checkpoints on 
road segments require stopping or otherwise 
investigating traffic in only one direction and 
therefore seem more practical.
Road network data was obtained from 
StreetMap North America, a dataset included 
in ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.3 software. The data is 
based on 2003 TeleAtlas data. We followed 
the conventional method of encoding a road 
network as a graph by representing road 
segments as links and intersections as nodes. 
In the StreetMap data, some nodes exist only 
to record a change in road attributes, such as 
changes in speed limits or road types. While 
this affects some graph attributes (such as the 
degree distribution), it does not affect the size 
of the MCS. 
We selected the 50 largest urban areas (UAs) 
in the US according to 2010 Census data.6  The 
center for each UA was assigned to be the 
center of the most populous city included in 
the UA. For example, in the Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington, Texas UA, Dallas has 1.24 million 
inhabitants, Fort Worth has 793 thousand, and 
Arlington has 376 thousand, hence the center 
of Dallas was chosen to be the center of the 
entire UA. 
Deciding on where to place the inner and 
outer boundaries is a balancing act. In our study 
we use concentric circles to allow comparisons 
between the cities and with prior work.7 As 
noted by Barnett et al., the methodology applies 
to more general buffer areas, such as county 
boundaries. A decision maker would be able 
to use the landscape to his advantage. Rivers, 
lakes, oceans, and mountains all provide 
natural barriers that limit the number of roads 
coming into a region. Boundaries of the buffer 
area can be placed intelligently to balance 
competing factors such as cost per checkpoint, 
travel times, political jurisdictions, economic 
importance of the region, locations of critical 
assets, and population density.  
To observe the behavior of the size of 
MCSs with varying size of the buffer area, we 
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calculated the MCS on buffer zones with inner 
radius of 5, 10, and 15 miles, and increased 
the outer radius in 1-mile increments from the 
inner radius to a maximum of 45 miles.
Denote by M(ri ,ro) the size of the MCS 
in the buffer area with inner radius ri  and outer 
radius ro. For fixed inner radius ri, the size of 
the MCS decreases monotonically as the outer 
radius is expanded.  To wit, if buffer area A is a 
subset of buffer area B, then any cut set for A 
is also a cut set for B. Hence the size of the cut 
set for A is an upper bound for the size of the 
cut set of B. Therefore, for our study, M(ri, 45) 
is the smallest MCS for buffer areas with fixed 
inner radius ri. Furthermore, the MCS found 
when the inner and outer radii are equal is the 
number of inbound edges which gives an upper 
bound for the size of the MCS with fixed inner 
radius ri.
To illustrate, Figure 1 displays for the 
city of Phoenix buffer areas bounded by circles 
with a 15 mile inner radius and 25 and 45 mile 
outer radii respectively. Inner and outer circles 
are colored in light blue and incoming road 
segments intersecting the circles are colored 
in bright blue. Road segments in the MCS are 
colored in red. The MCS for the buffer area with 
outer radius of 25 miles is 64 and it decreases 
to 36 by expanding the outer circle to a 45 mile 
radius.
Figure 1: MCSs for Phoenix for buffer zones with inner circle of 15 miles and outer circles of 25 (image 1) 
and 45 miles (image 2).  Arcs crossing the inner and outer circles are colored in blue and arcs in the cut set 
are colored in red.
Image 1 - Phoenix M(15,25) = 64
Image 2 - Phoenix M(15, 45) = 36
We developed a tool using standard 
Java libraries to extract a graph representation 
of a city from a database and implemented the 
Ford-Fulkerson maximum flow algorithm to 
find the MCS. In our implementation of the 
Ford-Fulkerson algorithm, all nodes inside the 
inner radius are collapsed into a supersink, and 
all nodes outside the outer radius are collapsed 
into a supersource. 
Even for the largest buffer area in our 
study (inner radius equal to 5 miles, outer 
radius equal to 45 miles) on the largest city 
(New York City), an area containing 560,051 
nodes, the Java implementation took less than 
10 minutes to find the MCS.  
A cost-benefit analysis for checkpoint 
placement would weigh the benefits of 
expanding the size of the protected area against 
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always sort the observations into k groups, 
regardless of whether the observations exhibit 
any real clustering. Many methods to estimate 
k have been proposed. We employ the Gap 
statistic, which has the advantage of being able 
to recognize when only one cluster is present 
in the data.10 Discussion of the merits and 
weaknesses of a sampling of the other methods 
can be found in Walther and Tibshirani.11
Results
We first establish a context for the results on 
New York City found by Barnett et al.12  Denote 
by M(ri , ro) the size of the MCS in the buffer area 
with inner radius ri  and outer radius ro. Barnett 
et al. used JServer data and found M(15, 45) = 
89. With the ESRI StreetMap data, we found 
M(15, 45) = 87. This result shows remarkable 
agreement – the slight discrepancy is likely due 
to different choices for center locations (Times 
Square versus our choice of City Hall). The 
histogram in Figure 2 shows the distribution 
of M(15, 45) over the 50 UAs. The median 
for M(15, 45) is 55.5, and the quantity varied 
from 10 (Las Vegas) to 124 (Philadelphia). 
With M(15, 45)=87, New York requires more 
checkpoints than do most, but not all, other 
cities. This makes sense, for while New York 
City has more road segments than does any 
other city in our data, a significant portion of 
the boundary of the city is open water. Cities 
requiring a larger number of checkpoints than 
New York City include Atlanta (98), Pittsburgh 
(99), Indianapolis (107) and Philadelphia (124). 
None of these urban areas have significant 
natural barriers preventing expansion. The 
rivers cutting through Philadelphia are both 
within the 15-mile inner circle, and thus do 
not provide a natural barrier in this case. It is 
surprising and worrisome that for a few cities, 
M(15, 45) is as small as 10. Although such a 
small cut set makes installation of a checkpoint 
network feasible, it also represents a major 
vulnerability.  For such cities, damage to just 
a few roads would significantly interfere with 
regional traffic, and even isolate the city’s road 
network from the rest of the country.
the costs incurred by increasing the number of 
checkpoints. 
To quantify the protected assets, we use the 
total street mileage. This measure implicitly 
weights more heavily those regions that are 
dense with homes and businesses. A simple 
metric for the benefit from choosing inner 
radius ri is the proportion of roads within the 
disk with radius ri, as measured by the total 
miles of roadway inside the disk divided by the 
total miles of roadway in the urban area. 
Costs to deploy a checkpoint network depend 
on geography, property values, and the number 
of checkpoints required. All these attributes are 
city dependent. To enable comparisons across 
the 50 US urban areas, we instead focus on the 
number of checkpoints. The cost of protecting 
a larger region can be approximated by fixing 
the outer radius at 45 miles and by computing 
the number of checkpoints as the inner radius 
increases from 5 to 40 miles in increments of 1 
mile. 
To determine which cities behave 
similarly, we perform k-means clustering on 
three sets of data, corresponding to the three 
inner radius lengths of 5, 10, and 15 miles. For 
each of the 50 UAs, the variables are the sizes 
of the MCS on each of the possible buffer areas. 
Thus for ri =5, there are 41 variables, for ri =10 
there are 36 variables, and for ri =15 there are 
31 variables. To prevent large numbers from 
skewing the results, we standardize each 
variable by subtracting the mean and dividing 
by the standard deviation.
K-means clustering is a simple and 
widely used method for identifying clusters 
in quantitative data. We refer the reader to 
references such as Hastie et al. for a detailed 
overview of the method.8 There are a few 
drawbacks to using k-means.9 Clusters that 
don’t resemble an n-dimensional ball won’t be 
recognized well. Centers for the k clusters are 
initialized with a random sample, so there is 
inherent variability in the produced clusters. 
To ameliorate the latter, it is common to 
generate many random initial cluster centers 
and choose the cluster that minimizes the 
overall within cluster sum of squares. Another 
issue is that the number of clusters, k, must 
be specified by the analyst. The algorithm will 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the size of the MCS
Table 1: MCS decrease by considering a 30 wide mile buffer area
City M(15,15) M(15,45) M(15,15)/ M(15,45) MCS Reduction
Miami 309 16 5% 95%
Virginia Beach 167 10 6% 94%
Los Angeles 650 61 9% 91%
New York City 759 87 11% 89%
Atlanta 478 98 21% 79%
Indianapolis 293 107 37% 63%
Oklahoma City 215 81 38% 62%
Columbus 188 91 48% 52%
Figure 3: Distribution of Decrease of the MCS 
by considering a 30 mile wide buffer zone
The distribution of the ratio of the size of 
the MCS and the number of roads entering 
the protected area (M(15, 45)/M(15, 15)) is 
depicted by the histogram in Figure 3. Details 
for a selection of cities are shown in Table 1. 
This ratio represents the relative decrease of 
the number of checkpoints needed compared 
to the baseline number of inbound roads into 
the inner circle of radius 15.
For the 50 cities studied, the gain in a reduced 
number of checkpoints (1-M(15, 45)/M(15, 15)) 
ranged from 52% to 95%, with median 81%. 
For New York City, the reduction gain is 89%, 
placing it in the upper quartile. At the high end, 
we find that Miami (95%) and Virginia Beach 
(94%) benefit the most by considering a 30 
mile wide buffer area. At the low end, the cities 
that benefit the least are Oklahoma City (62%), 
and Columbus (52%). The range of the quotient 
M(15, 45)/M(15, 15) values is somewhat 
surprising, but an inspection of each of the cities 
helps explain it. For example, for both Miami 
and Virginia Beach it makes sense that the 
ratios M(15, 45)/M(15, 15) are so much smaller 
than those for Oklahoma City and Columbus. 
Both Columbus and Oklahoma City are small 
enough and lie almost completely within the 
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15-mile-radius disk, leading to a small value 
of M(15, 15). Since neither Oklahoma City nor 
Columbus has any substantial natural barriers 
nearby, there are roads entering the cities from 
every direction, increasing M(15, 45). Thus the 
ratio M(15, 45)/M(15, 15) is especially large. 
For Miami and Virginia Beach, the opposite 
is true. The buffer zone of Miami, being 
squeezed between the Everglades and the 
Atlantic, is long and narrow. Hence the 15-mile 
circle intersects dense urban areas in the north 
and the south of the city, increasing M(15, 15). 
Since so few roads enter Miami, M(15, 45) is 
especially low. Similarly, although 75% of the 
15-mile circle centered at Virginia Beach is 
over water, the remaining portion intersects 
the densely populated area near Norfolk. The 
presence of large natural barriers including the 
Atlantic, two wildlife refuges, and Hampton 
Roads allows for M(15, 45) to be extremely low.
Next, we investigate the overall behavior of 
the size of the MCS as we increase the buffer 
zone. We fix the inner circle and increase the 
buffer zone by adding one mile at the time to the 
outer circle radius. Figure 4 shows the decrease 
in the size of the MCS as a function of the outer 
radius for four representative cities and for each 
of the three choices for inner radius (5, 10, and 
15 miles).  Plots for the full set of 50 cities are 
included in the Appendix. As expected, the size 
of the MCS decreases as the size of the buffer 
area increases, but in most cases, it becomes 
constant rapidly. The largest decrease happens 
in the initial one-mile wide buffer area that is 
not shown in the plots since the size of the MCS 
M(15, 15) is too large to be displayed, but Table 
2 shows the initial mean reduction in the size 
of the MCS for the one mile wide buffer area (1- 
M(15, 16)/M(15, 15)) for the three inner radius 
values.
Figure 4: Decrease in MCS as outer radius increases
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Table 2: Percent change in the size of the MCS 








As we increase the buffer zone (by choosing 
a larger outer radius), the size of the minimum 
cut set decreases at a lower rate and in most 
cases, it rapidly levels off (see Figure 4, Figure 
9, and Figure 10).  Summary statistics for that 
distance are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Mean distance at which the size 










We find that for each choice of ri, by the time 
the buffer area is about 16 miles wide, most of 
the decline in the size of the MCS has occurred. 
There are, of course, a few cities where this 
distance is much larger. For ri=5 miles, these 
cities are New York City (ro=45), Houston 
(ro=42), Phoenix (ro=42), and Seattle (ro=42). 
In each of these cases, there are geographic 
features such as parks, mountains, and large 
bodies of water that allow further drops in the 
size of the MCS past the initial leveling out. 
For example, in Houston, the size of the MCS 
first flattens out at ro≈30 miles, but beginning 
at ro=40 miles the outer radius intersects the 
ocean, producing a sudden small drop. 
Next we investigated the benefit of increasing 
the outer radius. We fixed the inner radius ri 
and found the size of the MCS M(ri, ri), namely 
the baseline number of inbound roads into the 
inner circle of radius ri. Then we followed how 
the size of the MCS decreases (compared to 
M(ri, ri)) as we increased the outer radius and 
calculated the percent decrease  in the size of 
the MCS. We performed this calculation for 
all the cities and kept track of how many cities 
had an  MCS size decrease of at least p percent. 
To summarize, for each choice of outer radius 
and a fixed p, we calculated the number of 
cities for which the percent decrease in the size 
of the MCS was at least p  (compared to M(ri, 
ri)). We made this calculation for all p values 
between 50% and 99% using 1% increments. 
Figure 5  depicts this situation: in the figure, 
the y-axis provides the outer radius ro, the 
x-axis provides the percent reduction p, and for
each combination of (x, y) values, the shade of
blue indicates the number of cities for which
M(15, ro) is p percent smaller than M(15,15).
For example, by extending the outer radius to
30 miles, we find that for more than 45 cities,
M(15, 30) is 64% smaller than M(15, 15), for
between 30 and 35 cities, M(15, 35) is 78%
smaller than M(15, 15), and for between 5 and
10 cities, M(15, 45) is 88% smaller than M(15,
15). The plot demonstrates that for most of
the 50 cities, reductions in the size of the MCS
from increasing ro occur early on – only for a
few cities does an expansion of the outer radius
past 30 miles provide any further reduction in
the number of cuts.
Figure 5: Distribution of the number of cities 
that have an x% size reduction for the minimum 
cut as the outer radius increases (with fixed 15 
miles inner radius).
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Clustering
As mentioned in the methodology section, for 
each of the three different values for the inner 
radius (5, 10, and 15) we have a sequence of 
MCSs that were obtained by increasing the 
outer radius one mile at a time until it reached 
45 miles. We used each of these sequences of 
MCS sizes to cluster the 50 cities. From the 
Gap statistic we find that the only dataset that 
appears to exhibit a clear degree of clustering 
is when the inner radius is equal to 5. We ran 
the k-means algorithm with 25 starts and chose 
the clustering that minimized the within cluster 
sum of squares. 
Figure 6: Outer radius vs. within-cluster mean cut set size
Figure 6 plots on the left hand side the 
individual MCSs colored by cluster, and on 
the left hand side the resulting within-cluster 
means, plus or minus one standard deviation. 
Most of the variation is in the first few miles. 
This is apparent from the overlap in error 
bands for the within cluster mean in the first ten 
miles, and from how much larger those error 
bands are in that range. Note that after about 16 
miles, the expected distance at which the size of 
the cut set levels off, the different cluster bands 
for the within cluster means do not intersect 
anymore. For the most part, the clustering 
algorithm appears to have sorted cities by the 
size of the MCS. The exact composition of the 
clusters is contained in Table 4.
Table 4: Results of clustering algorithm.
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A few comments on the clusters:
• The first cluster contains cities where the
MCSs are unusually small. These cities
are characterized by having major natural
barriers nearby, such as mountain ranges
near San Diego and Salt Lake City, and
large bodies of water near San Francisco,
New Orleans, and Virginia Beach.
• The cities in clusters two and three behave
similarly. For most of these cities, the
minimum size for the cut set is reached
quickly. For the second cluster, the size of
the MCS is between 25 and 45. For the third
cluster, the minimum tends to be between
45 and 65.
• The fourth cluster contains cities whose
MCSs are unusually large. For the most
part, these are cities that have very few
natural barriers inhibiting their growth.
The exceptions to this are Los Angeles and
Chicago, both of which border a large body
of water. These cities have much larger road
networks than do the other cities in the
cluster, which may be the reason that their
MCSs are so large.
We expect that not all cities fit perfectly 
within their assigned cluster. The k-means 
algorithm requires that every observation be 
assigned a cluster, even if the connection is 
tenuous. However, as long as our interpretation 
of the resultant clusters allows for porous 
boundaries, the algorithm helps us make rough 
groupings of cities and discern similarities.
A few cities in particular don’t seem 
to fit well in their assigned (or any) cluster. 
For example, whereas the decline in MCS 
size flattens out eventually for most cities, the 
curve for Houston has two distinct drops after 
the initial decline. These correspond to the 
distances where the inner radius first intersects 
Trinity Bay and the Gulf of Mexico, respectively. 
Miami has a similar drop corresponding to the 
southern extent of the city.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
We selected one city from each cluster to 
illustrate the cost-benefit analysis. Figure 7 
depicts the increase in number of checkpoints 
for each mile added to the radius of the 
protected area and the corresponding increase 
in the percentage of road-miles within the inner 
circle. Analogous to what we observed with 
expanding the outer radius, there is an uptick 
in cost when the inner radius approaches the 
outer radius. The figure shows the costs up to 
ri=44, so as to allow some reduction in cost from 
M(45,45). The colors in the plots represent the 
percentage of road-miles in the 45-mile-radius 
disk that are within the inner radius.
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Figure 7: Number of checkpoints versus inner radius for four cities. Percentage of road miles protected is 
indicated by color.
  
Table 5 reports the number of checkpoints for a selection of choices for ri. 
Table 5: Total checkpoints for representative cities
City M(5,45) M(15,45) M(25,45) M(35,45) M(40,45)
San Francisco 17 39 46 84 95
Austin 33 46 65 88 109
New York City 46 87 109 128 168
Philadelphia 88 124 143 177 204
From these plots it is clear that the cost 
per mile increase of the inner radius is highly 
variable. Interestingly, we see a few places 
where a free increase of coverage is possible; 
that is, where the inner radius can be increased 
without increasing the number of checkpoints. 
For example, in New York City, it takes the 
same number of checkpoints (83) to protect an 
area with radius 8 miles as it does to protect an 
area with radius 12 miles – more than doubling 
the protected surface area. 
By increasing the number of checkpoints 
to 89, an area with radius 19 miles can be 
protected, representing more than fivefold 
increase of protected area for a relatively small 
additional cost. Looking at the percentage of 
road-miles protected, the change from ri=8 to 
ri=19 provides an increase from 6% to 32% – a 
substantial gain.
Whereas both San Francisco and New 
York City can benefit from these free coverage 
increases, for Austin and Philadelphia, the cost 
increases with almost every increase in the 
inner radius.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 11 Article 8 (September 2015) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Watkins, Cuéllar, Kubicek, Rodriguez, Stroud,  Security Checkpoints  11
Figure 8: Total number of checkpoints for the 25 most populous cities. Changes in color represent increases 
in the percentage of protected road-miles within the inner radius.
Finally, we look at the problem of 
protecting a large set of cities. We focused only 
on the 25 most populous cities: for each choice 
of inner radius we calculated the total number 
of checkpoints required to protect them and 
the percentage of road miles within each inner 
circle. The results are displayed in Figure 8. We 
find that 50% of the road miles in these cities 
can be protected by setting ri = 26 on each city, 
corresponding to a total of 1,841 checkpoints. 
With ri = 5, only 5% of road miles are protected, 
at a cost of 1,155 checkpoints. Expanding the 
inner radius to 44 miles, while covering 97% of 
road miles, has a cost of 4,602 checkpoints.
Conclusions
By implementing the procedure outlined in 
Barnett et al. for the 50 most populous urban 
areas in the United States we confirmed that 
the problem of finding a minimum cut on 
urban road networks can be solved using 
publicly available Java libraries on standard 
desktop computers. To our knowledge, the 
behavior of MCS within buffer areas on 
urban road networks has not previously been 
investigated. We discovered that there are 
substantial similarities among the 50 urban 
road networks in our study, particularly in that 
the number of checkpoints required to protect 
urban areas drops precipitously as the size of 
the buffer area increases until a minimum 
value is reached. This value is usually reached 
within a 16-mile-wide buffer area, although 
geographical features such as mountains and 
lakes can allow for further decreases. We found 
that for the 50 most populous regions of the 
US, the size of the MCS ranged from 10 to 124, 
with median value 55.5. This indicates that 
for even very large urban areas, it is feasible 
to use a checkpoint network to protect against 
terrorism. We also see that a few of the largest 
cities in the United States are particularly 
vulnerable to disruptions in the road network, 
in that damages to a small number of roads 
could severely limit connections to the regional 
road network, or even completely prevent all 
road-based transportation to and from the city.
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Through our cost-benefit analysis we 
found that although in general the number 
of checkpoints rises with each increase in the 
size of the protected area, for many cities, it 
is possible to greatly increase the length of 
the inner radius without incurring additional 
cost. This demonstrates that there is no one-
size-fits-all solution for an optimum buffer 
area configuration. Rather, unique features of 
road network topology and of the landscape 
surrounding cities allow for some cities to 
protect a larger area at little or no increase of 
cost, whereas for other cities, every increase in 
the inner radius requires a larger number of 
checkpoints.
Future Work
Road segments do not have equal importance. 
By design, urban road networks have a 
hierarchy of road types, from low-speed low-
throughput residential streets to freeways and 
major arterials. Thus some road segments will 
make installation of checkpoint systems more 
expensive. The MCS is based on the sum of the 
weights assigned to the edges. In our study, 
each road segment was given weight 1, so that 
the sum of the edge weights gave the number of 
segments contained in the cut set. By encoding 
each street type with the approximate dollar 
cost to deploy a checkpoint and by assigning 
that cost as edge weights for the road network, 
a minimum cut set can be calculated that 
minimizes the estimated dollar cost to install a 
checkpoint network. 
Geography plays a major role in the 
defensibility of urban areas. Future work 
could include optimizing the buffer area based 
on landscape features such as coastlines, 
mountain ranges, rivers, and protected areas 
such as parks and wildlife refuges. Although 
some (particularly Midwestern) cities are not 
surrounded by natural barriers, large cities on 
the coasts are well-suited to such an approach. 
Many developed areas have oblong shapes, or 
even multiple dense centers, such as the Los 
Angeles region with centers in Los Angeles, 
Riverside, and Santa Ana, or the Washington, 
DC – Baltimore, MD region. Rather than 
arbitrarily choosing one size of circle to 
compare cities, it would be valuable to develop 
criteria for selecting protected areas based 
on population density, economic value, and 
landscape features. This would better match 
the approach that would be used in practice.
Further research should also incorporate 
water, rail, and air transportation, including 
existing border and port defenses. 
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Appendix
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show for fixed inner radius (5, 10,15) plots for the size of the minimum cut 
set (MCS) as a function of the outer radius for the 50 most populous urban areas (UAs). UAs are 
ranked by population size in decreasing order.
Figure 9: MCS size as the outer radius increases for the 25 most populous UAs.
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Figure 10: MCS size as the outer radius increases for UA ranked 26th to 50th.
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This short (141 pages) and very readable 
book is a good introduction to some of the 
most useful concepts and best practices for 
terrorism analysis.  As the title suggests, it is 
written primarily for practitioners, such as 
working professionals from law enforcement, 
fire services, or emergency management who 
find themselves serving as intelligence and 
homeland security analysts.  The focus is on 
terrorism analysis, but many of the principles 
discussed in the book would be useful for 
anyone—whether practitioner or student—who 
is working to understand and analyze homeland 
and national security threats.  
The authors attempt to provide a structure 
to the terrorism analytical process, which is a 
very useful effort because much of the focus of 
reform efforts within the American intelligence 
community since the 9/11 attacks has been 
aimed at improving the work of analysis. 
The book is partly a work about terrorism, 
and partly about the business of intelligence 
analysis, and thus it fits somewhere between 
the vast terrorism studies literature and the 
smaller set of works on intelligence analysis. 
Other more comprehensive books are available 
on intelligence analysis in general,1 and on 
homeland security intelligence in particular,2 
but this book offers a different approach, 
primarily because it emphasizes the use of 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) as an overall 
framework for terrorism analysis.  
The first chapter is an overview of some 
of most important challenges facing all 
intelligence and terrorism analysts, such as the 
cognitive biases from which we all suffer.  The 
authors explain that a primary goal of the book 
is to help the reader apply structured thinking 
to overcome these biases; as an example, they 
encourage analysts to seek out primary source 
material on potential problems or threats, 
A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis  
(Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014).
Reviewed by Erik J. Dahl  
rather than relying on second hand accounts. 
This may be obvious to most intelligence 
professionals (or to most graduate students), 
but it is worth emphasizing, especially in a book 
aimed at those without extensive experience or 
training in analysis.  
Chapter 2 reviews and critiques much of 
the current academic and popular work on 
terrorism, arguing that “much of terrorism 
literature lacks the theoretical frameworks 
that are needed to support or produce accurate 
analysis” (p. 24).  They criticize some popular 
publications on terrorism for lacking any 
theoretical framework, and this is a valuable 
point.  A good model of high-quality, practically 
focused terrorism analysis might be that done 
by the Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point, especially in their journal the CTC 
Sentinel.3
The authors of this book appear to be on 
shakier ground, however, in arguing that many 
academic students of terrorism have persisted 
in believing that most terrorists are mentally ill 
or suffer from some psychological disturbance 
(pp. 28-29).  Most mainstream terrorism 
scholars have for some time moved on from 
these earlier theories which attributed much 
terrorism violence to psychological deviance, 
so this criticism comes across as a bit of a straw 
man.  Nonetheless, there is an ongoing debate 
among terrorism scholars over the appropriate 
methodology to be used in terrorism research 
today, so this book’s fresh approach is 
worthwhile.4  The authors argue that no single 
theory can explain all the different types and 
varieties of terrorism, and they offer Social 
Identity Theory as an overall framework for 
analysis.
Chapters 3 and 4 introduce Social Identity 
Theory (SIT), which involves attempting 
to understand how individuals—such as 
David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg,  
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 11 Article 9 (September 2015) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Dahl,  Review: A Practitioner's Way Forward  2
terrorists—are part of groups that are 
driven fundamentally by the same types of 
mechanisms, wants, and needs as other groups 
(p. 56).  They note that analysts must be able 
to look at terrorist groups objectively, and even 
with empathy. This can be difficult, especially 
for law enforcement professionals whose job 
it is to arrest such individuals, not necessarily 
to understand them.  In chapter 5 the authors 
argue that the principles of SIT can be used 
to analyze a wide variety of groups, including 
rightwing Christian fundamentalist groups, 
and not just the radical Islamist groups that 
receive most of the attention.
Chapter 6 provides practical examples of 
how SIT may be used to analyze a number 
of different articles and written works that 
a terrorism analyst might come across in 
his or her daily work.  This section includes 
worthwhile examples and comments about 
the use of Twitter feeds and other social 
media information, but more material on 
the importance of social media for terrorism 
analysis today would have been useful.  As 
a whole, these examples would be good in a 
college or graduate school course on critical 
thinking, but it might have been more useful 
here to present one or two case studies of real 
world terrorism groups or situations, rather 
than individual articles about such situations.  
Overall, this book appears to be more useful 
for undergraduates or graduate students 
studying terrorism or intelligence analysis 
than it is for its intended audience of homeland 
security professionals working in state and local 
intelligence fusion centers or other analytical 
positions.5  For example, it is not clear how often 
a local police officer would be asked to write an 
analysis of al Qaeda or ISIS, as the focus of this 
book implies.  Although the authors do discuss 
the utility of their approach for examining 
bikers, street gangs, and other types of groups, 
more material on non-terrorist groups might 
be useful.  The extensive use of graphics and 
cartoons is unusual to this reviewer, who is 
more used to reading dry scholarly works, but 
it may work in a book that is not intended for an 
academic audience.  
It is also not clear how appropriate the Social 
Identity Theory model is for understanding 
the growing problem that the United States 
and other countries are facing with home-
grown and lone wolf terrorism.  If a potential 
terrorist is not a part of a group, then how well 
do these principles, which are based largely on 
group identification, apply?  It does appear that 
many or even most home-grown terrorists are 
inspired by terrorist groups, so these concepts 
may indeed be useful for understanding their 
motivation, but more discussion of this aspect 
of the problem would be useful.  
Despite these issues, this book can serve as a 
very good introduction to the art and science of 
intelligence analysis, especially for students or 
working professionals who are asked to conduct 
terrorism analysis.  
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Abstract
The National Academy of Sciences 
recommended that the Department of 
Homeland Security use methods of qualitative 
comparative risk assessment as part of its 
approach to strategic planning.  To provide 
insight into how this can be done, this paper 
examines a set of ten homeland security risks– 
including natural disasters, terrorist events, 
and major accidents– in a systematic fashion. 
These hazards were described in terms of the 
annualized risk to the United States as a whole 
using open-source data and a standardized set 
of attributes.  This assessment can be useful 
on its own, providing a baseline of knowledge 
about these homeland security risks and a 
source of data for subsequent risk management 
and comparative risk assessment studies. 
Additionally, this assessment can help identify 
what is known about the homeland security 
risk generally– the availability of data on 
homeland security risks and the uncertainty of 
the risks as they vary by hazard and attribute.
Introduction
The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is a large and complex organization 
with a mission that covers multiple priorities 
including security, resilience, and customs and 
exchange.  Managing priorities in preparing for 
and responding to the range of terrorist events, 
natural disasters, and major accidents that are 
in their purview requires an understanding 
of the diverse set of risks involved.  In an 
organization managing risks that can kill 
hundreds to thousands and with an annual 
budget in the tens of billions, properly aligning 
capabilities to risks can save both dollars 
and lives.1  DHS defines risk as the “potential 
A Comparative Risk Assessment of 10 Hazards
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unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, 
event, or occurrence, as determined by its 
likelihood and the associated consequences,” 
and knowing the extent of expected damages 
of a risk can be useful when considering the 
costs of risk reduction activities.  Accordingly, 
DHS is committed to utilizing risk assessment 
in informing decisions and priorities.2  In 
a process described in a summary of the 
Strategic National Risk Assessment, DHS uses 
risk assessments to identify high risk factors 
in support of capabilities, to support critical 
thinking about strategic needs, and to promote 
a common understanding in order for all 
components of DHS to act independently but 
collaboratively.3
Assessing homeland security risks is a 
particularly challenging endeavor.  This is 
partially due to the nature of the risks. Homeland 
security risks include high consequence/ low 
likelihood events with significant uncertainty, 
making homeland security a challenging 
domain for risk assessment.4 To a certain extent, 
these challenges in homeland security risk 
assessment reflect the maturation of the field, 
as natural hazard risk assessment methods are 
more advanced than methods used to assess 
risks associated with terrorism.5  But terrorism 
also involves inherent challenges in estimating 
the likelihood of attacks that are not inherently 
probabilistic because they are carried out by 
intelligent adversaries.6  Bringing these risks 
together in a comparative fashion is even 
more challenging.  A 2010 National Academies 
review of DHS’s approach to risk analysis 
recognized several opportunities for DHS to 
improve their comparative risk assessments.7 
Homeland security risk assessments are often 
conducted in an ad hoc fashion, and identifying 
the attributes of concern in a model specific 
to the hazard makes it difficult to compare 
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risks.  For example, comparing risks based only 
on estimates of expected casualties will bias 
results against cyber-attacks, while omitting 
environmental damages will bias results against 
oil spills.  Additionally, the “heterogeneity 
and complexity” of risks in DHS’s portfolio 
limits the use of a single meaningful unit of 
risk, making a quantitative integrated risk 
assessment “impractical”.8
While the review recommended against 
comparing all-hazards in a quantitative fashion 
using a single risk measure, they did recognize 
the benefit of qualitative comparisons to inform 
decision making.9  While there are known 
limitations to the direct use of some qualitative 
methodologies (such as risk matrices), using a 
range of quantitative and qualitative measures 
to inform expert judgment can be useful.10  DHS 
has followed this approach in their Second 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR), including assessments of a range of 
homeland security risks to support an expert 
consideration of risk reduction priorities.11
Another suggestion of the National 
Academies panel was to incorporate time-
tested scientific practices, including external 
peer-review, in their verification and validation 
of risk models.  It is important for risk models 
to be transparent both internally (so that 
policy-makers can understand the assumptions 
underlying their decisions) and externally (so 
that common approaches can be used to inform 
similar risks and to support model validation). 
This paper presents a shared starting point for 
a comparative assessment of homeland security 
risks, building on the recommendations of the 
National Academies panel.  We compare a set 
of ten hazards including a varied set of natural 
disasters, terrorism, and major accidents, 
using a standardized set of attributes that cover 
health, economic, societal, environmental, 
governmental, and non-consequence aspects of 
risk.  We identify and document risks estimated 
through open-source literature in a transparent 
fashion.  This presents a common framework to 
examine homeland security risks and a baseline 
as to what those risks may be.
Methods
We undertook this risk assessment in order to 
support a comparative risk ranking.  While the 
2010 National Academies report recommended 
that DHS avoid quantitative comparative all-
hazard risk assessments, it suggested that 
qualitative techniques can be appropriate.12 
There are a range of techniques which can 
be useful for all-hazard comparison of risks, 
including the Analytic Hierarchy Process, 
multi-objective risk analysis techniques, and 
others.13 This study uses one such comparative 
approach, the Deliberative Method for Ranking 
Risks.  This method was developed in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s in research out of 
Carnegie Mellon University to deal with the 
range of risks faced in environmental policy.14 
The Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks has 
five steps: 1) identifying the risks to be ranked; 
2) identifying important attributes to describe
the risks; 3) describing each of the selected risks
in terms of the selected attributes; 4) selecting
participants and performing the risk ranking,
and; 5) analyzing results.  Other papers describe
the application of the deliberative method in
detail.15  This paper focuses on the first three
steps of this method involving the assessment
of a set of risks in a comparable fashion.  While
we used a specific set of comparable risks in
this study to support a specific risk ranking, the
assessments used to support the rankings are
generalizable.
Certain decisions must be made regarding 
how to conceptualize the risk before any 
comparative risk assessment can be performed. 
One initial decision involves deciding how 
to identify discrete risks to be compared.  In 
homeland security, risks may be broken out 
by target (as in the Border Zone Protection 
Program), by city (as in the Urban Area 
Security Initiative), by sector (as in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan), by hazard (as 
in the National Planning Scenarios and the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review), 
or other ways.  In the process of considering 
the alternative ways to categorize risks, no 
single approach is universally correct; instead 
the categorizations should be matched to 
the purpose for which they are used and the 
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structure of the organization using them.16 
While DHS uses a range of approaches to 
categorize risk depending on the purpose of the 
assessment, for this study we made the choice 
to categorize risks in terms of hazard, which 
the DHS defines as a natural or man-made 
source or cause of harm or difficulty.17  This 
approach considers the risks (i.e. the likelihood 
and consequences of harm) associated with 
selected hazards (i.e. the cause of that harm). 
This consideration of risks associated with 
hazards reflects high-level strategic documents 
and planning within DHS.18
Next, we selected specific hazards.   A relevant 
set of risks should be logically consistent, 
administratively comparable, equitable and 
comparable as regards cognitive constraints 
and biases.19 For reasons of comparability, 
we sought hazards which reflected the types 
of incidents described by DHS in their 
mission statement, specifically “…a terrorist 
attack, natural disaster, or other large-scale 
emergency.”20
The set of hazards was neither exhaustive 
nor representative, but was selected to include 
risks that varied in interesting ways, reflecting 
a range of causes and consequence levels 
associated with the types of problems managed 
by DHS (see Table 1).  The specific hazards we 
selected were drawn from a larger list identified 
from DHS documents.21  From this list, we 
selected a subset of the hazards to cover the 
domains of terrorism, accidents, and natural 
disasters.  This focus did not address other 
aspects of the DHS mission such as securing 
the borders or managing immigration.  This is 
consistent with DHS risk analyses, notably the 
Strategic National Risk Assessment.22
Table 1: Hazards selected
Natural Terrorist Accidental
Earthquakes Nuclear detonation Toxic industrial chemical accidents
Hurricanes Explosive bombings Oil spills
Tornadoes Anthrax attacks
Pandemic influenza Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure
Comparing risks also requires having a 
consistent set of attributes to describe them. 
This set of attributes should be representative 
of the aspects of risk about which people 
and policy makers are concerned.  Selecting 
a set of attributes that comprehensively yet 
parsimoniously describes the aspects of risk 
that people are concerned about requires 
significant judgment in applying the scientific 
literature.23 
We drew the attributes to describe risk 
from the literature on homeland security and 
emergency management.  We focused our 
literature review on papers which described an 
overarching framework for consequences or 
which reviewed the emergency management 
or homeland security literature with regards 
to aspects of consequence.24 The review 
also examined DHS papers or processes 
that utilized a framework in an attempt to 
comprehensively describe risks.25  This focused 
literature review identified 41 attributes which 
covered a range of consequences about which 
people were concerned, including not only lives 
lost and economic damages, but also social, 
psychological, environmental, and political 
concerns.  
From these identified attributes, we 
selected 17 attributes describing health, 
economic damage, societal damage, and 
non-consequence factors reflecting aspects 
of dread and uncertainty associated with 
the psychometric paradigm.26  As many of 
the identified attributes described similar 
concepts, attributes were selected which 
could cover the range in a parsimonious 
fashion.   These definitions for each attribute 
were formalized; for example, the distinction 
between more severe and less severe injuries or 
illnesses was related to hospitalization, with a 
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definition and examples for each.  Most of the 
selected attributes  involved expected value 
characterizations, describing the risk in terms 
of expected damage to the nation as a whole for 
one year as averaged over many years. However, 
some attributes were described in non-
annualized terms, including both perspectives: 
reflecting damages for a single event and non-
consequence characterizations of the risk.  We 
present the set of selected attributes, including 
consequence and non-consequence aspects of 
risk, in Table 2.  For more details on the process 
see Lundberg (2013).27
Table 2: Attributes Used to Describe Homeland Security Risks 
Health Socioeconomic Other attributes
Average number of deaths per year Average economic damages per year Natural/human-induced
Greatest number of deaths in a single 
event
Greatest economic damages in a 
single event
Ability of individuals to control 
their exposure
More severe injuries or illnesses per 
year on average
Duration of economic damages
Time between exposure and 
health effects
Less severe injuries or illnesses per 
year on average
Size of area affected by economic 
damages
Quality of scientific understanding
Psychological consequences per year 
on average
Average environmental damages per 
year
Combined uncertainty
Average displaced households per 
year
Disruption of government services
We developed specific estimates of these 
attributes for each of the selected hazards.  Some 
of these estimates were quantitative, while 
others were qualitative.  We drew data for these 
estimates from the available literature.  These 
included unclassified government records, peer 
reviewed articles, books, news reports, and 
raw data from databases on disasters (such 
as EM-DAT) and terrorism (such as RAND’s 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents). 
We identified these sources from other risk 
assessments, literature reviews, other articles 
and books, and targeted internet searches.  We 
conducted research underlying the assessments 
throughout 2010 and early 2011.
As estimates of risk in homeland security 
can have considerable uncertainty, we adopted 
three approaches to characterize the risk with 
appropriate degrees of precision: rounding, 
bounding, and the use of qualitative levels when 
appropriate.  First, we rounded quantitative 
estimates of risk to only one significant digit 
so as to not overstate the precision of the 
estimates.  Second, we incorporated uncertainty 
in quantitative estimates using bounds.  For 
annualized expected consequences, these 
bounds represented the lowest and highest 
estimate of risk identified in the literature.  For 
worst case attributes (greatest number of lives 
lost in a single event and greatest economic 
damages in a single event), bounds represented 
low and high estimates for the largest potential 
event.  These reflected the range from the 
largest consequences that had ever actually 
occurred and the largest consequences that 
could theoretically occur as identified in models 
or the range from the largest consequences 
that had occurred in the U.S. to the largest 
consequences that had occurred anywhere in the 
world.  Finally, we only characterized attributes 
in quantitative terms when there was sufficient 
justification to do so; attributes that were less 
concrete (such as environmental damage) were 
described qualitatively.  When qualitative scales 
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were used, we used structured definitions to 
improve consistency.  For example, thresholds 
for ability of an individual to control their 
exposure involved the actions one would need 
to take to avoid exposure to the risk, with high 
control related to advance warning of a clearly 
visible event and low control related to risks 
that can only be reduced by significant lifestyle 
changes, such as moving away from urban or 
suburban areas.
While this paper focuses on the estimates 
associated with the attributes described in 
Table 2, this was only one part of describing the 
risks.  We described the risks in risk summary 
sheets that followed a specific format consistent 
with best practices in risk communication. 
The summary sheets began with a paragraph 
summarizing the risk and a table listing the 
estimates for all of the identified attributes 
on the first page.  The subsequent pages then 
described in greater detail what is known about 
the risk and how it can harm people, what the 
exposure is to the risk, and what is already 
being done about the risks.
Finally, we brought in hazard-specific experts 
for the analyses of the hazards (including not 
only the estimates for the attributes but also the 
descriptions in the risk summary sheets).  This 
expert review was part of the risk summary 
process (Deliberative Method for Ranking 
Risks step 3), separate from but supporting the 
risk rankings (Deliberative Method for Ranking 
Risks step 4).  In this review, researchers 
unaffiliated with the project but with expertise 
on the hazard were identified and were asked 
to consider the risk summary for the hazard 
on which they possessed expertise.   They were 
asked to review whether the assessments were 
based on the best available science about the 
hazard and whether the estimates accurately 
reflected that knowledge both in the accuracy 
and precision presented.  We incorporated 
comments from the reviewers into the final risk 
summaries.
The result of this process was a set of risk 
summary sheets describing the risk associated 
with ten homeland security hazards in a 
comparable fashion.  The detailed assessments 
are available in online supporting materials and 
summarized in the remainder of this paper.28
Results
The risk assessment process identified 
estimates in 137 documents including datasets, 
government documents, peer-reviewed 
articles, NGO publications, published books, 
and news articles.  Many of these documents 
provided multiple estimates.  For example, we 
used estimates of consequence from nine of 
the National Planning Scenarios, and in many 
cases we were able to identify both low and high 
estimates.29  Datasets were particularly useful in 
creating multiple estimates including estimates 
for multiple hazards, for different periods 
of time, or for different places.  For example, 
the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorist 
Incidents provided a number of estimates for 
consequences over different time periods and 
for different countries.30
The data to develop consequences varied in 
format.  We identified estimates of consequence 
in terms of counts per year or counts per event. 
While some hazard-attribute pairs had data 
that went back over 100 years (e.g. deaths from 
tornadoes) it is questionable whether historical 
data reflect contemporary conditions, either 
because the historical data was not collected as 
diligently or because the risk has changed over 
time.
The data could support quantitative estimates 
for some hazards and attributes, but could only 
support qualitative levels for others.  Data were 
strongest in support of estimates of lives lost, 
either in a single event or averaged over many 
years, as lives lost are a discrete harm important 
enough to be regularly recorded.  Estimates 
of direct economic damages were widely 
available; indirect or secondary economic 
damages were also available but varied widely. 
Some authors suggested all  policy activities 
following an event should be included in 
secondary costs (in the case of the events of 
Sept. 11, 2001 that included the costs of two 
wars, far beyond the costs of the event itself), 
while others suggested that the substitution in 
a mature market economy would attenuate any 
losses from a disaster.  Data on health effects 
other than lives lost were not as strong. Even in 
the case of hazards with historical data, injuries 
were often only recorded for individual events 
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(often the largest events, which may or may not 
be typical), not for averages over many years.
The differences in data warranted the 
application of different methods to derive 
estimates from them.  We drew estimates from 
the data in six general ways: projections from 
historical data, projections from analogous 
data, modeled estimates, expert opinion, 
projections from the proportionality of one 
attribute to another, and bounding estimates. 
We present these categories in an order of 
increased abstraction, not necessarily in strict 
order of preference; the approach selected 
depended not only on how directly it described 
the actual consequences but in how precisely 
and accurately it described them.  It was not 
possible to choose a single approach that would 
work well for each hazard and attribute.  For 
example, the historical data on tornadoes 
allowed estimates of risk by averaging over 
many years, but the lack of data on terrorist 
nuclear detonations required decomposing 
risk into likelihood and consequence then 
using expert opinion and data from World War 
II and from scenario models to calculate an 
estimate.  The determination of whether one 
kind of approach provides a better estimate 
than another involves an inherently subjective 
judgment.  As expected, most natural disasters 
lent themselves to averages of historical 
data while most terrorist hazards involved 
combining likelihood derived from expert 
opinion with consequence from modeled data 
or other approaches (see Table 3).  However, 
this was not always the case.  Terrorist 
explosive bombings, for example, had sufficient 
data to support statistical analysis, with a 
record of terrorist explosive bombings over 
several decades in different contexts.  Other 
terrorist scenarios do not lend themselves to 
historical averages, as they have rarely (in the 
case of anthrax attacks) or never (in the case 
of terrorist nuclear detonations) occurred. 
The non-probabilistic nature of adaptive 
adversaries limits the utility of probabilistic risk 
assessments.31  Novel or rare events can also 
require more creative approaches to estimating 
consequences.  For example, while cyber-crime 
and cyber-espionage are widespread, cyber-
attacks on critical infrastructure have been 
The precision of the estimates of homeland 
security risks had large amounts of uncertainty 
for some hazards, but that does not mean 
that they cannot still be useful for some 
applications.  Table 4 presents the precision 
in the quantitative estimates in terms of the 
orders of magnitude difference between the 
lower and upper bound for each of the hazard-
attribute pairs.  The range of the estimates 
was substantial for some hazards, with two or 
even three orders of magnitudes of difference 
between the low estimate and the high estimate 
for a given attribute.  This lack of precision 
may limit some quantitative approaches but 
can be useful for qualitative approaches– 
similar orders of magnitude for the bounding 
estimates have been used in studies using the 
Deliberative Method for Ranking Risk in other 
domains.33  Still, uncertain estimates of risk 
may also suggest areas where future research 
may be useful.
The precision of the estimates varied by 
hazard and attribute.  When considering the 
precision by hazard, there is less precision 
in the estimates of risk for terrorism than for 
natural disasters, with major accidents falling 
between them.  But this approach presented 
little variation when comparing the precision 
by attribute, in part because there was some 
consistency in the approaches within a hazard; 
for example, if a hazard were to decompose 
likelihood and consequence, the same range 
of likelihoods would be applied to estimates of 
lives lost, injuries, and economic damages.
rare; incidents of computer failure in mass 
transit and the Northeast Blackout of 2003 were 
selected as analogous events.  Similarly, the 
historical consequences of pandemic influenza 
may not be useful to describe the contemporary 
consequences in light of improvements in 
public health systems, so we used models of 
consequence data.  We present the specific 
estimates for each of the attributes by hazard 
in Table 5, presented as an appendix to this 
article.  For details on how particular estimates 
were selected see Lundberg (2013).32
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Table 3: Approaches Used to Estimate Homeland Security Risks for Selected Hazards and Attributes
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Table 4: Precision of Estimates by Hazard and Consequence as Measured by Orders of Magnitude between 
Lower Bound and Upper Bound
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Estimates are Too Imprecise 
to Quantitatively Differentiate 
Homeland Security Risks
The quantitative estimates of the risks provide 
some, but only some, ability to differentiate 
risks.  The ability to quantitatively differentiate 
risks was limited due to the degree of precision 
in the estimates.  Quantitatively distinguishing 
the hazards on any single attribute is possible 
only to a limited extent. Figure 1, for example, 
shows the estimates of lives lost for each hazard 
on a logarithmic scale, where the estimates for 
26 of the 45 hazard-hazard pairs overlap for 
expected lives lost per year and 8 of 45 overlap 
for greatest number of lives lost in a single 
event.  The other attributes are similar, with the 
estimates of an attribute for any given hazard 
overlapping with the estimates for another 












Average lives lost per year Greatest lives lost in a single event
Figure 1: A Comparison of Average Lives Lost Per Year and Greatest Lives Lost in a Single Event
These multidimensional risks can also be 
presented holistically in an easily comparable 
visual format using radar charts.  Figure 2 shows 
the identified risks of the selected 10 homeland 
security hazards across all 17 attributes.  To 
create this chart, the “best” estimate for each 
of the 17 selected attributes of risk was plotted 
on a normalized scale relative to the other 
hazards, with 0 (at the center) representing the 
lowest value in this set of hazards and 1 (at the 
edge) representing the highest value in this set 
of hazards.  We plotted qualitative attributes 
ordinally on this scale while quantitative 
attributes were plotted on logarithmic scales. 
The attributes are grouped in particular 
quadrants: the upper right quadrant presents 
health effects; the lower right presents economic 
damages; the lower left presents non-economic 
consequences; and the upper left presents non-
consequence attributes.  These allow quick 
visual comparison of the risks.  For example, one 
can see immediately that the risks of hurricanes 
are greater than those of tornadoes.  In this 
case, hurricanes equal or exceed tornadoes 
on every dimension of the risk; to borrow the 
language of game theory, the risk of hurricanes 
dominates that of tornadoes.  Judging hazards 
that are not dominated can be done but with the 
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caution that concern depends to at least some 
extent on the subjective value placed on each 
attribute.  For example, if one risk is smaller 
than another for each attribute except lives lost, 
where it is larger than the other, it is not entirely 
clear which of the two risks will be of greater 
concern.  It is also possible to distinguish 
between large and small risks overall, but one 
can also identify the aspect of those risks that 
is particularly large, whether it is in terms 
of health effects (as in pandemic influenza), 
economic effects (as in earthquakes, terrorist 
nuclear detonations), or societal effects (as in 
hurricanes).  The use of radar charts may be 
a useful tool to rapidly understand homeland 
security risks in a relative context.
The risk assessment presented in this 
paper serves as a starting point for comparing 
homeland security risks.  The hazards described 
here are only a subset of the possible risks to the 
nation, but additional hazards can be adapted 
easily for comparison using the framework of 
attributes described here.  Additionally, while 
the selected “best” estimates presented here 
involve inherent subjectivity, the estimates 
and the justifications for them are transparent, 
allowing for others to modify those estimates 
as need be.  The identification of risks in a 
standardized fashion can serve as a starting 
point for comparative risk assessments in the 
future.  
The results show that it is possible to estimate 
homeland security risks in a comparative 
fashion, although there are some limitations 
in the use of those estimates.  One limitation 
is an inherent subjectivity.  Determining 
estimates of homeland security risks requires 
many types of subjective judgment.  Estimating 
lower and upper bounds is objective in theory 
(identifying the lowest and highest estimates 
in the literature) but can involve subjectivity in 
determining the scope of the risks– for example, 
determining which events to use as analogous 
for a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure. 
Selecting a “best” estimate involves a greater 
degree of subjectivity, particularly when 
dealing with risks that lack historical data.  In 
those cases, selecting a “best” estimate involves 
subjective judgment as to which risks are more 
likely or more reasonable.  We addressed this 
subjectivity by being transparent as to how and 
why the “best” estimate was selected.
The lack of classified information may also 
bias these estimates.  The risk assessments in 
this paper used only estimates derived from the 
open-source literature.  It is possible (but by 
no means certain) that estimates for terrorist 
events may be more accurately characterized 
using classified information.  Terrorists want 
to both conceal and publicize their actions; 
while terrorists try to keep their planning and 
intentions secret, they want their results to be 
highly public in order to amplify the influence of 
the attack.  Accordingly, open-source estimates 
of risk describing historically common terrorist 
events (e.g. explosive bombings, assault 
scenarios) should be reliable at the 10,000 
foot view used in this analysis, assuming that 
the exposure to the risk has not appreciably 
changed from the historical record.  Rare or 
novel risks are less likely to be reflected in the 
historical record.  In these cases, classified data 
may (or may not) support a more accurate 
estimate than open-source data.  It is certainly 
true that analysts with access to classified 
data will know more about terrorist activities 
than those limited to open-source data, but it 
is not clear whether this translates to greater 
understanding of the residual risk, as one 
would assume that any actionable intelligence 
would be acted upon thus removing the threat 
from the residual risk that remains.  While 
the attempts to address uncertainty in the 
estimates– bounding, rounding, and qualitative 
levels– should attenuate the concern regarding 
the use of open-source data, the extent to which 
the estimates developed here would differ from 
those developed using classified information is 
unclear.
Still, some things can be learned from this 
analysis, both with regards to the risks and 
to the risk assessment process.  First, there 
are sufficient open source data to describe 
homeland security risks; the precision of 
the estimates in this study are similar to the 
precision of estimates for risks studied in other 
domains using similar methodologies (see 
Lundberg, 2013).34  But the extent to which 
homeland security risks can be estimated 
does vary by hazard.  Looking at the range of 
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Figure 2: Selected Homeland Security Hazards across Multiple Dimensions of Risk
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estimates generated for risks, it is only possible 
to distinguish between any two hazards based 
on a single attribute about half the time; in some 
cases, upper estimates may be over three orders 
of magnitude greater than the lower estimates 
for a given attribute.  Natural disasters can be 
described with more precision than terrorist 
events, as expected.  This is particularly true 
of rare/novel high consequence events such as 
terrorist anthrax attacks or nuclear detonations, 
but even terrorist bombings with a substantial 
history to draw upon are associated with less 
precision than natural disasters.  However, the 
degree of precision does not vary greatly by 
attribute; only greatest number of lives lost in 
a single event could be described with better 
precision than the rest of the estimates.
Better precision of these uncertain estimates 
could plausibly help improve decision-making, 
but improving the precision of the estimates 
is not without tradeoffs and it is important 
to not overstate the precision beyond what is 
appropriate.35  There are natural limitations 
in trying to establish with greater precision 
the likelihood of essentially non-probabilistic 
events, notably terrorism.36  Some hazards 
(such as earthquakes) have an essentially 
probabilistic nature with each day akin to the 
roll of the dice, and imprecision reflects limits in 
the ability to determine what that is.  But other 
homeland security hazards are not probabilistic; 
to borrow from Albert Einstein, terrorists do 
not roll dice.  Whether or not a terrorist event 
occurs is not a probabilistic event—it is the 
result of the decisions of an adversary—and 
while we may not know what those decisions 
are, they are indeed decisions and not random 
acts.  While treating terrorist actions as if 
they were probabilistic and modelling them 
using probabilistic methods can be useful in 
some circumstances, it can be misleading in 
others (see Brown and Cox, 2011, for a broader 
treatment of the challenges of PRA in terrorism 
risk analysis).37 Accordingly, narrowing the 
bounds of uncertainty associated with the risk 
of high-consequence terrorist hazards could 
overstate what is really known about the risk. 
Given recent concerns about overstating the 
precision of this kind of subjective probability 
(including intelligence estimates as to the 
likelihood of WMD in prewar assessments 
on Iraq, 2003),38 this kind of false precision 
should be avoided.  Instead, both the estimates 
of risk and the estimates of the precision of 
that risk should be presented to homeland 
security decision-makers and decision support 
tools that can integrate imprecision (such as 
Robust Decision Making or Assumption Based 
Planning) should be explored.39
Another lesson is that the risks do vary by 
more than just size.  The largest risks have 
their effects predominately in only one aspect 
(i.e. health, economic damage, or societal 
damage, but not all three), but the particular 
aspect where that largest effect is realized 
varies by hazard– health effects drive damage 
for pandemic influenza, economic damage for 
terrorist nuclear detonations and earthquakes, 
and societal disruption for hurricanes.  This 
provides empirical support for suggestions 
that analyses of homeland security risks should 
consider a range of attributes rather than just 
lives lost and economic damages.  One might 
do this through graphical means (such as the 
example star charts or a set of complementary 
metrics in a dashboard approach) or 
numerically.
This multi-dimensionality can bring 
limitations to integrated comparative risk 
assessments.  Adding additional attributes 
quantitatively compounds the lack of precision, 
as the complication of deciding how to combine 
multiple attributes inherently involves 
subjective judgment (in deciding how many 
dollars an acre of wetlands damaged by oil 
is worth, to give one example of many).  The 
typical challenges of subjectivity in converting 
these different attributes into a single metric are 
compounded by the problems of imprecision. 
For some of the challenges in summarizing 
risk using risk measures and risk indices, see 
MacKenzie, 2014 and NAS 2010.40  In this 
respect, we concur with the National Academy 
of Science panel on DHS’s approach to risk 
analysis when they say that DHS should not 
compare all the different risks in their portfolio 
using a single quantitative metric, and that 
qualitative tools maintaining the underlying 
individual attributes should be used to inform, 
not replace, decision-makers.
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To this end, the analysis identifies some 
ways in which multiple individual attributes 
can inform policy-makers.  Risk summaries 
can be created using best practices in risk 
communications, integrating summaries 
and tables to present information clearly 
and comprehensively; an approach such as 
Lundberg (2013) can be useful for getting 
informed consideration of risks using summary 
sheets.41  Additionally, visual aids can, when used 
correctly, communicate information quickly 
and clearly.42 The star charts presented in this 
paper can quickly illustrate the relative size of 
the risks as well as the kinds of consequences 
(i.e. health, economic, or socioeconomic) that 
are of greatest concern.  While these charts 
present the risks individually, one could plot all 
of the hazards on a single chart by presenting 
only the outline.  Alternatively, the charts could 
be changed to incorporate the uncertainty of 
the estimates, presenting the lower and upper 
bounds for each of the risks.  And radar charts 
are not the only tool that could be used to 
present information visually; approaches from 
business infometrics, including the Five Star 
Framework or dashboard designs, could also 
be used to communicate multiple attributes 
quickly and easily.43
Comprehending the risks is just a first step 
to making decisions in the homeland security 
domain.  While risks are important, it is the 
extent to which activities reduce risk that 
decision-makers are actually considering. This 
represents an additional step that can present 
challenges to estimate.  These risk reductions 
must also be considered with regards to their 
efficiency: the extent that risk can be reduced for 
a given amount of money.  However, efficiency 
is not the only value that should be considered; 
other values, such as liberty and equity, should 
be considered as well.  This makes decision-
making in the homeland security domain 
a complex undertaking, one where a single 
quantitative estimate cannot substitute for 
judgment.
While some articles have explored the reasons 
to be cautious about the use of qualitative risk 
assessment tools,44 there are also reasons 
to be cautious about the use of quantitative 
estimates.  In the context of homeland security 
hazards at the national level, the precision of 
available estimates presents one challenge to 
developing integrated risk assessments and the 
multiple dimensions of risk in national hazards 
presents another.  There may be situations in 
which purely quantitative or purely qualitative 
approaches may be recommended, but it is 
important to be aware of the limitations and 
strengths of each.  In many cases, it can be 
important to embrace the complexity of risks 
in the homeland security domain rather than 
embrace false simplicity.  For now, homeland 
security risk assessments will remain both an 
art and a science.
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Table 5: Value for Each Attribute by Hazard
Public Health and Safety






Terrorist Nuclear Detonation 200
Terrorist Explosive Bombings 10
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure 0
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident 8
Oil Spills 1
Greatest Number of Deaths in a Single Episode
Earthquakes 5,000 - 20,000
Hurricanes 2,000 - 4,000
Tornadoes 300 - 700
Pandemic Influenza 300,000 - 2,000,000
Anthrax Release 3,000 - 20,000
Terrorist Nuclear Detonation 100,000 - 800,000
Terrorist Explosive Bombings 200 - 2,000
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure 0 - 10
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident 3,000 - 20,000
Oil Spills 200






Terrorist Nuclear Detonation 200
Terrorist Explosive Bombings 30
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure 0
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident 50
Oil Spills 5
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Terrorist Nuclear Detonation 100
Terrorist Explosive Bombings 60
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure 0
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident 500
Oil Spills 60






Terrorist Nuclear Detonation High
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Low
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Low
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Low
Oil Spills Moderate
Societal and Economic Damage






Terrorist Nuclear Detonation $3B
Terrorist Explosive Bombings $100B
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure $50B
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident $300B
Oil Spills $1B
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Greatest Economic Damages in a Single Event




Anthrax Release $300M- $100B
Terrorist Nuclear Detonation $1T-$10T
Terrorist Explosive Bombings $1B-$40B
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure $100M-$10B
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident $2B-$700B
Oil Spills $4B-$40B
Duration of Economic Damages
Earthquakes Months to Decades
Hurricanes Months to Years
Tornadoes Weeks to Years
Pandemic Influenza Months to Years
Anthrax Release Months
Terrorist Nuclear Detonation Years
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Weeks to Months
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Days to Weeks
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Days to Years
Oil Spills Months to Decades
Size of Area Affected by Economic Damages
Earthquakes County to State
Hurricanes Counties to States
Tornadoes Blocks to Counties
Pandemic Influenza Nation/World
Anthrax Release Neighborhood to City
Terrorist Nuclear Detonation Nation/World
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Less than a Block to City
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Company to Nation
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Blocks to Counties
Oil Spills Counties to States
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Terrorist Nuclear Detonation Moderate
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Low
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Low
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Moderate to High
Oil Spills High
Average Individuals Displaced per Year
Earthquakes 700 - 20,000




Terrorist Nuclear Detonation 100-300,000
Terrorist Explosive Bombings 3-100
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure 0
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident 5,000-200,000
Oil Spills 5
Disruption of Government Operations
Earthquakes Moderate
Hurricanes Moderate to High
Tornadoes Moderate
Pandemic Influenza Moderate to High
Anthrax Release Moderate
Terrorist Nuclear Detonation High
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Low to Moderate
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Moderate to High
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Low
Oil Spills Low
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Terrorist Nuclear Detonation Human-Induced
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Human-Induced
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Human-Induced
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Human-Induced
Oil Spills Human-Induced
Ability of Individual to Control Their Exposure





Terrorist Nuclear Detonation Low
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Low
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Low to Moderate
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Low to Moderate
Oil Spills Moderate
Time Between Exposure and Health Effects
Earthquakes Immediate
Hurricanes Immediate to Years
Tornadoes Immediate
Pandemic Influenza Days
Anthrax Release Days to Weeks
Terrorist Nuclear Detonation Immediate to Decades
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Immediate
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Immediate
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Immediate to Decades
Oil Spills Immediate to Years
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 11 Article 10 (December 2015) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Lundberg &  Willis,  Assessing Homeland Security Risks  19
Quality of Scientific Understanding
Earthquakes High




Terrorist Nuclear Detonation High
Terrorist Explosive Bombings High
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Low to Moderate








Terrorist Nuclear Detonation High
Terrorist Explosive Bombings Moderate
Cyber Attack on Critical Infrastructure Moderate
Toxic Industrial Chemical Accident Low to Moderate
Oil Spills Low
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